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ABSTRACT
TOWARD A CRITICAL ETHIC: HOBBES, KANT, AND NIETZSCHE ONFEELINGS AND FOUNDATIONS
MAY 2002
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Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos
LONG
The texts that play a major role in my dissertation include Hobbes's Leviathan
, Kant's
Groundwork ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals and Critique ofPractical Reason, and
Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil and Toward a Genealogy ofMorals. My research is
situated on the border between ethics and politics because I challenge the belief that
ethical conduct always requires universal laws. The articulation of an ethical sensibility
that is not grounded on a universal law has been one of the thorniest issues in political
theory. Ethical reflection has been unnecessarily trapped between the poles of moral
universalism and/or relativism. Through readings of Hobbes, Kant, and Nietzsche in
reference to foundations and specific human feelings, I demonstrate that the absence of
moral universal does not put an end to ethics but is the condition for a new ethical
sensibility that overcomes the this opposition. A critical ethic confronts the difficulty of
articulating the relationship between ethics and politics in an age of disenchantment.
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CHAPTER 1
TOWARD A CRITICAL ETHIC: HOBBES, KANT, AND NIETZSCHE ON
FEELINGS AND FOUNDATIONS
A. The Necessity and Difficulty of Ethics
Theorizing (he relationship between ethics and politics today, as well arguing for their
interconnection, is difficult. No, only did modern political though, announce the
separation of the spheres of politics and morality bu, countless philosophers declared war
on foundationahsm, universalism, essentialism, humanism, and rationalism. The writings
of Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Weber, Adorno, Derrida, Irigaray, and Foucault (to name
only a few) have so thoroughly interrogated the philosophical tradition that some
commentators have concluded that the Western philosophical is exhausted.' Recent
thinking in the field of political theory has also attacked transcendental foundations and
the tradition of Enlightenment universalism. 2 The targets of this attack include the
For Lacoue-Labarthes, ethics suffers from the "exhaustion of philosophical
possibilities. '' Lacoue-Labarthes, Philippe, Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction ofthe
/ olitical, trans. by Chris Turner, (Cambrigde, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell 1990) 31for Alasdair MacIntyre, "the language of morality is in a state of grave disorder." Alasdair
MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press), 2. 3
Un the words of Judith Butler, foundations have become "a site of permanent political
contest." "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 'Postmodernism "' in
Feminists Theorize the Political, edited by Butler & Scott, (New York: Routledge, 1992) 8.
|
Contingent foundations" can be read as the ethical impasse that is apparent in her essay
"Ethical Ambivalence" in The Turn to Ethics, edited by Garber et. al., (New York:
Routledge, 2000). Butler views the turn to ethics as an escape from politics. Butler has
accepted the colonization of ethics by those who conceive it in depoliticizing ways as
opposed to contesting the domination of ethics and conceiving of it in political terms. For
William E. Connolly, "nothing is fundamental." William E. Connolly, The Ethos of
disembodied subject, self-grounding reason, the possibility of a perspectiveless
standpoint, and universality untainted by power.
The loss of these previous mechanisms of unification has contributed to the
disintegration of bonds of solidarity, insecurity and disorientation, and moral confusion.
In addition, the end of the bi-polar international order; the collapse of both Marxism and
the Soviet Union; the increasing fluidity of borders as a result of globalization; the
decline of the nation-state as the dominant actor in the international arena; the erosion of
the legitimacy of political institutions; the ambiguous status of the United Nations; the
collapse of the distinctions between peace and war, soldier and civilian; the proliferation
of nuclear armaments; the equivocal character of "humanitarian intervention;" media
disinformation campaigns; struggles for the recognition of new identities; the impact of
the internet on social, political, and economic structures; the proliferation of computer,
animal, and human viruses; and cloning has inaugurated an era marked by the feeling of
vulnerability and the phantomalization of everyday life. To say that we are in an era of
"posts" only captures part of the picture. These mutations in our experience of reality
place us between epochs. As we lose sight of the world we have lost the one we are
about to enter defies comprehension. We are "wandering between two worlds, one dead /
Pluralization, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995) 1. Inspired by the work
of Michel Foucault, Connolly has sought to develop ethics without foundations. An ironic
conception of subjectivity and an appeal to ontology de-problematizes the ground that he
renders contestable. Connolly has too quickly abandoned the Kantian imperative tradition.
This issue is discussed in greater detail throughout this study.
2
The other powerless to be bom.- The re-emergence of aggressive modes of nationalism,
fundamentalism, and political extremism can be viewed as reactions to the destruction of
historical markers of stability and the loss of transcendental foundations. It is unclear
how to respond to these new developments and old re-visitations.
One strategy has been to deny moral insecurity and groundlessness. This is clear in the
nostalgic reassertion of God. Tradition, Family, Country, or Nature that we have
witnessed with the rise of the Right and Christian fundamentalism in American politics*
Some strands of Leftist thinking have simply refused to reconstruct ethical foundations
since they believe that they are inescapably implicated in ruses of power, discipline, or
normalization. The retreat of the Left from the sphere of ethics has left us ill-equipped to
respond to the contemporary ethical malaise and moral monopoly of the Right. 5
Although there has been growing interest in the intersection between ethics and politics,
apparent in the recent publication The Turn to Ethics
,
more needs to be done to advance a
viable Leftist ethico-pohtical agenda and to counter the caricature of it as relativistic.
Arnold Matthew, "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse," in The Poetical Works ofMatthew Arnold, edited by Tinker & Lowry (London: Oxford University Press, 1957) 302
4The denial of groundlessness is apparent in Jerry Falwell's "Moral Majority" insofar
as it monopolizes the moral sphere and denies moral insecurity or uncertainty. Precisely
how fanatical this movement is capable of becoming is evident in the claim made by
Falwell that homosexuals are to blame for the WTC attack.
5
Additionally, "political studies suffer from overemphasizing science while paying
insufficient attention to the realm of morals." David Ricci, The Tragedy ofPolitical
Science. Politics, Scholarship, Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984)
3
hedomstic, or incoherent on ethical matters.
6
Many Leftists inspired by post-
structuralism view the turn to ethics as a retreat from politics.’ This is simply no, true
and has made their work an easy target for accusations of irreresponsibility.
Given the collapse of the Enlightenment ideals of progress, rationality, and
emancipation, i, is no, clear wha, it would mean for the Left to develop a non-reactionary
conception of ethico-political citizenship today. For the las, 30 years, some academic
leftists who take the critique of the Enlightenment seriously have been preoccupied with
deconstruction, subversion, laughter, dissonance, and parody as opposed to building
v.able ethico-political alternatives.
8
For Stephen White, the real challenge is "to shift the
intellectual burden...from a preoccupation with what is opposed and deconstructed to an
engagement with what must be articulated, cultivated, and affirmed in its wake."’ Can
I conceive the ethico-political as a space of negotiation, indeterminate inter-
relationahty, paradox, ambtgu.ty, sensitivity, critique, and the suspension of purposive
subjectivity. A space where the absence of absolute ground is affirmed and where citizens
are confronted by competmg imperatives. The possibility of enacting context sensitive
s rategies of engagement are increased when these conditions are met. This is developed ingreater detail throughout this study. p m
7See Mouffe, "Which Ethics for Democracy," and Judith Butler, "Ethical
Ambivalence" in The Turn to Ethics.
See Butler's Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion ofIdentity (New York-
Routledge, 1990). De-naturalizing gender is a good idea but the normative vision of this
text needs to go farther than "subversive laughter": "there is a subversive laughter in the
pastiche-effect of parodic practices in which the original, the authentic, and the real are
themselves constituted as effects"; 146. For another moment of an unhelpful "politics" of
laughter see "Differance" in Derrida's Margins ofPhilosophy, translated by Bass (Chicago
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 27.
9Stephen White, "Weak Ontology and Liberal Political Reflection," Political Theory
Vol. 25 No. 4, August 1997, 506.
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there be ethical limits to thinking and practice that Ho rw • *•B P 6 d° not re-institute the foundations that
have been rendered contestable? Ones that advance a normative vision of a better
collective life? Can the chain connecting moral certainty, impatience with difference, and
rage be broken in order to inaugurate a new moral epoch of generosity, receptivity.
openness, and critical sensitivity?
Inspired by recent developments in post-structuralist thought in order to rethink the
possibility of moral citizenship, these questions situate this study within a growing body
of literature that explores the possibility of ethics without transcendental foundations.
The conception of critical moral citizenship that I develop takes the critique of
subjectivity seriously. For post-structuralists, subjectivity is as an obstacle to a generous
sensibility. I demonstrate how a reformulated conception of the subject, one that
maintains an affirmative relation with the other, can enlarge our sense of ethical
possibility. Usually human feelings are viewed as an obstacle to ethical action, as
potential contaminants that poison rational foundations for conduct. But not all feelings
are the same. As opposed to constituting subjectivity, certain feelings yield a critique of
it insofar as they disrupt its stability and sovereignty, complicate rational foundations for
practice, and open spaces where the other can flourish without sacrificing its singularity.
As paradoxical as this may sound, feelings can both constitute the subject as well as
rupture it.
My assumption is that how we feel has an impact on our capacity to be generous,
receptive, and sensitive. Feelings are often motives for political action; our corporal
5
responses ,o experience condition our conduct. Love and passion, no, knowledge, lead to
action. In contras, to the claims made by scholars who defend the cognitive content of
morality, feelings do not necessarily destroy the capacity for rational action bu,
destabilize the ground for conduct in ways that promote critical reflexiveness. My turn to
feelings is not a retreat into subjectivity to escape structural problems, but a strategy to
explore how transformations in the subject can raise the stakes of ethico-political
engagement.
To a large extent, how we feel is learned. Like Pavlov's dog, human's salivate
emotionally in response to social scripts. During times when political regimes need the
support of the populace, citizens are manipulated through the use of emotionally charged
symbols (i.e. the flag). In extreme cases, emotions can be used to create passive subjects
incapable of challenging the status quo: "one of the essential ingredients in fascism is
emotion ...and this emotion always joins itself to concepts:'"
1
There are also feelings that
fall outside all projects of stabilization, threaten the borders of atomized subjects, widen
human sensibility, and create disruptive citizens."
In the search to locate abstract rules for conduct, moral feelings are given short shrift
by universalis,ic theories of moral conduct. 12 But moral conduct always involves
I
“Lacoue-Labarthes and Nancy, "The Nazi Myth," translated by Brian Holmes
Critical Inquiry, Vol. 16, 1990, 294.
IIAs for the disruptive citizen par excellence, I am thinking of Socrates even if he
tailed to adequately cultivate his aesthetic-affective dimensions.
Benhabib maintains that "A major weakness of cognitive and proceduralist ethical
thinkers since Kant...has been the reductionist treatment of the emotions and affects "
6
competing imperatives. Strictly rational plans for action pay insufficient attenfion to the
complexity and plura.ity of human attachments. As Martha Nussbaum puts it. "intellect
without emotions i,..value blind - But in contras, to Nussbaum's rehabilitation of pity
and compassion, I defend moral feelings tha, may a, firs, glance seem like unlikely
cand,dates (i.e, anxiety) and argue that they should be permanent features of all
democratic societies. 14 Feelings are just as important as moral imperatives and
overdosing on one or the other is no, only dangerous but renders an incomplete image of
moral conduct's motivational complexity.
My specific strategy for developing an approach to ethics attuned to the importance of
imperatives as well aesthetic-affective dimensions of experience connects three of the
most famous modern political thinkers with post-structuralism and recent research on
feelings/emotions. Going back to the tradition of political thought in order to reread and
rethink moments where spaces are opened for new conceptions of subjectivity and ethical
citizenship is the subtext of each chapter of this study. Through readings of Hobbes,
Kant, and Nietzsche that are motivated by the necessity of criticizing the present, 1 show
that the complications in transcendental foundations (Reason, universality, the Subject,
common sense, Nature, Nation, or God as the source of meaning and value) do not
Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender
,
Community and Postmodernity in Contemporary
Ethics, (New York, Routledge, 1992), 49.
13Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston-
Beacon Press, 1995) 68.
14 For Nussbaum's discussion of compassion see "Compassion: The Basic Social
Emotion" Social Philosophy & Policy, Vol. 13 No. 1, 1996.
7
annihilate the possibility of an ethical sensibility, but are the enabling conditions for one
conceived otherwise; one not rooted in virtue, rules, norms, natural laws, anthropology,
utilitarianism, teleology, or consequentialism; but one "grounded" on the withdrawal of
these grounds. Withdrawing these grounds frees ethical conduct from the inflexibility of
rules and norms and opens spaces for generous and context-sensitive responses to moral
dilemmas.
B. Strategies of Negotiation
Responses to philosophical disillusionment, cosmic disenchantment, the retreat of the
gods, the lack of intrinsic purpose in the world, and moral skepticism have emerged from
a wide variety of quarters in the academy. Although their motivations are not identical,
advocates of liberalism (Rawls, Dworkin, Kymlicka), communitarianism (MacIntyre,
Sandel, Taylor, Walzer), discourse ethics (Habermas, Apel, Benhabib),' 5 radical plural
democracy (Laclau and Mouffe), and post-structuralism (Derrida) have attempted to
develop defensible conceptions of moral citizenship.
Grounded in the work of social contract theory and Kant's philosophy of right, liberals
advocate individual rights, the rule of law, public versus private, constitutionalism, and
institutional safeguards for the protection of individual liberty and equality. Liberals
perpetuate the modem breach between politics and ethics by restricting difficult
philosophical and religious questions that could arouse passionate debate to the private
15Benhabib has opened up Habermas's thinking in promising ways. Although she
preserves his notion of interactive universalism, she combines it with an awareness of
gender and sensitivity to context. See Situating the Self.
8
realm. The state is a neutral arbiter and offers neutral guidelines to resolve conflicts
when competing moral views come into conflict. 16 Deep moral dilemmas are better left
in the private sphere because liberals fear conflict triggered by debate over competing
conceptions of the good. Liberals want to protect individuals from totalizing, exclusive,
and violent definitions of the good life that are likely ,o result from state interference in
these matters. Bu, the liberal fear of conflict (even in its healthy versions) has tmpeded
public discussion. It has retarded the moral development of citizens that could result
from encounters with individuals with competing perspectives. It is not difficult to
interpret liberal tolerance, moreover, as a strategy of non-engagement. Getting
presuppositions and fundamental assumptions out into the open can also unsettle their
unjustifiable dimensions in ways that render the appearance and/or resurgence of
fundamentalism less likely. Liberalism fails to confront the most serious problems facing
democratic societies.
Communitarians protest against both the fundamental assumptions and the normative
vision of the liberal model of politics. Inspired by the work of Aristotle, Machiavellli,
Rousseau, Jefferson, and Arendt, communitarians view the liberal conception of the
person as legalistic and narrow and emphasize the necessity of an active citizenry bound
to notions ot the common good, tradition, communal identity, and recognition for the
success of democratic political life. Although they tend to be non-foundationalists.
16Many critics have claimed that the liberal ideal of a neutral state is a sign of the fear
of power and conflict. See Chantal Mouffe, The Return ofthe Political
,
(London - Verso
1993 ).
9
communitarians seek ground in tradilion or a vision ofcommunity conceived as the
partaking ofcommon substance and see liberal ideals as a threat to collective culture and
identity. Hence a nostalgia for a lost morality/community permeates throughout this
viewpoint. Although the concept of citizenship is more expansive than the liberal
alternative, an ethical deficit is apparent in terms of the demand for consensus, the
primacy of the collectivity, the possible unwillingness of the community to accept modes
of difference that challenge its commonality, the absence of space for deviants, and the
potentially complacent acceptance of tradition.
Another response to the crisis in transcendental foundations and the problem of moral
citizenship has been articulated by advocates of "discourse ethics" and can be situated
somewhere between the liberal and communitarian models. Habermas, the chief
formulator of this perspective, takes the challenge of developing post-Enlightenment
conceptions of reason and morality seriously. A second generation member of the
1 rankfurt School, he has attempted to reconstruct transcendental philosophy on universal-
pragmatic grounds without falling back into traditional foundationalism. Central to this
position is the idea of intersubjcctive communicative rationality as opposed to a
conception of reason grounded on the isolated subject. For I labermas, communicative
rationality is freed from coercion/power, has explicit rules and norms of competence,
pursues consensus/understanding, publicity, and institutionally secured political action. 17
1 ;Habermas has a stringent definition of argumentation: "a practice may not
seriously count as argumentation unless it meets certain pragmatic presuppositions. The
four most important presuppositions are: (a) publicity and inclusivcness: no one who could
make a relevant contribution with regard to a controversial validity claim must be excluded;
10
Language in his famous "ideal-speech situation” is conceived as neutral, transparent, and
an ahistorical vehicle of communication. The goal is a "universalism that is highly
sensitive to differences .” 18 A worthy goal.
Habermas's fundamental presuppositions about the ahistorical and transparent nature of
language are difficult to accept. Language is often unintentionally deceptive; words have
multiple meanings. In addition, his conception of discussion casts serious doubt on his
effort to reach a universalism sensitive to differences. Habermas fails to acknowledge
how his own rules of argumentation might be implicated in an act of power .' 9
Disagreement is always possible in this model so long as Habermas's basic assumptions
about argumentation are not questioned. Critics who use reason to criticize reason
succumb to a "performative contradiction." On this point, there is a lack of flexibility and
generosity in Habermas's thinking. Acknowledging the interconnection between reason
and power does not necessarily mean collapsing the distinction altogether and rejecting
modernity. Although Habermas has made a significant contribution to developing a post-
(b) equal rights to engage in communication: everyone must have the same opportunity to
speak to the matter at hand; (c) exclusion of deception and illusion: participants have to
mean what they say; and (d) absence of coercion: communication must be free of
restrictions that prevent the better argument from being raised or from determining the
outcome of the discussion." "From Kant's ’Ideas" of Pure Reason to the 'Idealizing'
Presuppositions of Communicative Action: Reflections on the Detranscendentalized 'Use of
Reason' in Pluralism and the Pragmatic Turn: The Transformation ofCritical Theory
,
edited by Rehg & Bohman, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001) 34.
18Habermas, The Inclusion ofthe Other: Studies in Political Theory, edited by Cronin
and De Greiff, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998) xxxv.
1
9
I doubt that there is space for someone like Socrates in Habermas’s model.
11
Enlightenment conception of reason and morality, he is inattentive to power and
overestimates the capacity of reasoned argument to reach a consensus on moral
dilemmas. 20
If an impatience with passionate argument (liberals), deviatton from communal norms
(communitarians), and linguistic ambiguity/the inescapabili.y of power (discourse ethics)
unites liberals, communitarians, and advocates of discourse ethics, the work of
Laclau/Mouffe stands in sharp contrast. Driven by the effort to rejuvenate and
reformulate the Leftist project in the wake of the collapse of Marxism, they reconceive
democratic politics in non-foundationalist and anti-essentialist terms. Laclau/Mouffe
emphasize the inescapability of power, conflict, contingency, antagonism, pluralism and
the importance of a hegemonic articulation capable of uniting the "green," "pink," and
"red" Lefts. A hegemonic articulation refers to the following fact: "the absent fullness of
the structure has to be represented /misrepresented by one of its particular contents. This
relation by which a particular element assumes the impossible task of universal
representation, is what I call a hegemonic relation." 21 For these anti-utopian political
realists, the dream of consensus untainted by power is a symptom of the liberal evasion of
the political.
But where is the ethical dimension to the Leftist hegemonic articulation?
20As the lives of Socrates, Martin Luther King and countless others illustrates,
persecution or worse usually awaits individuals who attack widely accepted modes of
stupidity or dedicate their lives to exposing political hypocrisy.
Laclau, Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony," in Deconstruction and
Pragmatism, (New York: Routledge, 1996), 59.
12
Laclau/Mouffe claim that they seek to re-establish the lost connection between ethics and
politics but exactly how far they can go in this direction is mitigated by their conception
of politics conceived as conflict between friends and enemies. These battles demand
homogenization or, in the words of Mouffe, "equivalent articulations," between the
claims of diverse groups. 22 Although Mouffe asserts that "equivalence does not eliminate
difference" it is not clear how this magic trick can succeed. 23 Once their conception of
politics conceived on Schmitt’s friend/enemy axis is brought into play, the ethical deficit
becomes even more apparent: "every definition of a 'we' implies the delimitation of a
frontier and the designation of a 'them'... all forms of consensus are by necessity based on
acts of exclusion." 24 Although they are correct to challenge the Rawlsian and
Habermasian conception of consensus politics, they rule out in advance strategies of
negotiation that are not premised on oppositions.
Laclau and Mouffe conceive politics as the construction of a Leftist collective identity
that is destined for irrational conflict with its enemy in its effort to hegemonize the social
sphere. But this risks the homogenization of differences and could even destroy spaces
for engaging the other in terms other than a simplistic opposition between "us" and
"them." There seems to be little space in this model for relating to the other as an
indeterminate other. Laclau and Mouffe's conception of politics has yet to be fused with
2
2
Mouffe, "Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community," in Dimensions of
Radical Democracy, (London: Verso, 1992), 230.
23Mouffe, The Return ofthe Political, 84.
24 Mouffe, "Feminism and Radical Politics," in Feminists Theorize the Political, 379.
13
adequate ethical limits.
This last point serves as an important point of contrast with the post-structuralism of
Derrida. Influenced by the writings of Nietzsche, Freud, Husserl, and Heidegger, he
seeks to provoke a crisis in the foundations of Western philosophy through the
deconstruction of metaphysical binary oppositions. Driven by a deep responsibility to the
other, he locates aporias within canonical philosophical texts that disrupt foundational
metaphysical oppositions (nature/culture; reason/madness; sense/non-sensense). Over the
last 20 years, Derrida has taken his critique of philosophical texts in explicitly ethical and
political directions. For Derrida, the qualitative relation with the non-phenomenal other
is both the essence ofjustice and the constitutive moment of politics. As opposed to the
Hegelian liquidation of difference into a higher unity, he maintains that difference is
irreducible; contamination characterizes all relations between self and other and renders
self-identity impossible.
Derrida constructs new concepts that embody difference, paradox, and impossibility in
order to transform human consciousness in ways that prevent thinking from assuming
totalizing or homogenizing forms. The spaces left open in these these "undecidables" or,
double contradictory imperatives, increase responsiveness to the other. Cognitive
imperialism is held back and the messianic other is not forced to present itself in ways
that efface its radical singularity.
Derrida has opened new avenues for thinking about political and ethical foundations
that foreground justice as the relation with the other. Of the "strategies of negotiation"
14
.ha. , have considered here (liberalism, communifarianism, d.scourse ethics, radical/p.ura,
democracy, and pos.-struc.uralism), Derrida's version of post-structuralism is the best
available option for cultivating a generous sensitivity t0 the other without lapsing back
into fundamentalism. 25 The tension that he creates between ethics and politics creates
opportunities for rethinking their interrelationship that go beyond the shortcomings of the
other approaches. Many unsympathetic critics of deconstruction have missed his effort to
resignify the ethico-political and the affirmation of the other that is the fundamental
motivation driving some of his most recent work.
C. Ethics "Without" Foundations
Political theorists usually battle over the interpretation of a limited number of key
texts. The three core chapters of this study resist both the liberal appropriation of Hobbes
and Kant as well as the postmodemization of Nietzsche in order to locate a middle
position that can serve as an ethico-political alternative to currently available options. In
the chapter titled "Politics and Anxiety in Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan ," I show that he is
not a mechanical rationalist or an early liberal thinker but a philosopher who can be
mobilized for a non-reductive conception of politics and an expansive notion of
subjectivity. Although Hobbes may be the father of the fearful subject he also gave birth
to one that is haunted by the suspension of her identity in anxiety. Fearful subjects are
2 5
Infused by a sympathetic reading of discourse ethics, Stephen White's "weak
ontology" represents another possibility. See "Weak Ontology and Liberal Political
Reflection," Political Theory
,
Vol. 25, No. 4, August 1997.
15
closed to the possibility of experience; anxious ones still have a chance of relating to the
other in ways that respect its dignity and singularity. Replacing the connection between
politics and fear with a politics/anxiety model suspends self-preservation as the telos of
the Commonwealth and opens the future to productive modes of ethico-political
indeterminacy. Hobbesian anxiety emerges as a feeling that we should cultivate in proper
doses.
In Kant and the Paradox of Respect," I show that it is an over-simplification to label
him an abstract transcendentalist, liberal theoretician, or advocate of sovereign
subjectivity. In my rendering, Kant simultaneously lays and takes away the ground for
morality; the ground oscillates and the moral agent is overtaken by the self-effected and
paradoxical feeling/non-feeling of respect. And as opposed to constituting subjectivity,
respect frustrates the subject's attempts at self-grounding and brings him face to face with
the problem of acting in ways compatible with radical freedom. Respect also blurs the
sharp opposition between the noumenal and phenomenal realms and opens a space for the
possibility of a non-appropriative relation with the other. A subject overtaken by respect,
finally, becomes a moral citizen and is less likely to panic, retreat, or retrench during
encounters with the other.
In the chapter titled "Nietzsche's Ethic of Singularity," I show that Nietzsche is not a
proponent of nihilism, subjectivism, or the "will to power." Rather, he presents the
annihilation of transcendental foundations as the destiny of Western metaphysics and
seeks to perpetuate the crisis in meaning and subjectivity in the paradoxical ethical
16
feeling called '•pathos of distance." The individual who is overtaken by this feeling lets
go of the will to meaning, affirms the law of life, overcomes the tendency to vent
reSSmlimem °n °therS 38 3 reSU" °f rneaninglessness of suffer,ng, and celebrates the
other when it appears in its disturbing or threatening modes. She is free and autonomous;
she risks herself in non-ins,rumental encounters with unknown others. Breaking the link
between ressentiment and politics and putting the pathos of distance in its place re-
establishes the link with ethics. It also gives birth to the citizen of the future, or what
Nietzsche calls, the "genius ofjustice."
Taken together, the feelings that I bring into critical view do not call for therapy or
medicahzation but serve as ethico-political conditions of possibility for justice and
positive models ofrelationality with the other. The cultivation of anxiety, respect, and
the pathos of distance enable us to loosen our grip from transcendental security. It will be
demonstrated that they are the preconditions for affirming the loss of absolute
metaphysical foundations (as well as one of the possible responses to this fact) and do not
necessarily produce a reflex that violates this groundlessness
.
26 A critical ethic affirms
groundlessness and contingency and promotes practices that remain within the limits
prescribed by this condition. My research removes ethics from those grounds/reasons
" 6What is commonly coined "road rage" is a current example of a pathological reflex.
The perception of a wrong between drivers of automobiles produces a hyper-reaction —
rage. Often, this opens an unending series of pathological violations and barbaric counter-
violations. This study will articulate the conditions for practices and imperatives that
elevate the human above the pathological reflex. For this reason, I make distinctions
between various feelings and I valorize those feelings that can be motives for practices that
are simultaneously receptive to otherness and critical of acts of contempt for
groundlessness.
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ha, are posited in a zone immune ,o fundamental interrogation, ones that represent
unlawful overextensions of reason, and resituates ethics a permanent realm of paradox.
Specific feelings linked to the experience of radical freedom move ethical reflection
beyond the opposition (or stalemate) between universalism and relativism.
D. "Feeling"
My interest in feeling does no, represent a jump into the irrational or mystical in order
to flee from the Western tradition. Philosophical disillusionment with Enlightenment
reason did result in leaps into the "irrational," appeals to "lived experience [Erlebnis],"
and the search to recover a sense of lost "immediacy." 2’ In contrast, I invoke feeling in
this study to mark the interruption and suspension of representational thought and the
problematization of conceptuality as opposed to its rejection.
The meaning of the word feeling is overdetermined. Historically, there have been
multiple designations for feelings including passions, emotions, sensibility, sentiments,
sensation, moods, affects, appetites, and physical stimuli. The ambiguity and complexity
inherent to this word is clear in a dictionary definition:
Feeling n (12c) la (1) : the one of the basic physical senses of which the skin
contains the chief end organs and of which the sensations of touch and
temperature are characteristic : TOUCH (2) a sensation experienced through this
sense b
: generalized bodily consciousness or sensation c : appreciative or
responsive awareness or recognition 2 a : an emotional state or reaction b pi:
susceptibility to impression : 3 a : the undifferentiated background of one's
awareness considered apart from any identifiable sensation, perception, or thought
b : the overall quality of one's awareness c : conscious recognition : SENSE 4 a :
often unreasoned opinion or belief : SENTIMENT b : PRESENTIMENT 5 :
capacity to respond emotionally esp. with the higher emotions 6 : the character
27
Lebensphilosophie focuses on the "concrete" and "lived" elements of experience and life.
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ascribed to something : ATMOSPHERE 7 a : the quality of a work of art thatconveys the emot.on of the artist b: sympathetic aesthetic response 8: FEEL*
According to this definition, feeling involves sense, sensation, touch, awareness,
reactivity, aesthetics, consciousness, emotion, the absence of agency, receptivity,
irrationality, and subjectivity. Although I doubt that it would be possible to accomplish it
in any meaningful way, it is not the purpose of this study to define feeling but to make a
distinction between feelings that liberate humans from determination (what I call
citizenship, or what Kant calls moral autonomy) and those sensations that constitute
subjects and foreclose ethical practice (what Nietzsche calls the feeling of ressentiment,
or what Hobbes calls fear). In the specific chapters of this study, I try to preserve the
historical specificity and shades of meaning between competing designations for visceral
experience in Hobbes, Kant, and Nietzsche. But, in the final one, I generalize about
feeling in ways that permit overcoming the conceptual paralysis inherent to overly
historicist orientations in order to draw conclusions about new possibilities for ethics,
politics, and democratic citizenship.
E. A Brief History of Feeling
The concept of feeling (if it is one) has proved to be one of the most abused, dismissed,
or overlooked categories in the tradition of political thought. 29 Whatever the word feeling
28Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, tenth edition, (Springfield
Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 1999), 427.
29
Feeling/emotion has been conceived of as irrational (Habermas/Rawls); subjectivist
(MacIntyre); rational (Nussbaum); hedonistic (Christianity); non-subjectivist (Terada).
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may mean, it is always something that cannot be completely thought.’" Perhaps this may
account for philosophy's low valuation, if not rancor, against feeling. Feelings are the
enemies of clear thinking, reason, order, stability, reliability, and self-mastery. For this
reason, feeling is charged with treason in the court of philosophy and stands guilty as
charged because it cannot give an adequate account of itself. If feelings are to remain in
the polls, they must accept their subordinate status. But in privileging what is clear,
measurable, and determinate, philosophers have built their cognitive empires on the
denigration of what their language is incapable of grasping or defining. The repression of
the margin, however, always comes back to haunt the repressor.
The marginal value accorded to feelings goes back at least to the foundations of
classical political thought that inaugurated the opposition between reason and feeling, the
former the master of the latter
.
31 A low valuation of the passions or feeling can be found,
for example, in Plato's Republic where he claims that the guardians must subordinate
their feelings to reason. That is why Plato bans the flute and multi-stringed instruments
from his ideal polis. They tend to disturb the harmony of the soul that reason is supposed
to master. Even though feeling plays a special role at precise moments in his thought,
30The Greek word aisthesis means perception or sensation. It is contrasted by
Parmenides with episteme. The result of the complete collapse of the aesthetic with the
ethical would produce relativism. When ethics is a question of knowledge it becomes
mechanical or dogmatic. A critical ethics is strategically related to both the universality
implied in knowledge and the particularity implied by the word aesthetic.
3 Perhaps it could go back even further where the steadiness of Adam's will is
overtaken by the alluring charm of Eve's passion. Or even further still, when Eve is
seduced by the charms of the reptile.
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Plato nonetheless establishes an oppositional structure between reason and feeling, and
values the former as opposed to the latter. 32
Plato's low valuation of the feelings was probably inherited by his student Aristotle. In
the Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses the relation between rhetoric and the emotions:
"things
do not seem the same to those who love and those who hate, nor to those who are angry
and those who are calm."” Our emotional state has an impact on the way we perceive
that world. But Aristotle restricts the par, of rhetoric that deals with emotions to the
realm ofjudgment. Feelings remain merely tools that are mastered by reason* In the
Nicomachea* Ethics, Aristotle defines feelings as "appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy,
joy, love, hate, longing, emulation, pity, and in general things accompanied by pleasure
b hr°'rr
r lnterest for thls study is *e following moment in the first book of Plato'sWh,le under Socrates's scalpel, Thrasymachus blushes: "Thrasymachus agreed
o all this, not easily as I'm telling it, but reluctantly, with toil, trouble, and - since it wassummer - a quantity of sweat that was a wonder to behold. And then I saw something I'dnever seen before -- Thrasymachus blushing." See Plato, Republic, translated by Grube
( ndianapohs: Hackett Press, 1992), 350 c,d. Is it coirect to say that Thrasymachus
blushed? As self-contradictory as this may sound, he was the object, not the subject, of hisown blushing, of his own displacement. Thrasymachus registered the breakdown of the
representation of his own self-identity. Or, the image of his own self-coherence was short-
circuited His face and body spoke a non-verbal language in spite of himself or preciselv
because he tried to maintain his identity and coherence even after it was ruptured by
Socrates. Plato could not give a better example of the absence of Thrasymachus's self-
mastery. If it can be said that the experience called blushing exceeded Thrasymachus's
intentions, perhaps we could see in this unforgettable moment the announcement of his
suspension. He was stuck between the poles of self-mastery and the tyranny of his own
passions.
141.
3 3
Aristotle, Rhetoric
,
translated by Lawson-Tancred (New York: Penguin. 1991),
In the lessor known text by Aristotle, De Anima, he claims that sensation is always
of particulars. (Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1996), 52.
21
or pain." Nothing less than the possibility of a polls grounded on reason
the distinction between reason and feeling: "feelings seem to yield not to
is at stake in
argument but to
force. " 6 Aristotle maintains that "if someone were to live by his feelings he would not
listen to an argument to dissuade him, nor could he even understand it..." Without a
rational foundation for politics, it seems, human life would be impossible to distinguish
from animality. 37
1 he status ol feeling has undergone a dramatic metamorphosis in modern political
thought. In the 1 8th and 1 9th centuries, there was a growing interest in feeling that could
be traced back to Descartes in the 1 7th. Descartes privileged the self-identity seeking
activity of the cogilo, or the subject that grounds itself in its own reflection and
establishes its own certitude. The turn inward (cogilo ergo sum) would constitute the
modern subject. And with it the body had a new significance as an object of inquiry.
This may explain the centrality of the body in his last book. The Passions ofthe Soul.
even if he sought to distinguish the passions of the soul from the body as such, thus
perpetuating the classical opposition. 38 His opening words about the quality of the
3
5
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 28.
36Nicomachean Ethics, 200. In the Poetics, he discusses how tragedy reduces
feelings (Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1998), 43.
3 7The Stoics also viewed feelings or the passions as disruptive of individual
autonomy and sought to purge them from human life for the sake of self-mastery. Right
action is completely freed from passion.
3 8
Descartes, The Passions ofthe Soul, translated by Voss (Indianapolis: Hackett
Press, 1989). The passion ol wonder, in particular, would be worthy of more investigation
22
discourse on the passions is nevertheless noteworthy: "The defectiveness of the sciences
we tnheri, from the ancients is nowhere more apparent than in what they wrote about the
Passions.” 39 Even though Descartes sought to overcome the limits inherited from the
ancients, and even though the distinction between feeling and reason is partially blurred
in his conception of "animal spirits" and the material location of the immateriality of the
soul in the "pineal gland," he nonetheless promotes the subjective mastery of the passions
that constitute the mind/body dualism that he provisionally put into question. Cognition
would remain primary, feelings secondary. They needed to be subdued, controlled, or
even eradicated. 411 Descartes's text on the passions nevertheless marked a Copernican turn
that created a new space for an analysis of feeling.
Unlike Descartes, Machiavelli and Hobbes were the first major political thinkers who
gave decisive importance to the relationship between feelings/passions and political
order. The human body would become a space for social and political transcription. For
Machiavelli, the strategic manipulation of love and fear in the groundless world of
politics were central to the prince's attempt to keep his keep his grip on power. 41 That
For Descartes, wonder is the first of all the passions and has no opposite. Descartes also
has a provocative definition of respect; Veneration, or Respect, is an inclination of the
soul not only to esteem the object it reveres but also to submit to it with a certain
apprehension, in order to try to render it propitious”; 109.
39Passions ofthe Soul, 1 8.
40
Descartes's relation to Hobbes is important in this regard. Hobbes's sought to
manage the passions, even if he viewed their total eradication as an impossibility. The
Commonwealth would always, it seems, float slightly above them.
4
Machiavelli, The Prince, translated by Bull, (New York: Penguin, 1981).
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Hobbes viewed ihe relarionship between passion and po.itics as inextricable was probably
the result of his experiences during the social breakdown in ,7th century England. Given
this context, i, is not surprising that Hobbes identif.ed fear and anxiety as the political
feelings par excellence. How they were managed had a massive impact on public order.
Stimulating fear and quelling anxiety constituted subjects, kept them in their place, and
reinforced the necessity of centralized power. Hobbes accepted the fallen status of the
subject; no elevation or moral improvement was possible through the feelings. Feelings
were nonetheless the condition of possibility of the Commonwealth as well as the source
of its potential rupture. Even if they could pose problems, passions and feelings became
a permanent feature of political life. 42
With Kant the status of feelings underwent a decisive shift, apparent in his Critique of
Judgment
,
insofar as he granted philosophical legitimacy to the investigation of human
feelings - the sublime and the beautiful - and he went so far as to connect the feeling of
the sublime to moral concepts. 43 But feelings in Kant nevertheless remained on the edges
See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).The problem of governing the passions occupies a central place in the Federalist Papers
Passions could be diffused through their dispersal in a large space {Federalist 10) and their
harmful effects neutralized through their reciprocal cancellation {Federalist 51 ). The
Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay (New York: Bantam
Books, 1982). For a discussion of the relationship between liberalism and passion see
Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory ofLiberal Democracy (Chicago-
University of Chicago Press, 1995); see also Albert Hirschman's The Passions and the
Interests. Political Argumentsfor Capitalism Before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1 977) and The Soft Underbelly ofReason: The Passions in the
Seventeenth Century, edited by Gaukroger (Routledge: New York, 1988).
4 3Kant, Critique ofJudgment, translated by Pluhar, (Indianapolis: Hackett Press,
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Ol his thought, as something he struggled to incorporate into his thinking. This is
apparent in the complicated and paradoxical feeling/non-feeling of respect:.** But at times
the peculiar philosophical rancor against the feelings appears even in Kant. Feelings
interrupt the sovereignty of reason and threaten i, with an incurable disease. In the third
book of the Anthropologyfrom a Pragmatic Point of View called “On the Faculty of
Desire," he distinguishes passion from emotion. The emotions are "honorable and
unconcealed" but passions are "cancerous tumors" for pure practical reason” Kant
nevertheless pushed the thinking of feeling further than any prior philosopher insofar as
he broke the clear opposition between reason and feeling. More importantly, he
demonstrated how and under what conditions the intermingling between them is not only
possible but how the human can be morally improved through their interconnection.*6
Nietzsche marks another decisive shift in the legitimacy accorded to drives and
feelings in philosophical quarters and goes further than Kant in important ways.” Like
“Kant was influenced by the moral sense theory of Shaftesbury and Hutscheson.
,
"^nt ,^Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View, translated by Dowdell(Uarbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 157, 173.
4b
Friedrich Schiller's Ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen sought to
revise Kant's transcendental idealism and reconcile the noumenal and phenomenal
components of the human. Schiller, Ueber die aethetische Erziehung des Menschen
,
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000). For a useful discussion of this text see Jane Bennett's The
Enchantment ofModern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001) 138-44.
^Heidegger would probably be the next German philosopher in this chain. For him,
the moods of the subject, including anxiety and boredom, play a decisive role in his thought
in Being and Time
,
translated by Maquarrie and Robinson (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1962). For Heidegger, the experience of fmitude produces the feeling of
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Kant who sought to restrain the imperialistic drives of reason through feeling, Nietzsche's
appeal to feeling is also a complex strategy. In his famous "On Truth and Lies in an
Extra-Moral Sense" and in many of his other writings, he sought to frustrate the
opposition between cognition and feeling.*' This was a declaration of war on the
philosophical oppositions that ground the emergence of the conceptual world, opposihons
that Kant for the most part left intact. In contrast to him, Nietzsche rearranges and
interrupts the dominant Western philosophical discourse on feeling in ways that have a
profound impact on his ethics.
More recent studies of feeling/emotions/affects have proliferated in a wide range of
fields including psychology, philosophy, cognitive science, anthropology, and political
theory. But most of these studies seek to assign feelings/emotions a cognitive status or
see them as a threat to ethics instead of viewing them as an essential component of ethical
practice. 4" Martha Nussbaum's recent book, Upheavals of Though,: The Intelligence of
Emotions, is indebted to recent work on emotions, but precisely how emotions provoke
anxiety.
4 8 See Philosophy and Truth: Selectionsfrom Nietzshe's Notebooks ofthe Early
1870's, edited and translated by Breazeale (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities
Press International, Inc, 1993).
49See Explaining Emotions, edited by Amelie Oksenburg Rorty (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1980) with contributions by Averill, Baier, Blum, de Sousa, Ekman,
Greenspan, Isenberg, MacLean, Marshall, Matthews, Morton, Neu, Rey, Rorty,’ Scruton,
Solomon, Stocker, Taylor, Tov-Ruach, Wollheim. See Rei Terada, Feeling in Theory: ’
Emotion after the "Death ofthe Subject, "(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) for
a discussion of some of these authors.
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an "upheaval" of thought remains a question » She purges undecidability and uncertainty
out of emotions for the sake of compiete cognitton. in her effort to deveiop a "cognitive
evaluative" view of the emotions, she comes close to turning emotions into thoughts.
Nussbaum's work does more to perpetuate reason's mastery of feeling than it does to
challenge it.
Alasdair MacIntyre maintains that any intermingling between emotion and ethics
undermines the possibility of the latter. He went so far as to link emotivism to relativism
in After Virtue. Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and moral
judgments are nothing but expressions of subjective preference, attitude, or feeling. In
the world that circulates around the preferences of the subject, morality is impossible. In
contrast to both Nussbaum and MacIntyre’s work, Rei Terada’s recent study Feeling in
Theory: Emotion after the "Death ofthe Subject" develops and defends a post-
structuralist theory of the emotions and provides an important point of support for my
study. Terada’s work is valuable because it takes emotion out of discourses of
intentionality. For Terada, "destroying the illusion of subjectivity does not destroy
emotion. My study builds on Terada’s work in order to explore the relationship
between a non-reductionist approach to feeling and ethico-political practice. 52
50Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals ofThought: The Intelligence ofEmotions.
(Cambridge: Cambrigde University Press, 2001).
51
Terada, 157. She does not explore the political or ethical implications of this
insight.
52 Sea also Language and Politics ofEmotion, edited by Lutz and Abu-Lughod
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) for a discussion of the ways in which
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In addition to the growing theoretical curiosity in the hunran body, an interest in the
type of analysis I initiate in this study can be sighted in the field of pohtical theory .»
Chantal Mouffe, while discussing political theorists seeking moral consensus through
rational discussion, suggests that "the prime task of democrat politics is not, as
deliberative democrats argue, to eliminate passions or to relegate them to the private
sphere in order to establish rational consensus in the public sphere. I, is to mobilize those
passions toward democratic designs - But as I pointed ou, earlier, Mouffe has yet to see
the connection between ethics and politics as indispensable. In The Inclusion ofthe
Oihcr, Habermas states: "the critical and self-critical stances we adopt toward
transgressions find expression in affective attitudes."” But he nonetheless views these
altect.ve attitudes as a basis too narrow for social solidarity. In his effort to defend the
rational content of morality, Habermas pays insufficient attention to the connection
between moral sentiments and universal codes for conduct. In his recent text intended to
revitalize the American Left, Rorty asserts that "emotional involvement with one's
country.. .is necessary if political deliberation is to be imaginative and productive." 56 Like
emotions are connected to politics and how the medicalization of emotions only treats
symptoms and denies context. J
See Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex " (New
York: Routledge, 1993).
J K
5 4 Mouffe, "Which Ethics for Democracy?" in The Turn to Ethics
, 92.
5 5Habermas, The Inclusion ofthe Other
,
4.
56
Rorty, Achieving Our Country,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 3.
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most liberals, Rorty uncritically accepts the distinction between public and private and
seeks to keep the dtscusston of difficult philosophical questions opened by Nietzsche and
Others in the private realm. His complacent liberalism discourages thmking about new
ethical and political possibilities inspired by post-structuralism.
There has been a growing interest in feelings among political theorists but most of
them have yet to see an adequate way to connect feelings and ethics. Influenced by the
research of Michel Foucault and others, Connolly’s emphasis on the "ethical importance
of engaging the visceral register of subjectivity and intersubjectivity" has opened up new
spaces for thinking about the connections between ethics, politics and feeling in ways that
go beyond the shortcomings of Mouffe, Habermas, Nussbaum, MacIntyre, and Rorty.”
He seeks to find a middle position between command and teleological conceptions of
morality, one that is attentive to the visceral dimension of experience. My research is
influenced by Connolly's but ultimately diverges from it. Connolly's phenomenological
pluralism privileges the appearance of coherent identities as opposed to leaving spaces
open for modes of being that exceed identity formations, recognition, or
conceptualization altogether. More significantly, the specific modes of feeling Connolly
promotes including "agonistic respect" are under-specified. And as I will discuss in
greater detail in Chapter 3, he gives up on the imperative ethical tradition. As a result, his
work becomes hard to distinguish from relativism. I seek to go further than Connolly’s
5 7 See Connolly's Why IAm Not a Secularist, 15; Jane Bennett's The Enchantment of
Modern Life, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) also falls here. See especially
her "ethic of enchanted materialism" (157).
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work and mobilize Derrida to connect specific feeling
on radical freedom.
s to an imperative ethics grounded
It IS important for political theorists to take feelings/emotions/passions seriously
because they are inescapable features of political life and permit us to have a more
complex understanding of it. Feelings can be manipulated and abused by regimes
seeking the support of subjects for aggressive external ventures or for disciplinary action
against internal dissent. But they can also cause the destabilization of these same regimes
and serve as conditions of possibility for ethieo-political citizenship. What and how we
feel determines our capacity for generosity, receptivity, and patience; what we feel
conditions our attachments and our loyalties and for these reasons can produce a more
complex conception of the motivational complexity undergirding a dynamic ethical and
political life. The human may try to rule his animality, and to some extent he should, but
he nonetheless remains an animal. The following chapters demonstrate how a
reconceptualization of the relationship between feelings and the ethico-political can help
us rethink what it means to be both animals and citizens.
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CHAPTER 2
POLITICS AND ANXIETY IN THOMAS HOBBES'S LEVIATHAN
A. Passions and Politics
LeViC“han ' iS fam°US f°r itS account °f 1 I" order to achieve political tranquility,
humans replace fear of each other with fear of the state. Fear stabilizes subjectivity and
this makes the Commonwealth possible. But this claim only captures part of the picture.
This chapter establishes the difference between fear and anxiety and traces the political
implications of this distinction. While the centrality of fear has received substantial
commentary,2 1 argue that anxiety, not fear, is the fundamental problem in Leviathan
although it has received little analysis.3 A lot is at stake in this distinction. Investigating
1 homas Hobbes, Leviathan
,
edited by Richard Tuck (Cambridge England-
Cambridge University Press, 1996). All references to Leviathan refe’r to this edition
unless specified otherwise.
'Although a wide range of concerns are apparent in scholarship on Leviathan
,
nearly
all ol them, even if only in a marginal way, underscore the importance of fear See
especially the essays by Wolin, Schochet, and Dietz in Thomas Hobbes and Political
Theory
,
edited by Mary Dietz, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1990); see also
David Johnston, The Rhetoric ofLeviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics ofCultural
Transformation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) 34; Stephen Holmes,
"Introduction" in Hobbes's Behemoth or The Long Parliament, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990) x; Paul D. Cooke, Hobbes and Christianity: Reassessing the Bible
in Leviathan, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996) 208-210; A. P.
Martinich, The Two Gods ofLeviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics
,
(New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 159-160; Johann Sommerville, Thomas
Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) 55-
56.
3Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy ofThomas Hobbes, translated by Elsa M.
Sinclair, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), Sheldon Wolin, Politics and
Vision, (Boston: Little and Brown, 1960), and Michael Oakeshott's, "Introduction" to
Hobbes's Leviathan, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1947) overlook the distinction between
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anxiety may not only provide access to a new interpretation of Hobbes, it may also
stimulate though, about political possibilities foreclosed by Hobbes's politics of fear. As
we shall see, Hobbes seeks to eradicate anxiety through fear of the state which replaces
the cause of anxiety, the future, with a tangible objee, of fear - the Commonwealth.
Even though Hobbes infrequently deploys the term, anxiety is connected to a network
of fundamental concepts in Leviathan including law, causality, cognition, the future,
sensibility, and the possibility of vision or foresight. It also names the breakdown of his
empiricist conception of experience because anxiety disrupts the metaphysical foundation
that is articulated by Hobbes in the section titled "Of Man" that grounds the
Commonwealth in a determinist empiricist doctrine that locates the origin of all feelings,
thoughts, and actions in the realm of sensibility. Anxiety irritates this foundation because
it is both inside and outside of sensibility; it is a feeling that is caused by nothing in
particular. Anxiety, we shall see, is a sign of the gap that separates sensibility from the
sphere of cognition; this gap is impossible to bridge with a representation.
There are more reasons why we should examine the distinction between fear and
anxiety. The first one involves a faithfulness to the text. Hobbes valued clear definitions
because the possibility of the Commonwealth presupposed the consistent, and non-
mterchangeable, use of language. Given Hobbes's own emphasis on the consistent use of
fear and anxiety. Unlike Oakeshott and Wolin, Strauss focuses on the fear of death and
overlooks anxiety altogether. Jan H. Blits in "Hobbesian Fear," Political Theory, Vol. 17.
No. 3 provides a close examination of fear in Leviathan, but he too in the end collapses
fear and anxiety. The inability to comprehend the future is not "pre-political" (418), as
Blits maintains, rather it is the fundamental political problem Hobbes sought to
overcome.
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language, we ought to ask ourselves what the difference between fear and anxiety might
be." Second, the distinction between fear and anxiety has proven to be important for
continental philosophy. Both Soren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger, for example,
have emphasized the importance of anxiety, insofar as it is related to freedom, and have
sought to maintain a strict separation of fear from anxiety. 5 Sigmund Freud claimed that
the problem of anxiety is a nodal point at which the most various and important
questions converge, a riddle whose solution would be bound to throw a flood of light on
our whole mental existence." 6 Perhaps new light could be shed on anxiety by exploring
the way not only Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and Freud conceived it but Hobbes too.
Finally, anxiety is important to the quandaries, difficulties, and aporias of politics.
Politics is not about procedures and rules, but rather risk, upheaval, crisis, and the
destablization of foundations; that is what gives the political meaning and reality.
Anxiety, then, is inseparable from the surprise inherent to all truly political moments. For
this reason, we ought to consider not only whether anxiety is essential to the human
condition, but whether it is also the sine qua non of the political itself. Hobbes makes
4There is sufficient evidence demonstrating that Hobbes did not regard fear and
anxiety as synonyms and this is the starting point ofmy critical engagement with him.
Although he did not completely draw out all the implications of this difference, he
nonetheless uses both fear and anxiety in a precise and non-interchangeable manner.
5Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept ofAnxiety, translated by Feidar Thomte et. al„
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Martin Heidegger's Sein undZeit,
(Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993) 184-191 for the distinction between fear and
anxiety.
6Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, edited and translated by
James Strachey, (New York: Norton & Company, Inc, 1966) 393.
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this clear even though he wants to break the link between politics and anxiety. The point
would be to intensify this relation in order to open politics to risk, possibility, and
contingency. That would mean we would have to learn to live with
B. Fear
not against, anxiety.
Hobbes knew that fear was a difficult force to manage, but he nonetheless believed that
.ts precise allocation was essential to creating and maintaining political stability. What
Hobbes says about the relationship between fear and politics is original. He departs from
a tradition of political thought that was skeptical about the positive function of fear.
Aristotle, for example, discussed fear and maintained that it caused revolution, not
cohesion. 7 One of Hobbes's contemporaries was also critical of fear. In The Passions of
the Soul
,
Descartes states,
As for Fear or Terror, I cannot see that it can ever be praiseworthy or useful-
consequently it is not a particular Passion-it is only an excess of Cowardice
stonishment, and Apprehension, which is always unvirtuous...And because the
principal cause of Fear is surprise, there is no better way to free ourselves of it
than to make use of forethought and prepare ourselves for every eventuality the
apprehension of which may cause it. 8
In a crucial footnote in the Groundingfor the Metaphysics ofMorals, Kant claims that
fear is a feeling that is analogous to respect; but the latter is superior to the former since
respect is not caused by the realm of sensibility. 9 Unlike respect, which is always linked
Aristotle, Politics, translated by C. D. C. Reeve, (Indianapolis: Hackett Press 1998)
Book 5.
8Rene Descartes, The Passions ofthe Soul, translated by Stephen H. Voss,
(Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1989) 1 16.
9Immanuel Kant, Groundingfor the Metaphysics ofMorals, translated by James W
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to freedom, fear makes freedom impossible. Edmund Burke also theorized fear. While
discussing the sublime, he states, "No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its
powers of acting and reasoning asfear"™ What does Hobbes say about fear?
According to Hobbes, fear is linked to determinate objects of sense. Objects of sense
are an "External Body, or Object, which presseth the organ proper to each Sense" and
continue inward to the brain, and heart and "eauseth there a resistance, or counter-
pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver itself: which endeavour because Outward,
seemeth to be some matter without."" The pressure caused by an external object on the
organs of sense causes an internal resistance and this collision creates "Motion" which
makes the subject aware of the presence of an external object. 12 But what distinguishes a
fearful object from a mere object of sense? The fearful object does not arouse the
appetite but causes, as Hobbes states, aversion. Aversion is not a vague response to
indeterminate phenomenon but linked to concrete objects. In Chapter VI, Hobbes defines
fear: "Aversion with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEAR." 13 Hobbesian fear, then, is
the result of the human's relationship to threatening objects of sense.
For Hobbes, fear can hold society together, but not all fears have this productive
Ellington, (Indianpolis: Hackett Press, 1993) 14.
l0Edmund Burke, On the Sublime and Beautiful, (New York: P.F. Collier & Son
1909) 51, emphasis added.
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element. Fear is the possibility of the Commonwealth, and yet, if i, is not properly
managed, it can also destroy it. Fear as a political stabilizing force is apparent in many
important places in Leviathan. In Chapter XXVII, for example: "Of all Passions, that
which enclineth men least to break the Lawes, is Fear.'"* And, in Chapter XIII: "The
Passions that encline men to Peace, are Fear of Death...'" 5 Even though fear can create
governable and law-abiding subjects it can also interrupt the identity, or "fit," between
subject and sovereign: "If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it.
Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon,
by which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more
fitted than they are for civill Obedience.'" 6 Again: "The Passion to be reckoned upon, is
Fear; whereof there be two very generall Objects: one, The Power of Spirits Invisible; the
other, The Power of those men they shall therein Offend." 17 On the one hand, obedient
citizens can be created and sustained with those fears that point to the ultimate
annihilation of the self, but, on the other, not all fears solidify proper political obedience.
Hobbes was only troubled by irrational and superstitious fears of non-corporeal bodies
and spirits to the extent that they could be used as a means to manipulate the credulous in
order to incite a revolt against the secular sovereign. Hobbes feared ghosts, but for
,4
Ibid„ 206.
,5
Ibid„ 90.
l6
Ibid., 19.
l7
Ibid., 99.
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strictly political reasons.
This fear materializes in a pivotal
titled "Ofthose things that Weaken,
he states,
place in Leviathan. In a passage in Chapter XXIX
or tend ,o the DISSOLUTION ofa Common-wealth
The Spiritual! [Authority], though it stand in the darknesse of Schonlpistinctions, and hard words; yet because the fear of Darknesse and Chn •greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to Tronhle n
’
‘ S
to Destroy a Commonwealth. And this is a Disease which not urifidvcompared to the Epilepsie...in the Body Naturall." J
be
The Spiritual Authority can destroy a Commonwealth, or trigger epileptic fits, because it
competes with the secular realm for the obedience of subjects and frightens them with
threats of ghosts and darkness. Citizens with divided loyalties are prone to rebel from
their lawful sovereign. For Hobbes, it is not so important that these fears are absurd, as it
is that these fears are greater than other fears. Those seeking power use extra-legal terror
to dominate the populace independently of the civil power. But why are the fear of
darkness and ghosts so potent?
Although Hobbes does not say where these peculiar fears arise, the imagination is a
likely candidate since it is the only faculty which can generate impossibilities and lend
reality, or sense, to that which is unreal, or non-sense. Since the imagination is not
restricted to sensibility, it can create unlimited objects to fear, and this troubled Hobbes
because the force of imagined fears might eclipse fear of the state. 19 These fears, he
l8
Ibid., 227, italics in original.
,9
Recall Shakespeare's Macbeth: "Present fears Are less than horrible imaginings
37
believed, would not only lead to eivil disobedience but would generate unjustified,
incoherent, and unpredictable actions; stable subjectivity would be shipwrecked. Only
the pure materiality of fear could save it. A perceived fear may be nothing more than an
imaginative projection and this is not equivalent to a real and concrete threat. This is
important because, as Hobbes states, only the fear of "corporeal hurt," not "Phantasticall”
hurt, justifies the action it produces. 20 To summarize: political order required
manageable subjects; only ones fearful of actual objects, not phantasms, were capable of
being governed. Subordinating the spiritual authority to the political sovereign mitigates
the disruptive and uncontainable fears the former implants in the imagination.
C. Panique Terror
But Hobbes's discussion of fear is not uncomplicated. Take, for example, the feeling
he calls "Panique Terror." Panique Terror disrupts the potentially stabilizing force of fear
because it has a mediated relation, or possibly no relation, to the realm of sensibility. He
defines Panique Terror as "Feare without the apprehension of why, or what..." 21 The why
as the question of origin or ground is absent; the answer to the question "what is it?" is
also lacking because the subject is unable to identify a sensible object. But if Hobbes
assumes causal relationships between sensible objects and feelings, how is a feeling
Macbeth, Act i, sc. 3, in The Riverside Shakespeare
,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1974) 1315.
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Leviathan, 206-207. Such a distinction, however, seems to generate problems. How
would one distinguish fear of fantastical hurt from fear of corporeal hurt?
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Without an object possrble? This assumption may explain why he reduces Panique Terror
to a manifestation of eausality:
"There is alwayes in him that so feareth, first, some
apprehension of the cause...-" Although apprehension of the cause seems to make
Panique Terror identical to fear insofar as it is caused by an object, Hobbes puts this
rdentrty into question: "Though the rest run away by Example; every one supposing his
fellow to know why. And therefore [Panique Terror] happens to none but in a throng, or
multitude of people. The important word here is suppose which means "to put under,
or assume to be true." 21 If everyone supposes that someone else has knowledge of the
object of fear then the example, not the cause, sets the "throng" into a frenzied motion.
One s relation to the actual fearful object of sense is mediated through the secondary
effects of someone else's relation to the object. This weak series of links is set into
motion by a rumor; no one may have originary access to the fearful thing in itself, and
yet, everybody acts as r/someone did. Panique Terror is a problem since no object is the
authentic origin of this feeling.
Even if the problem of Panique Terror never ceases to be a question, the reason why
Hobbes insists on the priority of the sensible character of fear is clear. Since the
Commonwealth demands total obedience, it must be the most important object of fear
and inspire unceasing terror. The differences that may arise between subjects and that
22
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may produce mild forms of fear among them are ultimately insignificant; the presence of
the sovereign must eelipse these distinctions: "And though they shine some more, some
lesse. when they are out of [the sovereign's] sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more
than the Starres in presence of the Sun.- The sovereign must have a monopoly on fear;
w'thout il
’
he wou 'd lose the capacity to persuade subjects to obey. He who inspires the
greatest fear, apparently, is obeyed.
Fear plays a key role in Leviathan. And yet, Hobbes's own discussion of it is strained.
Fear grounds the Commonwealth, and yet, it can also uproot it. But containing and
managing fear is not easy. A hierarchy of fear is needed; everything should not be feared
equally. Fear can be controlled only if it is restricted to the realm of sensibility. If it is
not, the relationship between civic authority and fearful subjects unravels. Moreover, as
we have seen, the relationship between fear and sense is often tenuous. But beyond fear,
a more general and indeterminate feeling poses an even more fundamental problem for
Hobbes. That feeling is anxiety.
D. Anxiety
Anxiety is linked to the future, causality, and knowledge, but in a paradoxical way.
Anxiety does not correspond to anything entirely determinate or sensible, and it occurs.
Hobbes explains, when one lacks a stable representation of the future; such a lack or gap
generates anxiety. "Anxietyfor thefuture time," Hobbes claims, "disposeth men to
inquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better
25
Leviathan, 128.
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able to order the present to their best advantage.-* For Hobbes, one has anxiety abon, the
luture, not the present, and (his induces one to search for causes. One searches for
causes, an inquisitiveness that is peculiar to man, in order to order the present, or suppress
the surprise that the future promises. But, as the quotation stipulates, knowledge of the
cause enables men to order the present, not the future, which means that the future
remains a problem; and so there is anxiety.
Anxiety is not the only experience that induces men to seek causes. Wonder also does
this:
The first origin of philosophy goes back almost to the origin of speech For both
were present among the most primitive men of the earliest times, who wondered
at Cod s works. And wonder stimulated their minds to seek the causes ofthe
things they wondered at? 1
Anxiety and wonder have a relation to a species ofjoy: "Joy, from apprehension of
novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to Man, because it excites the appetite ofknowing the
cause. Anxiety, wonder, and admiration are felt when the human runs up against the
limits ol reason. In contrast to wonder and admiration, anxiety is the most important
feeling in Leviathan because it names the experience of the groundlessness and
incomprehensibility ol human existence. I he other two, in contrast, are a sign of a
specific encounter with objects that exceed cognitive limits.
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We must now make a fundamental distinction between fear and anxiety. The future as
such, not a particular future, is the cause of anxiety; for this reason, i, is a feeling more
genera, than the fear of death. The fear of a specific form of death may be a part of this
future, but it is not necessarily identical to it; the future always exceeds materiality. Since
the assumption behind Hobbestan fear is the presence of an object of sense, then the fear
of death is restricted to the realm of sensibility. That which engenders death, not death
itself, causes the fear of death, so death as such, cannot be feared. Whereas the fear of
death is linked to sense, anxiety lacks a relation to the sensible world and occupies a
space somewhere between sense and non-sense.
Hobbes’s discussion of sensibility and causality is central to his understanding of fear.
anxiety, and the future as well as his effort to determine the undetermined. In an earlier
section of Leviathan, he draws a line between the human and the animal; the human
wants to know the cause, he wants to know why and how; this is our fate. He claims:
Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as in no living creature butMan. so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason; but also by this
singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other
pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take away the care ofknowing causes
which is a Lust ofthe mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual! and
indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any
camall Pleasure. 29
Man is distinguished from animals by the passion called curiosity and this mode of
inquisitiveness seeks knowledge. Compelled to investigate, what man discovers is not
satisfying. Knowledge of the cause disempowers because it does not give him pleasure
29
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or rest; nor does it allow him to order the present. Why?
For Hobbes, even if we can locate a cause, the cause of that cause is ultimately
incomprehensible. The search for causes is destined to violate the principle of
succession:
Cunostty, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration ofthe effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; til] of necessity hemust come to thts thought a, last, that there is some cause, wh reof there s™former cause, but is etemall; which is it men call God. 50
Only God is free; He is outside the chain of succession and exists as an uncaused cause.
Hobbes again: "every act of man's will, and every desire, and inclination procedeeth
from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is
in the hand of God the first of all causes,)." 31 But, "The Name ofGod is used, not to
make us conceive him; (for his is Incomprehensible-, and his greatnesse, and power are
unconceivable;) but that we may honour him." 32 The result: the Hobbesian subject is
held in a state of suspension between the first cause, God, which names the limit of
human reason as the incomprehensible origin or causeless cause, and the future, which is
also inconceivable. This inconceivability is written into the structure of the subject, since
all life is grounded on ground that is ultimately ungrounded. A fateful question mark
relentlessly imposes itself on man; this ambush is anxiety.
30
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A problem awaits curious man opposite the investigation of causes. Even if he can
locate a eause/effeet relationship, knowledge of the cause boomerangs him into the
pursuit of its consequences and this generates "Promethean anxiety." One might think
that the discovery of a cause would gratify the "Lust of the mind" and put anxiety to rest,
since it might permit one to have a better sense of the future, but this is not the case: 33
For bemg assured that there be causes ofall things that have arrived hitherto ors a arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoreth tosecure himselfe against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth not tobe in a perpetual/ solicitude ofthe time to come
; So that every man, especiallythose that are over provident, are in an estate like to that of Prometheus. For asPrometheus (which interpreted, is, The prudent man,) was bound to the hillCaucasus
,
a place of large prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver,
devoured in the day, as much as was repayred in the night: So that man, whichlooks too far before him, in the care offuture time
,
hath his heart all the day lonegnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose norpause of his anxiety, but in sleep. 34
Prudence, the "supposing like events will follow like actions," 35 becomes a curse that
compels man to look "too far before him;" he is thrust into the future and this generates
anxiety, sleep, the silence of sense," 36 provides the only refuge.
The character of this aporia is clear. On the one hand, the future brings forth anxiety
and it compels one to inquire into causes; but, on the other, knowledge of causality also
produces anxiety. One's gaze is fixed on the future, but he experiences it as a question
33
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mark; one is also desperate to locate a fixed firs, cause, bu, tha, is also beyond his grasp.
Trapped between an incomprehensible fhture that generates anxiety and knowledge of
causality tha, also produces anxiety, the human is miserable. Everything is out of reach.
Anxiety, caused by both the absence of foresight of the future and knowledge of
causality, is the fundamental problem Hobbes must overcome.
The relationship between the past, the present, and the future is crucial to Hobbes's
understanding of anxiety and what must be done to escape it. In order to erase the
problem of anxiety, Hobbes must contain the future. But what is the future? He states,
"The Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past have a being in the Memory onely,
but things to come have no being at all; the Future being but afiction ofthe mind..."31
How is it possible for Hobbes to give a stable representation of the future, what he calls
"foresight," if the future is merely a "fiction of the mind"? Only what Hobbes calls
"compound imagination," a human faculty capable of exceeding the immediate bounds of
sensibility
,
is able to fashion "fictions of the mind." 18 The imagination by itself, however,
cannot construct a future; pure force, or an act of imposition, is also required. Hobbes
states, "For theforesight ofthings to come
,
which is Providence, belongs onely to him by
whose will they are to come." 39 Foresight of things to come cannot be obtained passively,
hence art, as the imaginative and willful imposition of form on matter, is essential for
37
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Hobbes: "For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH,
or S I ATE, which is but an Artiflciall Man." 40
The fundamental challenge is this: to rescue the nascent Hobbesian subject from
Promethean anxiety. This is a fate that accompanies knowledge of causality and the
awareness of the unlimited possibilities of the future. This is the way out: Hobbes
provides the subject with a vision of the future. Specifically, the Commonwealth gives
him foresight of his self-preservation and this obviates anxiety. But the gif, of foresight
presupposes that the sovereign can secure, if not determine, the future. As Hobbes
claims, the future is a "fiction of the mind." If this is the case, how can Hobbes's future, a
fiction by definition, claim ascendancy over other fictions? Would not one future be as
arbitrary as the next? The challenge for Hobbes is to construe, a future that ultimately
makes the presentation of alternative futures impossible. Representing the future is
possible only il there is one future; if there are a plurality of futures, the future becomes
possibility. But possibility does not correspond to anything and so it is impossible to
represent.
Hobbes wants to end discourse on the future. He will assume the role of the last
prophet. In order to do this, he judges, on the basis of his own first principles, competing
futurists. He refutes scholastic conceptions of teleology that set an end higher than the
mere reproduction of life. Hobbes believes, in contrast to philosophers schooled in
Aristotelian metaphysics, that political stability is possible only when the aspiration for
40
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the*— bonunt is purged from political discourse. Hobbes’s denunciation of these
Philosophers is famous. He refers to their words as "insignificant sounds...whereof there
have been aboundanee eoyned by Schoolemen, and pusled Philosophers - The residue
of Aristotelian metaphysics produces contradictions, absurdity, and if mixed with
scripture, spiritual darkness. All of these problems, he claims, can be traced back to
Aristotle:
And I beleeve that scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall
Philosophy, than that which now is called Aristotles Metaphysiques nor more
repugnant to Government, than much of that hee hath said in his Politiques• normore ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethiques
,
42
Not only do specific philosophical texts distort the image of the future that will lead to
political stability, but those who read tend to do so poorly and this has disastrous political
consequences. According to Hobbes, most readers become confused and enthusiastic
while reading because they uncritically accept the erroneous first principles of authors. In
a stinging metaphor, Hobbes discusses the consequences of the seductive power of books
on these readers. They are like birds that entring by the chimney, and finding
themselves inclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of
wit to consider which way they came in." 43 For Hobbes, books do not liberate; they
41
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enslave. Readers are
.rapped when scholarly treatises mediate their relattonship
reality; they are ungrounded and hover in a cage of shadows as opposed to standing on
the stable ground provided by firs, principles and "Perspicuous Words.- Enthusiastic
and credulous readers are "below the condition of ignorant men...For between true
Science, and erroneous Doctrine, Ignorance is in the middle.- While ignorance may not
be bliss, it is preferable, according to Hobbes, to floundering in falsehood. In contrast to
both Scholastic philosophers and gullible readers, Hobbes reduces the future to a
determinate image that eliminates discourse on it in order to secure "the Contentments of
life;” care of time to come and the anxiety produced by it will be put to rest
.
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Hobbes’s Commonwealth is the solution to the problem posed by the absence of
foresight of the future, and its telos is prophecized in the first line of the second part of
Uviathan, in Chapter XVII titled: "Ofthe Causes, Generation, and Definition ofa
COMMON-WEALTH." The thematic of sight, or more precisely, a vision of the future
that has been reduced to a determinate representation, is the justification underlying the
44
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Ibid., 23 1 . Even though Hobbes claims that the Commonwealth is based on more
than self-preservation, or "all the Contentments of life," self-preservation is more
significant. In his account of sensibility, Hobbes claims that humans are never content
but fated to have insatiable desires: "Life itselfe is but Motion, and can never be without
Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense" (46). Given this, it remains a
mystery how Hobbesian life could be said to be content. The sovereign, insofar as he
secures foresight of the self-preservation of his subjects, is the only person who is not
freed from care of time to come. The sovereign will have anxiety; his subjects will be
fearful.
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Commonwealth and the only possible way out of the state of nature:
The finall Cause, End, or Designe ofmen..., in the introduction of that restraintupon themselves,.
..is theforesight oftheir own preservation and of a more
contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable
condition of Wane, which is necessarily consequent to the naturall Passions of
men, when there is no visible Power to keep them all in awe, and tye them byfeare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants... 47
The future produces anxiety; the way to eradicate it for Hobbes is simple. He defines
the future in one way. The only possible future that will lead to political stability is
foresight of one's own preservation. The visible power creates, secures, and represents
this future. The image of the sovereign is simultaneously the reminder of one's
preservation but also of one's death. His image erases anxiety and engenders fear. The
sovereign must inspire fear but he must also possess foresight and that is the basis of his
authority: "The Soveraign Power...," Hobbes claims, "foreseeth the necessities and
dangers of the Common-wealth..." 48 Foresight as self-preservation is the future; time as
possibility is erased and collapses into actuality. Since no other future is possible,
discourse on alternatives can only be viewed as madness. 49
The question remains, however, whether Hobbes is totally successful in his effort to
master the future and quell anxiety. A state based on self-preservation would only defer
47
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the fateful, if not apocalyptic, result: "
Inhabitants, then the last remedy of all
And when all the world is overcharged with
is Warre; which provideth for every man, by
Victory, or Death - Perhaps that is the only possible conclusion to a state based on self-
preservation. The goal of Leviathan, therefore, is the defetral of the eoming catastrophe.
A particular future, irrespective of how it is defined, can only be temporarily secured. A
certain level of anxiety, it seems, will remain inside the Commonwealth. 51
E. Politics
Hobbes's Leviathan, perhaps more than any other text during his time, illuminates the
relation between the passions and politics. Stimulating and managing fear is viewed as
the highest exercise of sovereign political power. But that is not the complete story.
Hobbes's politics of fear receives its fundamental contours from the problem of anxiety
which, Hobbes believed, is essential to both the human condition and to politics.
Given the political context of his day, perhaps it is understandable that Hobbes
displays an impatience, if not hostility to politics, and that he sought to overcome anxiety
through a politics of fear. But Hobbes demonstrated that anxiety is a mysterious yet
powerful motivating force and that the Commonwealth, if it provides foresight of the
future, can put an end to anxiety. Hobbes broke the link between politics and anxiety by
temporarily determining the future as foresight of self-preservation. While this may have
50
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'Another area that would need to be investigated in this regard is Hobbes's theory of
language. Specifically, linguistic ambiguity justifies the continual presence of the
sovereign. A linguistic state of nature continues in civil society, but this was not
something that Hobbes would welcome.
50
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more, not less, anxiety.
Living with anxiety would
finality and security; conceiving it
mean embracing politics as an activity without closure.
as a practice grounded on contingency, risk, and
possibility. Because he sough, to master the future, Hobbes was unable to tolerate the
disruptive character of anxiety. That is understandable because anxiety is the most
difficult emotion; i, tests and haunts the mastery of the subject because it is a feeling that
we cannot completely control.* And yet, the loss of mastery coincides with an important
opportunity. Anxiety opens a space for critical reflection about political possibilities that
are foreclosed when the future is declared as present. Anxiety should be permanent
feature of the polis.
Under certain conditions anxiety may become paralyzing, debilitating, or worse.
While there is no absolute guarantee against these risks, anxiety mitigates this threat
because it interacts in a non-formulaic way with the hope that there are modes of living
together open to the ambiguity, paradox, and aporias of politics.” An affirmative re-
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Jacques Derrida, perhaps more than any other thinker, has thematized the aporia as the
condition of possibility of politics, responsibility, and justice. See his "Force ofLaw
The ’Mystical Foundation of Authority, ’’’ translated by Mary Quaintance in
51
evaluation of anxiety, in addition, could be an important f.rst step in articulating the
importance of an openness to the indeterminateness of the future so that we may discover
ways to inscribe this indeterminacy into the political foundations that structure political
life. Writing anxiety into our political institutions could be an antidote to the
Enlzauberung (demagification/disenchantment) predicted by Max Weber” Not only
would the active cultivation of non-paralyzing doses of anxiety install a reminder of the
contingent basis of our political arrangements but, perhaps more importantly, it would
intimate that these arrangements could be otherwise.
A politics of anxiety is already in progress in new and creative spaces and ways,
especially in the work of Jacques Derrida and others, and political theorists should draw
on these resources to expand its reach. 55 A politics of anxiety disrupts foresight of the
Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice, (New York: Cardozo Law Review, 1990).
Wendy Brown's States ofInjury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton-
Princeton University Press, 1995) is another noteworthy example.
54Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," edited by Gerth and Mills, in From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology, (New York: Oxford, 1958).
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Derrida (1990) argues that anxiety characterizes the political moment of
deconstruction and is the condition of possibility ofjustice: "This moment of
suspense...without which, in fact, deconstruction is not possible, is always full of anxiety,
but who pretends to be just by economizing on anxiety? And this anxiety-ridden moment
of suspense-which is also the interval or space in which transformations, indeed juridico-
political revolutions take place-cannot be motivated, cannot find its movement and its
impulse (an impulse which itself cannot be suspended) except in the demand for an
increase in or supplement to justice, and so in the experience of an inadequation or an
incalculable disproportion:" 955-957. Foucault also valorizes anxiety in "The Anxiety of
Judging" where he states that "I fear that is [sic] is dangerous to allow judges to continue
to judge alone, by liberating them from their anxiety and allowing them to avoid asking
themselves in the name of what they judge, by what right, by what acts, and who are they,
those who judge. Let them become anxious like we become anxious when we meet so
52
‘e,0S °tlhePOliS and renderS a" rePresentations of the future impossible. Despite the
ultimately provisional character of his task. Hobbes wants to represent the end. or give
foresight of the time to come; a political project based on anxiety, in contrast, mterferes
with even the most provisional attempts to represent the future. Hobbes's politics of fear
forecloses the possibility of any behavior that is not caused by inclination, which in turn
necessitates an external regulating state. His Commonwealth manipulates pain and
Pleasure through the fear of death in order to secure obedience. In contrast to fear,
anxiety frees the subject from empirical determination, since it is a sign that there are
always other possibilities. And just how one responds to these possibilities is impossible
to predict. Enduring a certain level of inde.ermination may not only prevent the closing
of the political but would also interrupt potentially totalizing formulations of the future.
Non-totalizing formulations would not seek to represent the future, rather they would
present the unbridgeable cleft between temporality and representation, always falling
short of the complete mastery of its object.
A politics of anxiety is not a politics of passivity, paralysis, guilt, original sin, or
paranoia, but it does require responsibility; one must act without the guide of incentives;
one must be responsible to and respect the finite limits of human reason and the
nonrepresentable character of the future. A politics of anxiety does not name the space
for the continual heroic self-choosing of one's authentic self in the face of a formless
few who are disturbed. The crisis of the function ofjustice has just been opened. Let's
not close it too quickly." In Foucault Live: Essays and Collected Interviews, 1961-1984
edited by Sylvere Lotringer, (New York: Semiotext, 1996) 254, emphasis added.
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future, but is, instead, the suspension between a rigid, if no, dogntatic, present, on the one
hand, and the complete exposure to the possibility of a better political life, on the other.
As we have seen in the ease of Hobbes, political programs that seek to eliminate anxiety
for the sake of order foreelose and suppress the always tension-laden and perilous
moments of polities.- A polities of anxiety seeks to cultivate these moments.
The project of political theory has been characterized as the attempt to see the unseen
in a "corrected fullness."” A politics of anxiety is skeptical about such a position; i, does
not set its sight on the construction of a total vision of the future, but puts into question
the presuppositions on which such a future is based. Fearless and unrelenting, this
questioning is essential to politics and political theory.
F. Beyond Hobbes
I lobbes opened the problematic of feeling and situated it in the heart of politics. Even
though I have taken an interpretive thread that was only intimated in his writings,
Hobbes's words on anxiety and its relationship to both the future and foundations
provided an entry point that complicates many contemporary intrepretations about
Hobbes but also sets the stage for challenging his domestication. Let us turn to a radical
German thinker whose writings continue to have a decisive impact on contemporary
understanding of both ethics and politics.
56Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition
,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1958) theorizes the risk and contingency inherent to political action. The appearance of
these moments could be counted on less than one hand.
”Wolin ( 1 960). See especially the discussion of "Vision and political imagination,"
54
CHAPTER 3
KANT AND THE PARADOX OF RESPECT
A. Back to Kant
This chapter reassesses the role of feeling - the paradox of respect, in particular - in
Immanuel Kant and the ways it complicates his moral philosophy. Kant is classified as
the philosopher of human reason but, as we shall see, he is also simultaneously a
philosopher of feeling. 1 With the feeling of respect, Kant lodged a crisis in the center of
his practical philosophy that has proved to be a significant source of contention among
prominent commentators. Tracing the contours of this problem may lead to a
reassessment of the value and limits of Kant's ethical meaning at a time when his writings
are becoming increasingly unpopular.
Current critics of Kant including Bonnie Honig, Romand Coles, William E. Connolly,
and others detect problems in his practical philosophy and conclude that he is, for lack of
a better expression, conservative. 2 Although these readers have provocative and
2 This study owes much to Peter D. Fenves's A Peculiar Fate: Metaphysics and
World-History in Kant, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), Werner Hamacher's
Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literaturefrom Kant to Celan, translated by Peter
Fenves, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Jean-Luc Nancy's The
Experience ofFreedom
,
translated by Bridget McDonald, (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1993).
"Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement ofPolitics, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993). Although Honig claims that respect is a "paradoxically hybrid,
rational, moral feeling" (26), she does not pursue the destabilizing implications of this
insight and concludes that two of the three strands of Kantian respect are "didactic and
disciplinary" (26); but Honig should be applauded because she acknowledges the plurality
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insightful interpretations of Kant, I believe that they have overstated their case. No, only
because there are resources within the Kantian project that can rejuvenate radical political
thought, freedom for example, bu, also because Kant's writings do no, constitute a unified
corpus. 3 Richard L. Velkley claims that Kant shifts from an analytical, logical, and
cognitive orientation to a synthesizing, spontaneous, and practical one." Given this turn,
of respect. Romand Coles, Rethinking Generosity: Critical Theory and the Politics ofCantos, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). Coles argues that Kant's flunking
radrcally eclipses the other" (24) and that '"respect' is entwined with a systematic Ld ofoblivion, imperialism, and theft;" 4. I comment on Coles's remarks on Kan, in greater detailater in this essay. See also William E. Connolly, Why IAm No, a Secularist
, (EelpoUUniversity of Minnesota Press, 1999). In the chapter titled "A Critique of Pure PoMcs "Connolly overemphasizes the purity of Kantian practical reason and insufficiently examinesthe ambiguous role that respect occupies in Kant's ethics. Even though there may be
multiple traditions of respect, Connolly invokes the Kantian language he disavows when heappeals to agonistic respect;'' See also Connolly's Ethos ofRealization, (Minneapolis
University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 235; Theodor Adorno claims that Kant is repressive
and authoritarian, Negative Dialectics
,
translated by E. B. Ashton, (New York: Continuum
Press, 1 973). In contrast to these critics, a thinker who never stopped insisting on theimportance of Kant for the future of philosophy is Walter Benjamin. In his "On the
Program of the Coming Philosophy," translated by Mark Ritter, in Benjamin Edited by
Gary smith, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989): "It is of the greatest importance
tor the philosophy of the future to recognize and sort out which elements of the Kantian
philosophy should be adopted and cultivated, which should be reworked, and which should
be rejected;" 3.
As for the first claim, Kant never stopped insisting on the importance of freedom,
and in the words of Hannah Arendt, freedom is the "raison d'etre of politics." For Kant,
freedom is the ground ot all action; but this ground is unstable and perhaps even groundless
See Hannah Arendt, "What is Freedom?" in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in
Political Thought, (New York: Penguin, 1956), 151, italics in original. As for the second
claim, Henry E. Allison's impressive Kant's Theory ofFreedom (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990) tends to overstate the overall coherence of the Kantian project. It is
not clear to me how Kant's fact of reason is, in the words of Allison, "a genuine advance "
230.
4 Richard L. Velkley, Freedom and the End ofReason: On the Moral Foundation of
Kant's Critical Philosophy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
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the Kantian project is haunted by antbiguity and tens.cn, bu, these ntonrents tend to be
insufficiently examined or are ignored altogether.
Through an analysis of the feeling of respect and its relationship to philophieal
foundations and freedom, my interpretation emphasizes the structural instability inherent
to Kant's ethical project in order to defend it in post-structuralist terms. Kant is not
"cognitivist, formalist, and universalist," as Habermas contends, but a radical thinker who
ant, e,pates the ideas of Jacques Derrida. 5 Hence, my orientation also distinguishes itself
from those who exclusively focus on Kant's notion of right in order to defend or
presuppose the value of liberal institutions.6 John Rawls claims that the roots for A
Theory ofJustice can be found in Kant.
7
But Rawls's domesticated image of Kant has
little similarity to the critical Koenigsbergian thinker.* For postmodern political theorists
5Se« Juer8en Habermas's essay "Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of
ant Apply to Discourse Ethics?" translated by Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber
Nicholsen in Kant and Political Philosophy
,
Edited by Ronald Beiner and William James
Booth, (New Haven: Yale University Press), 321. As for the Kant and Derrida relation Iam thinking of the problem of freedom in Kant and Derrida's insistence that any political act
worthy of the name must endure the ordeal of undecidability. Arguably, undecidability is
errtda s word for freedom. For both Kant and Derrida, freedom is beyond the order ofknowledge and this rescues practice from mechanical implementation.
Andreas Teuber claims that "Contingencies play no role in his [Kant's] conception of
the moral person" in "Kant and Respect for Persons," Political Theory
,
vol. 1 1 no. 3,
August 1 983, 389. Similarly, John Rawls, in A Theory ofJustice, claims that "the priority
of right is a central feature of Kant's ethics;" (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971),
7Rawls, A Theory ofJustice.
8 See Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal ofPhilosophy, 77,
1 980, 5 1 5-72. Rawls gives primacy to the social even though Kant insists on the primacy
of the practical. Rawls's preoccupation with institutions, moreover, ignores Kant's
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Kant ts too cold; for liberals, he is perfectly conservative. But there is another Kant.
B. Paradox
The word "paradox" appears in Kant's corpus infrequently, and this has lead to its
relative neglect as a theme among commentators. Perhaps it is even justifiable to direct
our attention to other topics given the following: "Consistency is the greatest obligation
of a philosopher and yet the most rarely found."’ Even though Kant valued philosophical
consistency, he suggests that the paradox could serve a critical Sanction. This is apparent
where he explicitly discusses the paradox in a section entitled "On Egotism" in
Anthropologyfrom a Pragmatic Point of View" Although he knew that it could be used
as a tool employed merely to make one appear unique and original, Kant also maintained
that the paradox could serve more than one's vanity:
Preference for the paradoxical is logical obstinacy in which a man does not want
to appear as an imitator of others, but rather prefers to appear as an unusual
human being. Instead of accomplishing his purpose, such a man frequently
succeeds only in being odd. But, because everyone must have and maintain his
own intelligence, the reproach of being paradoxical, when it is not based on vanity
or the desire to be different, carries no bad connotations. Opposite to the
paradoxical is the commonplace, which sides with the general opinion. But with
the commonplace there is as little safety, if not less, because it lulls the mind to
sleep, whereas the paradox awakens the mind to attention and investigation.
valorization of autonomy. The contrast I seek to draw between Kant and Rawls is not
absolute since Kant also theorized institutions, but to a lesser extent than is often
emphasized.
9Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason
,
Edited and translated by Mary Gregor,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 22, italics in original.
10
Kant, Anthropologyfrom a Pragmatic Point of View, translated by Victor Lyle
Dowdell, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978).
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which often lead to discoveries."
Smce, "everyone must have and maintain his own intelligence." taking delight in the
paradoxical removes one from "general opinion." A self-imposed exile corresponds to
intellectual independence. With the commonplace, one is prone to narcolepsy or perhaps
even a dogmatic slumber. Bu, Kant maintained that the paradox could be an antidote for
cognitive apathy because it triggers attention and may lead to discoveries. If the paradox
suspends reason, it also simultaneously enlivens it and "awakens the mind.” Not a
sympton of cognitive weakness, the paradox stimulates autonomous thinking and, Kant
claims, it is also the sign of a "humorous intelligence." 12 Even though Kant is aware that
it could be abused, he did not seek to devalue the paradox.
There are also infrequent references to paradox in Kant's practical philosophy. In
many places, Kant acknowledges the enigma of practical reason. And even though a
particular circle" threatens Kant's project near the conclusion of the Groundwork ofthe
Metaphysics ofMorals, the word paradox appears only once in this text, and in a context
somewhat removed from the feeling of respect. 13 In the Critique ofPractical Reason
.
11Anthropology, 12.
12
In a section of the Anthropology entitled "On the Specific Differences Between the
Comparative and the Argumentative Intelligence:" "Intelligence in punning is stale; while
needless subtlety (micrology) ofjudgment is pedantic. Humorous intelligence arises from
directing the head to appreciate paradoxes, in which the (sly) knave peers from behind the
naive sound of simplicity in order to subject somebody (or even his own opinion) to
laughter;" 120.
13Kant, Groundwork ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals, Edited and translated by Mary
Gregor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); the reference to the circle appears
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Kan, refers to the "paradox of method" bu, he never explicitly says that the feeling of
respect is a paradox. 14
But in the Critique ofPure Reason in the section entitled "The Application of the
Categories to Objects of the Senses in General," Kant refers to the paradox of self-
affection. 15 Respect can justifiably be designated a paradox because it is a feeling that is
not received from outside influences but one that is self-generated, that is, self-affected.
And self-affection, Kant suggests, is paradoxical. But more importantly, the fugitive
movement of respect itself is a stronger indicator of its paradoxical status. Respect is
neither completely sensible nor completely intelligible but both and neither at the same
time. It is a transient that eludes both poles of the binary opposition reason/feeling that
inaugurates Western metaphysics.
C. Respect
Kant's views on human leelings are ambiguous and provocative. Even though the role
and significance of feelings including the feeling of the beautiful, sublime, and respect,
changes throughout his political and philosophical writings, his interest in human feeling
on 55, the paradox on 49.
14 Critique ofPractical Reason, 54.
15
Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1965), 165. Fenves has an insightful discussion of Kant's elaboration of the
paradox of self-affection; 222. In addition, Howard Caygill states: "The discussion of
affection in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Deduction'.. .has features which Kant himself
describes as paradoxical; 58. Caygill continues: "Kant himself seems to have chosen not
to solve the problem, but rather to leave it open as an ineluctable but fertile philosophical
difficulty or 'aporia;'" in A Kant Dictionary, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), 59.
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persists throughout his entire intellectual career. As early as 1764 Kant investigates the
possibility of finer feelings in Observations on ,ke Feeling of,He Beautiful and ,ke
Sublime}*’ Later, he dedicates an immense amount of attention to the relationship
between feeling and morality, and the ways in which the former threatens the possibility
of the latter. But Kant does not accord all feelings the same worth; for the ultimate
success of his practical philosophy hinges on his capacity to make qualitative distinctions
between spec.fic feelings.'’ And the qualitative feelings excellence is respect. As we
shall see, the human's moral transformation materializes as a mode self-affection Kant
calls respect. 18
T rnMth
ant
t
°!^
e7a!i0nSn °n the FeelinS °fthe Beautiful and Sublime, translated by John. Goldthwait, (Berkeley: Regents of the University of California, 1960). Y
1
7
Kant distinguishes respect from awe, reverence, contempt, admiration, fear hoped am^ement. Por a discussion ofmany of these feelings see my "Politics and Anxiety inHobbes s Leviathan
,
Theory & Event, 5:1 For a discussion of the difference between
emotion and passion, refer to the Anthropology, 157.
1 y
In addition to the scholarship already discussed, there have been numerous studies
of respect. For a clear and helpful discussion of respect, in addition to other difficulties in
ant s writings, see H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral
Philosophy, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971); Mary Gregor discusses
the relationship between love and respect in Laws ofFreedom: A Study ofKant's Method of
Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1963), 186; Richard McCarty in "Kantian Moral Motivation and the Feeling of
Respect makes a helpful distinction between the intellectualistic and affectivistic views of
Kantian moral motivation and also claims that "some mystery...shrouds the peculiar feeling
of respect" in the Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy, 3 1 :3 July 1 993, 434; Alexander
Broadie and Elisabeth M. Pybus in "Kant's Concept of ’Respect’" distinguish between the
Socratic (reason) and Sentimental (feeling) moral positions and they claim that Kant has
effected a compromise between them in Kant-Studien, vol. 66, 1975, 63; Robert Paul Wolff
claims that "the introduction of the emotion of reverence is contradictory to the entire thrust
of Kant's argument" in The Autonomy ofReason: A Commentary on Kant's Groundwork of
the Metaphysics ofMorals, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973), 83; for a study of the
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One of Kant's earliest sustained referenees to respect appears in a footnote in the
Groundwork of,he Metaphysics ofMorals. It is the first thorough, albeit preliminary,
articulation of this feeling and its interrelationship to the network of fundamental moral
concepts in Kant's practical philosophy. This footnote appears early on in the first section
titled "Transition from common rational to philosophic moral cognition.” That respect is
discussed in a footnote is not insignificant. Even though Kant discusses respect in the
Critique ofPure Reason
,
Critique ofPractical Reason
,
Critique ofJudgment, Religion
within the Boundaries ofMere Reason, and Metaphysics ofMorals, his discussion of it in
the Groundwork demonstrates his own uncertainty about his appeal to a specifically
moral feeling in a text that severs feeling from the field of moral practice. 19
It is clear from the first line of this note, from its subjunctive grammatical construction
to the anticipation of an objection, that Kant believed his appeal to respect will be
criticized. He tries to refute the charge that he seeks refuge behind an obscure moral
feeling. Perhaps more importantly, Kant is here concerned with the mere possibility of
the feeling of respect. For this reason, he must distinguish it both from the inclinations as
relationship between respect and the inclinations see Andrews Reath's "Kant's Theory of
Moral Sensibility. Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination" in Kant-
Studien, vol. 80, 1989; A. Murray MacBeath in "Kant and Moral Feeling" has a helpful
discussion of the relationship between the sublime and the feeling of respect but, for reasons
that are obvious, I cannot support his claim that we must "ignore all Kant's contradictions of
what I take to be his official theory of the proper objects of respect..." in Kant-Studien vol
64,1973,302.
’
*
19Kant, Critique ofJudgment, translated by Werner S. Pluhar, (Indianapolis: Hackett
Press, 1987); Religion within the Boundaries ofMere Reason, Edited by Allen Wood et. al.,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Metaphysics ofMorals, Edited and
translated by Mary Gregor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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well as from
.he sphere of cognition. This is no. an easy task and Kan. knows it.
Respect, it seems, will occupy a non-space somewhere between the phenomenal and
noumenal realms. After introducing the famous proposition Vary „ the necessity ofan
actionfrom respectfor law,” Kant appends the following note:*
It could be objected that I only seek refttge, behind the word respect in anobscure feeling, instead of distinctly resolving the questionh™ ’ c
ofreason.though respect is a feeling, i, is not one receTved b~
it is, instead, a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and thfT^
specifically different from all feelings of the first kind, which can be reduced t^inclination or fear. What 1 recognize immediately as a law for me I cognize withrespect, which signifies merely consciousness of the subordination ofmy wifi 0 alaw without the mediation of other influences on my sense. Immediatedetermination of the will by means of a law and consciousness of this is called
respect, so that this is regarded as the effect of the law on the subject, and not asthe cause of the law. Respect is properly the representation of a worth thatinfringes upon my self-love. Hence there is something that is regarded as an
object neuher of inclination nor 0f fear, though it has something analogous toboth. The object of respect ,s therefore simply the law, and indeed the law that weimpose upon ourselves and yet as necessary in itself. As a law we are subject to it
without consulting self-love; as imposed upon us by ourselves it is nevertheless a
result of our will; and in the first respect it has an analogy with fear, in the second
with inclination. Any respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of
integrity and so forth) of which he gives us an example. Because we also regard
en arging our talents as a duty, we represent a person of talents also as so to
speak, an example ofthe law (to become like him in this by practice) and this is
what constitutes our respect. All so-called moral interest consists simply in
respect for the law. 21
Kanfs discussion of respect in this long footnote is striking. Respect (if there is such a
thing) is a self-produced feeling as opposed to one received from external stimuli, and
that is what makes it different from all other feelings. The unmediated recognition of the
20Groundwork, 13.
21Groundwork, 14, italics in original.
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validity of moral claims imposed upon humans
law on the subject" that results when
generates respect. It is the "effect of the
we impose a law with no mediating influences upon
ourselves. The immediacy of this law means respec, is fel, as immediacy itself as pure
force, lawgiving reason...forces from me immediate respect."22 And this immediacy is
precisely what distinguishes respect from other feelings. In the words of Kant, respect is
more powerful than all.
..feelings together 1,23
Respect is neither fear nor inclination but is "analogous" to both. It is not surprising
that Kant invokes an analogical mode of presentation here as an indirect way to elucidate
respect. Analogical relationships are not relations of identity and, more importantly, are
not completely rational but metaphorical. 2 " They establish a relation of similitude
through the reflective transfer of the features of different objects placed in a spatial
relationship. This moment of analogical spatialization in Kant simultaneously
interconnects and separates respect from its siblings fear and inclination. All three are
similar since they are feelings; for they all appear on the radar of corporeality. But they
are not the same. Kant doubts the extent to which fear could engender moral conduct
since it signals the absence of freedom; respect, in contrast, names the leap out of the
causal mechanism. And, action driven by fear would "destroy the whole moral worth of
! —
22Groundwork, 16.
23Kant, Metaphysics ofMorals, 209.
24
Derrida maintains that "Analogy is metaphor par execellence," Margins of
Philosophy, translated by Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 242.
64
actions" because i, receives its ground for conduct completely from sensibility•»
Something else is striking about this subtextual qualification. Kan, maintains that
"Respect is a feeling." The inclinations will no, and could no, be eradicated because, as
Kant states, the human "can never be altogether free from desires andinclinati ns..."**
The total purification of sensibility is an impossibility.- Kan, goes even further when he
clatms in Religion within the Boundaries ofMere Reason that "considered in themselves
natural inclinations are But the mclinations must nonetheless be circumscrtbed
so that the human can be morally elevated. And the humiliation or circumscription of
human sensibility is proportionate to his moral elevation. 29
If respect receives a preliminary and subtextual elucidation, this is not surprising since
the Groundwork prepares the way for another text that takes up similar themes. But the
leeling of respect is not dropped as an elusive object of inquiry; Kant develops it in
greater detail three years later in the Critique ofPractical Reason where it takes center
stage as the incentive for moral conduct* Kant's discussion of it does not occur beneath
25
Critique ofPractical Reason
,
1 08.
2 6Critique ofPractical Reason
,
7 1
.
,
^The punty Connolly sees in Kantian morality, in my view, is incompatible with
Kant's own words on the sensible basis of it. Kant wanted to purify morality from a certain
mode of sensible contamination but one feeling remains (respect), and it is the unstable
nexus between the human and the law.
*Religion within the Boundaries ofMere Reason
, 78, italics in original.
29
Critique ofPractical Reason, 67.
30
In the Critique ofPractical Reason, Kant now distinguishes between Triehfeder
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the .ex, bu, in one of the longest sections in the middle of this book. From a painstaking
footnote in the Groundwork, respect reemerges to occupy a central place in Chapter 3 of
the analytic of practical reason titled "On the incentives of pure practical reason."
Respect, we learn, is the sole motive to moral conduct.
Whereas in the Groundwork Kant claimed that basing morality on incentives destroys
its sublimity, in the Critique ofPractical Reason this is no longer the case.’ 1 A specific
incentive is now distinguished from contingent ones, and the former will undergird the
sublimity of moral practice. Any doubt Kant had about the possibility of respect
accomplishing this in the Groundwork is gone: "respect for the moral law is.. .the sole
and also the undoubted moral incentive." 32 But how is respect an incentive?
Kant defines an incentive as "the subjective determining ground of the will of a being
whose reason does not by its nature necessarily conform with the objective law..." 33 But
and Bewegungsgrund, a distinction that was not made in the Groundwork. Gregor makes
this point in a footnote to her edited volume of the Critique ofPractical Reason
,
32
31 Groundwork, 48. Coles underexamines the interconnection between sublimity and
moral categories in Kant's philosophy. This connection would probably frustrate the line he
seeks to draw between the first two critiques and the third. Coles privileges the Critique of
Judgment while adopting a somewhat dismissive stance toward the Critique ofPure Reason
and the Critique ofPractical Reason. Coles finds the consequences of Kant's narrative of
subjective sovereignty in the Critique ofPure Reason problematic. Kant's views on lying
and revolution, according to Coles, are short-sighted. As this essay seeks to demonstrate,
the radical resources Coles unearths in the Critique ofJudgment that can productively
disfigure dominant interpretations of Kant in the name of an ethic of receptive generosity
can also be found in Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy as well, although the
specific ethical consequences would not, of course, necessarily be the same.
22Critique ofPractical Reason
,
67.
33Critique ofPractical Reason, 62.
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at the outset of the Critique ofPractical Reason dedicated to clarifying the Triebfeder,
Kant acknowledges the difficulty of even conceiving of one: "How a law can be of itself
and immediately a determining ground of the will is for human reason an insoluble
problem..”" Kant will avoid the problem and redefine his task. The task becomes one of
showing "not the ground from which the moral law in itself supplies an incentive but
rather what it effects (or, to put it better, must effect) in the mind insofar as it is an
incentive."’ 5 The effect will be elucidated, not the ground itself from which the moral
law serves as a source of motivation.
As we have learned, Kant thinks that the human is never totally free from inclinations
and desires. Even though humans can never step outside of sensibility, the challenge is
whether something other than sensibility can motivate action in order to give it justifiable
moral worth:
sensible feeling. ..is indeed the condition of that feeling we call respect, but the
cause determining it lies in pure practical reason; and so this feeling, on account
of its origin, cannot be called pathologically effected but must be called
practically effected
,
and is effected as follows: the representation of the moral
law deprives self-love of its influence and self-conceit of its illusion, and thereby
the hindrance to pure practical reason is lessened and the representation of the
superiority of its objective law to the impulses of sensibility, and with it the
relative weightiness of the law., .is produced in the judgment of reason through the
removal of the counterweight... 36
Respect is an effect on feeling but it is not pleasure; nor can it be compared to any
34
Critique ofPractical Reason, 62, italics added.
35Critique ofPractical Reason, 62-63.
36Critique ofPractical Reason, 65, italics in original.
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pathological feeling because i, is not, Kan, claims,
"pathologically effected." And yet, I,
presupposes the sensibility and finitude that is its condition of possibility:
"Sensible
feeling.
..is indeed the condition of that feeling we call respect..."” Yet, respect is
nonetheless produced solely by reason, by an "intellectual ground." 3* This opens the
arduous path to genuine moral practice that requires getting rid of sensibility, "the
counterweight. I his is not an excavation that the human subject welcomes: "So little is
respect a feeling ofpleasure that we give way to it only reluctantly...We try to discover
something that could lighten the burden of it for us..." 3’ Again: "Respect is a tribute that
we cannot refuse to pay merit, whether we want to or not; we may indeed withhold it
outwardly but we still cannot help feeling it inwardly.”™ Respect exceeds the intentions
of the subject. But it also does more. It exposes the world of appearances to inherent
meaninglessness since something other, something essentially negative, provides the
ground for genuine moral conduct.
A peculiar negativity that can be cognized a priori will provide determination for the
liberated will. But this liberation is not entirely pleasant:
What is essential in every determination of the will by the moral law is that as
free wilL.it is determined solely by the law. So far, then, the effect of the moral
law as incentive is only negative, and as such this incentive can be cognized a
priori. For, all inclination and every sensible impulse is based on feeling, and the
37
Critique ofPractical Reason
,
65.
38 Critique ofPractical Reason
,
64.
39Critique ofPractical Reason
, 66, italics in original.
40Critique ofPractical Reason
, 66, italics in original.
68
negative effect on feeling...* itself a feeling. Hence we can see a priori that themoral law, as the determining ground of the will, must by thwarting all ourinclinations produce a feeling that can be called pain..."
The negative effect on feeling is itself a feeling." On the one hand, feeling is crossed
out, but on the other, a feelingless feeling is itself felt as a feeling. Respect seems to live
off the very feelings that seek to deny respect's own possibility. Feeling the absence of
feeling - ' pain" - corresponds to the negation of the inclinations of the self; this signals
the beginning of one's infinitely tested membership in an intelligible world. The
devastation of self-love is a prerequisite; self-conceit, in addition, must also be struck
down and this involves humiliation. 42 Kant acknowledges that "respect...shows us our
unworthiness with... severity." 43
If pain marks respect at the outset of its appearance, the second moment of respect is
also a negative feeling but one closer to the feeling of pleasure. And it is here that a
striking resemblance between the complicated network of sensations that constitute
respect and Kant's discussion of the sublime in the Critique ofJudgement appears. The
movement of attraction and repulsion in both the feeling of the sublime and respect
results in a negative pleasure. 44 But in the case of respect, the law is not only a source of
41 Critique ofPractical Reason
, 63, emphasis added.
42Critique ofPractical Reason
,
64.
43Critique ofPractical Reason , 67.
44
In reference to the feeling of the sublime, the full quote from the Critique of
Judgment reads: "the mind is not just attracted by the object but is alternatively always
repelled as well, the liking for the sublime contains not so much a positive pleasure as rather
69
pain bu, also the ground of a "positive feeling.- Although respect is no. pleasure, one is
"elevated" and this corresponds to the awareness of needing nothing, the sign of which is
an "inner tranquility.- This is no, so much a pathological reward as i, is a peculiar
comfort Kan, names "consolation" that is the result of viewing the majesty of the moral
law in its absolute holiness. 47
As we have seen, a discussion of the relationship between duty and respect in the
Groundwork initiated Kant's investigation of the latter. He provisionally concludes his
discussion of respect by returning to the concept of duty in the Triebfeder section of the
Critique ofPractical Reason :
ty. Sublime and mighty name that embraces nothing charming or insinuatingbut requires submission, and yet does not seek to move the will by threatening
anything that would arouse natural aversion or terror in the mind but only holdsforth a law that of itself finds entry into the mind and yet gains reluctant
reverence, a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretlv
work against it; what origin is there worthy of you, and where is to be found the
’
root of your noble descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations,
descent from which is the indispensable condition of that worth which human
beings alone can give themselves?48
admiration and respect, and so should be called a negative pleasure;" 98. Respect, in
contrast to the feeling of the sublime, has an a priori status. For a helpful discussion of the
sublime see Fenves’s "Taking Stock of the Kantian Sublime," Eighteenth-Century Studies
vol. 28, no. 1, 1994.
45
Critique ofPractical Reason, 63.
4 6Critique ofPractical Reason, 67, 75.
4
1
Critique ofPractical Reason, 75.
48Critique ofPractical Reason, 73, italics in original.
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The interconnection between our moral duty and the law silences the inclinations. The
critical philosopher even raises the possibility of duty's immaculate conception. This
mystery does not jeopardize the human's moral worth but is the fundamental condition of
it. This worth is not granted by a politician but is self-given, that is, taken. In order to be
a citizen, one must place a law above oneself which in turn "elevates a human being
above himself and the endlessness of this self-overcoming constitutes our proper self.*’
Finally, we discover "the sublimity of our own supersensible existence..." 50 But why
does Kant evade the question of the origin of duty? If there is an origin worthy of duty,
what would it be?
D. Ground
The word ground has particular significance for Kant since respect is unfathomable or
unergruendlich" for speculative reason and because he sought to provide a critical
ground for practice. 51 The centrality of the concept of ground is apparent in the first and
one of the most significant texts in the development of his critical practical philosophy:
Groundwork ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals.“ This text is ambitious because it seeks out
49Critique ofPractical Reason, 74.
"Critique ofPractical Reason, 75.
51 Critique ofPractical Reason, 68. Gregor translates "unergruendlich" as
"impenetrable" which erases the force of the literal connection to the ground contained in
this word. Unfathomable is better.
5
"For an antifoundationalist account of the Kantian critical project see Onora O'Neill.
O’Neill's discussion of the first critique as a "reflexive and political task" is provocative.
See Construction ofReason: Explorations ofKant's Practical Philosophy, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8-10.
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and establishes the supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative “ This is a
necessary and justifiable project since all previous texts on moral philosophy have failed
to locate and elucidate this principle. But to get there one must traverse "the highest limit
of all moral inquiry." 54
Despite its monumental goal, the Groundwork has an astonishing conclusion. The
ultimate foundation for morality, the groundlaying, remains a question and is
fundamentally inaccessible to cognition” A massive gap separates the body of the text
from the character of the inquiry promised by the title. Although the word Groundwork
suggests that this text will provide a groundlaying, groundwork, grounding, or foundation
lor morals, such a foundation is precisely what the text fails to supply. In fact, the
"Concluding Remark" of this text contains the following paradox:
And thus we do not indeed comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity of
the moral imperative, but we nevertheless comprehend its incomprehensibility
and this is all that can fairly be required of a philosophy that strives in its
principles to reach the very boundary of human reason. 56
Alter a transition from "Ordinary Rational Knowledge of Morality to the
Philosophical" and one from "Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysics of Morals," the
text culminates in a paradox that signals the fundamental inaccessibility of the foundation
53Groundwork, 5.
54 Groundwork, 65.
bbGroundlaying is the literal translation of the German word Grundlegung.
,eGroundwork, 66, italics in original.
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for practice. Even though grounding only names a preliminary project, one that will be
worked out three years later in the Critique ofPractical Reason, Kan. does no. even
provide a preliminary grounding. Instead, we get something like an absolute un-
grounding signaled in the invitation to embrace negativity or "comprehend
incomprehensibility.
"
The negativity of Kantian morality has proved to be a significant point of contention
among readers of Kant leading many to dismiss his ethical principles. But during Kant’s
discussion of the sublimity of the Jewish law prohibiting images of the divine in the
Critique ofJudgment, Kant reverses the relation between sensibility and morality and
insists that it is indeed the negativity of morality that is precisely what invigorates the
moral imagination
- gives it force - and checks the practices of governments who seek
pliable subjects:
It is indeed a mistake to worry that depriving this presentation of whatever could
commend it to the senses will result in its carrying with it no more than a cold and
lifeless approval without any moving force or emotion. It is exactly the other way
round. For once the senses no longer see anything before them, while yet the
unmistakable and indelible idea of morality remains, one would sooner need to
temper the momentum of an unbounded imagination so as to keep it from rising to
the level of enthusiasm, than to seek to support these ideas with images and
childish devices for fear that they would otherwise be powerless. That is also why
governments have gladly permitted religion to be amply furnished with such
accessories: they were trying to relieve every subject of the trouble, yet also of the
ability, to expand his soul's forces beyond the barriers that one can choose to set
for him so as to reduce him to mere passivity and so make him more pliable.. .this
pure, elevating, and merely negative exhibition of morality involves no danger of
fanaticism, which is the delusion ofwanting to SEE something beyond all bounds
ofsensibility. ..The exhibition avoids fanaticism precisely because it is merely
negative. For the idea offreedom is inscrutable and thereby precludes all positive
exhibition whatever... 57
57Critique ofJudgment, 135, italics in original.
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The negativity of morality is no, "cold and lifeless" bu, produces imaginative momentum
and is simultaneously a check on fanatictsm; the inverse instantaneously deadens the sou,
and is a tool of governments tha, engineer moral passivity. Governments fear that moral
claims will have no force unless they are supplemented with "childish devices." Kant
does not have this fear. For him, moral practice grounded on freedom ultimately lacks a
ground; freedom is essentially negative. And i, is indeed this negativity that engenders
the moral citizen's empowerment.
But the negative character of moral demands and the human's inability to conceive the
possibility of an action done out of duty does not mean that morality is a mere "phantom"
or that the law fails to effect us. 58 We are summoned by the law that we cannot
completely grasp even though we can nonetheless hear its command. The "voice of
reason" is one that is "so distinct, so irrepressible, and so audible." 59 It "makes even the
boldest evildoer tremble." 60 More terrifyingly, "even the dead are not always safe from
this critical examination." 61 We are in doubt, though, whether the voice of reason "comes
from man, from the perfected power of his own reason, or whether it comes from an
other, whose essence is unknown to us..." 62 The ground for morality cannot be rationally
58Groundwork
,
51.
59Critique ofPractical Reason, 32.
60Critique ofPractical Reason, 68.
61 Critique ofPractical Reason, 66.
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Kant, "On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy," in Raising the Tone of
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elucidated or grasped because it is freedom; that alone, nothing else, transfers the human
into an other order. 63
E. Freedom
When Kant designates God, freedom, and immortality in the Critique ofPure Reason
as the "unavoidable problems set by pure reason” this does not name three separate
undertakings but only one.“ It is the announcement of the problem of freedom as the
most important metaphysical investigation. For both the idea of an eternal divinity and
immortality involve the possibility of something that is entirely unconditioned, that is,
Iree. In the case of God, independence from an origin or ground other than one that is
self-given, or, in the case of immortality, something outside of temporal determination
altogether. And the possibility of both the former and the latter point to the problem of
freedom.
Perhaps more so than any other philosopher, Kant dedicates himself to the problem of
freedom with unprecedented rigor. And even though it occupies a central place in Kant's
writings, freedom never ceases to be an unproblematic concept. Consider, for example,
how Kant speaks of freedom in three different texts. In the Groundwork freedom is
Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant
,
Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida
,
Edited by Peter Fcnves, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 71, emphasis'
added.
63Groundwork, 59.
64 Critique ofPure Reason
,
46.
75
"presupposed."65
,he CrUique ofPractical Reason, freedom is a "fact of reason."66
the Anthropology, freedom appears as something primordial: "The child who has just
come from its mother's womb, unlike all other animals, seems to enter the world with a
loud shriek just because it considers the inability to make use of its limbs a restraint;
consequently, it announces this claim to freedom (which no other animal knows)."65
But over and above these strained formulations and anthropological speculation about
the primal cry, there is something paradoxical about Kant's meditation on freedom. In the
thought of freedom, reason must do what it is ultimately unable to do, that is, think the
unconditioned. A gap separates the conditioning activity of reason and the unconditioned
essence of freedom; for the thought of the unconditioned is incompatible with the ground
giving character of reason. It seems that every thought of freedom is destined to miss its
target. In order to think freedom, then, we have to think the unconditioned. Thought
must think the unthinkable. An unsatisfying predicament indeed: "By constant inquiry
after the condition, the satisfaction of reason is only further and further postponed.”6* The
deferral of cognitive gratification means that freedom always exceeds our faculties: "We
shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible."69 But we should be satisfied
65Groundwork
,
53.
66Critique ofPractical Reason, 28.
67Anthropology, \16.
68Groundwork, 66.
69Groundwork
,
60.
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"if only we can be sufficiently assured that there is no proof of its impossibility..."™ This
is a surprising claim if we accept Henry E. Allison's assertion that freedom inhabits the
most important place in Kant's practical philosophy. 71
The theoretical impossibility of conceiving freedom corresponds to the practical
dificulty of it as well. On the one hand, freedom is the condition of possibility for ethical
practice, but, on the other, freedom is not a stable foundation but designates the complete
removal of all determinate grounds. Freedom will never be a particular place or
standpoint. Kant’s famous "footpath of freedom," the path "on which it is possible to
make use of our reason in our conduct..." turns out to be not so much a trail of security
but something else, something that is at best undecidable. 72 The undecidable character of
freedom is, in the words of Kant, "a terrible thing," not only because it is the condition of
both good and evil but because it also annihilates the stability of the fundamental ground
for practice.
77 The result: the human comes face to face with the radical indeterminacy
of all action. Kant: "The law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act..." 74
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Critique ofPractical Reason
,
79.
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Allison, 1.
72Groundwork, 60.
7 JKant, Lectures on Ethics
,
translated by Louis Infield, (Indianapolis: Hackett Press
1996), 17.
7 4 Metaphysics ofMorals , 1 94. This does not threaten Kantian morality with
pointlessness. It preserves the sublimity of freedom and prevents the denigration of the law
to a tool. For a critique of the potential pointlessness of Kantian morality see J. B.
Schneewind's "Autonomy, obligation and virtue: An overview of Kant's moral philosophy"
in The Cambridge Companion to Kant
,
edited by Paul Guyer, (New York: Cambridge
77
But, and this is Kant's genius, the instability of freedom does not authorize ethical
license. The fundamental undecidability of freedom promises to generate modes of
action that do not negate the freedom that initially penuitted these acts to be possible
all. There is thus a certain lawfulness that corresponds to the instability of freedom:
at
"A
free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same."” But the "reciprocal
relationship" between lawfulness and freedom does not efface the fundamental riddle of
freedom. At the bottom of it all, freedom is the law, and the law can only ever be
freedom.
Kant maintains in the Groundwork that contemplating the possibility of the law as an
imperative of freedom leads one to the "extreme boundary of all practical philosophy." 76
Conducting oneself in accordance with it goes further. For Kant believed that it would
lead to nothing less than a total cosmic inversion of the fundamental laws of the universe;
the force of the laws of nature in determining conduct are replaced with the force of
freedom. We must "conduct ourselves in accordance with maxims of freedom as if they
University Press, 1992). For a valorization of the non-technical foundation for ethics and
politics see The Other Heading by Jacques Derrida, translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and
Michael B. Nass, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992). Derrida states, "when a
responsibility is exercised in the order of the possible, it simply follows a direction and
elaborates a program. It makes of action the applied consequence, the simple application of
a knowledge or know-how. It makes of ethics and politics a technology. No longer of the
order ofpractical reason or decision, it begins to be irresponsible;" 45, emphasis added.
Although Derrida is critical of Kant, there is a striking similarity between Kant's conception
of practical reason and the Derridean decision.
75Groundwork, 53. See Velkley for a discussion of the impact of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau's conception of law on Kant.
76Groundwork, 59.
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were laws of nature."” Freedom, a new ground in the outer reaehes of eogni.ion, ehanges
Place with the laws of nature and becomes the condition of possibility for an elevated and
redeemed planet. The initial sign of this possibility is the feeling of one's own radical
independence from nature.
But the possibility of even a partial independence from nature depends on human
receptivity. One must receive what is absolutely other and intrinsically opposed to the
innermost composition of the human. This is especially difficult to bear since the moral
law recognizes no limits. The logical result of the limitlessness of moral commands is
permanent moral failure; these commands can never be fulfilled. 78 But the unfulfillability
and impossibility of moral commands does not mean that they are opaque, even though
they may produce thauma in the resident of Koenigsberg himself: "The simplicity of this
law. ..must seem astonishing..." 79 This is the law: "So act that the maxim of your will
could always hold at the same time as a principle in a giving of universal law." 80 In the
categorical imperative, the human is commanded to do the impossible and this is the
77Groundwork, 66.
7 8For an intriguing discussion of the non-fulfillable character of the moral law refer to
Hamacher’s Premises
,
81-108. During his discussion of the relationship between the moral
law and happiness, Coles claims that the moral law would involve reason in the
contradiction of commanding that it determine and will itself according to something which
is fundamentally impossible;" 45. By appealing to the principle of non-contradiction, it is
not Kant but Coles who privileges the sovereignty of reason. I find Hamacher's discussion
of structural impossibility in Kant more persuasive.
7 9Metaphysics ofMorals, 5 1
.
80Critique ofPractical Reason, 28.
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essence, no, of Kant's ntoral reform, bu, of his moral revolution. Kant's famous criticism
of revolution in the Metaphysics ofMorals should be viewed strictly within the domain of
legality. Kan, never ruled ou, the possibility of a moral revolution:
''That a human being
should become no, merely legally good, bu, morally good...canno, be effected through
gradual reform bu, must rather be effected through a solution in the disposition of the
human being." 81
I he name for the moral revolution in the disposition of the human is Achtung. Respect
names the complete annihilation of political projects grounded on pathological
subject, vity. It also signals the impossibility of human moral perfection but without
abandoning the aspiration for it. A distinctly human feeling of moral failure, respect
reminds us that there is no secure position on which moral conduct can be based. But as
a sign of the human's moral finitude, respect nonetheless names the possible elevation of
the human out of the causal mechanism and into a "kingdom of ends.” Although he is
morally elevated, he is also embodied. 12 He is free but he cannot completely step outside
of sensibility. Ascending as he falls and descending as he rises, the Kantian moral agent
81
Religion within the Boundaries ofMere Reason, 67-8, italics in original.
8 For the theme of embodiment in Kant's writings see Susan Meld Shell, The
Embodiment ofReason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community, (Chicago - University
of Chicago Press, 1996). See also The Rights ofReason: A Study ofKant's Philosophy and
Politics, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980). In the latter, Shell states, "By thus
heightening the importance of intellectual and economic rights, Kant lessens the
significance of the distinction he draws between active and passive citizenship. An
empirically republican government is less urgently needful than the formal right to develop
fully one's own powers;" 173. Iam made uneasy by the distinction Shell draws between
active and passive citizenship. Given Kant's own insistence on the importance of autonomy
and, more generally, Kant's egalitarian hopefulness, passive citizenship is oxymoronic.
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is occupied by divergent forces that never entirely supply a standpoint that exceeds the
poles of this motile opposition. But the regime of sensibility does not stop him from
attempting to elevate himself above the tyrannical voice of pathology because the Kantian
moral agent also hears the "voice of reason " 8^
F. Ethical Paradox
Readers of Kant from a wide variety of priesthoods have had a difficult time coming
to terms with the feeling of respect. It is, in the words of Sarah Kofman, an "economy of
panic;" for Jean-Francois Lyotard it is "a blank feeling;" for Adorno, respect is even
"repressive." 84 But for the purposes of this study I examine Connolly's recent critique of
Kant. In his important Why I am Not a Secularist, he theorizes the "visceral register," a
name designating gut feelings and embodied trauma, and in the Chapter entitled "A
Critique of Pure Politics," he launches a critique of Kantian purity. 85 And it is here that
Connolly smells an unconscious dogmatism and imperialism in Kant; he is nervous about
the Kantian devaluation of sensibility; he wonders, finally, whether Kant places his
command morality outside a zone of legitimate contestation. 86 I understand and share
83Critique ofPractical Reason, 32.
8 4 See Sarah Kofman, "The Economy of Respect: Kant and Respect for Women,"
translated by Nicola Fisher, in Feminist Interpretations ofImmanuel Kant, Edited by Robin
May Schott, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Jean-Francois
Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic ofthe Sublime, translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg,
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 118; Adorno, 232.
85Connolly, 1999, 163.
8bSee also Connolly's "Speed, Concentric Cultures, and Cosmopolitanism" in
Political Theory, vol. 28, no. 5, 2000.
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Connolly's hesitations but, as I have shown,
.her is another way to approach Kant"
Connolly sees a dangerous drive to purity in Kant, hut as 1 have demonstrated that
there is also a struetural contamination at work. He sees command morality in Kant; so
do I, but it is a paradoxical one. In contrast to Connolly, my reading seeks to unhinge the
conservative appropriation of Kant at its root in the name of a Kantian ethic of paradox.
Such an ethic does not involve the either/or choice of embracing law or affirming
essential contingency (an opposition that I believe contemporary ethical reflection needs
to question to a greater extent than it has) but doing both at the same time.' 11 And this is
precisely what can deepend and expand contemporary conceptualizations of the
foundations for ethico-political practice. Although I can only sketch the outlines of this
ethic here, it is my alternative to Connolly's ethic of "agonistic respect" that he develops
in opposition to Kant.
A Kantian ethic of paradox affirms the value of the moral force contained in
categorical lawful pronouncements and is also attentive to the inescapable aporetic
dimensions, the conditions of possibility that are simultaneously conditions of
impossibility, of these commands. 89 Secondly, a Kantian ethic of paradox aspires to
8 7Although I cannot develop this theme here, I believe that Connolly has prematurely
accepted a domesticated rendering of Kant.
88Habermas is probably the clearest example of an advocate of rationality and
universality.
89As the reader may realize, I am borrowing this paradoxical formulation from the
work of Jacques Derrida. For his discussion of conditions of possibility that are
simultaneously conditions of impossibility see his essay in Deconstruction and
Pragmatism
,
Edited by Chantal Mouffe, entitled "Remarks on Deconstruction and
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value universality and singularity at the same time. It thus seeks a middle position
between advocates of abstract universalism, on the one hand, and particularity, on the
other. At its worst, an overemphasis on universality results in imperialism,
homogenization, and universal domination; affirming the particular, taken to the extreme,
produces nationalism, relativism, and subjectivism. So we need to know the dangers of
both the affirmation of universality and particularity, but also the value of both.
Derrida's recent work on cosmopolitanism and hospitality has gone further than any
other contemporary thinker in this regard. He articulates the necessity, value, and
mdispensability of a "double contradictory imperative" or "double duty." 90 Universality
is limited by valuing particularity; and particularity is stretched outside its idiom by the
universal. The one is always inscribed into the other. So it is not a choice between
universality or particularity but creating and enacting modes of thinking and practices that
value both at the same time. In Derrida's words: "the difficulty is to gesture in opposite
directions at the same time." 91 This "double duty" simultaneously enables ethical conduct
Pragmatism," translated by Simon Critchley, (New York: Routledge, 1996), 82.
One of the practical torms that this "double duty" takes is "welcoming foreigners in
order not only to integrate them but to recognize and accept their alterity: two concepts of
hospitality that today divide our European and national consciousness." And: "The same
duty dictates respecting differences, idioms, minorities, singularities, but also the
universality of formal law, the desire for translation, agreement and univocity, the law of
the majority, opposition to racism, nationalism, and xenophobia;" Derrida, The Other
Heading
,
1992, 77, 78, emphasis in original.
91 See Richard Kearney's interview with Derrida in Dialogues With Contemporary
Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage, (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1984), 120.
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bu, disables it too. It makes ethics difficult. But without ethical difficulty there is no
reason to work at being ethical.
But let us return to Kant. Have I forced Kantian respect into a paradoxical structure
that undermines the logical consistency of Kant's practical philosophy? The answer is no.
All commentators on respect acknowledge respect's mysterious status. And I refuse to
ignore or homogenize the textual tensions that constitute respect. Indeed, I affirm its
paradoxical movement. Finally, I have shown that there is a structural instability to
ground and freedom in Kant's practical philosophy as well. But what is the value of the
paradox of respect and what are the implications of this paradox on Kant's practical
philosophy as a whole?
First, the paradox of respect can help us appreciate the essentially ambiguous status of
fundamental elements of Kant’s practical philosophy in order to attune us to the actual
complexity of moral problems in the real world. I believe that the paradox, the one that
reason and the will to meaning seek to annul, can open a space for reflection. Second,
generating a paradox in a relatively new place may provide an impetus to read other crisis
points in Kant's writings. While I think that he is too dismissive of Kant's practical
philosophy, I applaud Coles's affirmative re-reading of the sublime, genius, and aesthetic
ideas in the Critique ofJudgment that he develops to articulate an ethic of receptive
generosity. 92
Third, the paradox of respect can create a space from which one can contest ethical
92Coles, 1997.
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programs that destroy space for the singularity of the other, especially when the other is a
hybrid or paradox. Kant's own valuation of the paradox is consistent with the founding
gesture of the critical project: restraining cognitive hubris. Affirming paradox suspends
the will to cognitive domination. But sometimes letting a paradox persist may signal, as
Kan, pu, i, earlier, "logical obstinacy." Bu, no, always. I, may be a generous response to
constitutive ethical ambiguity. Finally, even though the paradox may suspend the
sovereignty of reason and push it to its limit, it is valuable because it can irritate it out of
self-assurance or thoughtlessness, and perhaps it can even "awaken the mind." 93 As Jean-
Luc Nancy puts it: "Thinking is always thinking on the limit. The limit of
comprehending defines thinking. Thus thinking is always thinking about the
incomprehensible..." 94
G. Beyond Kant
The themes taken up in this chapter depart radically from most of the literature on Kant
in the field of political theory. As was the case in my chapter on Hobbes, my chapter on
Kant contains important lessons in reading and also illustrates how Kant can be mobilized
for the purposes of radicalizing contemporary political thought. Whether or not the
Kantian subject articulated in the Critique ofPure Reason is at odds with the paradoxical
dimensions that I have highlighted in respect is a question that goes beyond the confines
of this study.
93Anthropology, 12.
94Nancy, 54.
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CHAPTER 4
NIETZSCHE'S ETHIC OF SINGULARITY
A. Back to Nietzsche
The word, event, enigma, paradox, or madman known as Nietzsehe has not stopped
exerting a peculiar anxiety in academic settings. One of the signs of this anxiety is the
speed Nietzsche is summoned for various political agendas rendering a democratic, anti-
democratic, egalitarian, unegalitarian, radical, conservative, moralist, and anti-moralist
Nietzsche.
1
But, could it be that Nietzsche is significant as an ethical and political thinker
L1S 'T?S'u e v aCCOUntf0ralUheworkthathasrecently Wared on Nietzsche Irefer to the scholarship here that I believe has been the most widely received and comment
°^
er™JOr se
^
ondary writings throughout this essay. David W. Conway's Nietzscheand 0* Pol
,, New York: Routledge, 1997) examines Nietzsche's political signifiedin a sustained way. More is said about this text later. In Nietzsche and Political ThoughtMark Warren explores the role Nietzsche plays in the transition from modem to postmodern
thinking (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988). See Abbey and Appel's response to Warren
!"
,q0T“ 7'e‘fSche: A Response to Mark Warren" (Political Theory, Vol. 27 No
1
,
1 999 1 2 1
-125). In Nietzsche and Metaphor, Sarah Kofman not only examines the role of
metaphor in Nietzsche but discusses the ways in which Nietzsche cannot be categorized-
tran isated by Large (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). In Allegories ofReading
Paul de Man investigates the rhetorical dimensions in Nietzsche. De Man accuses
Nietzsche not of a "performative contradiction," but a rhetorical one; Nietzsche cannot
escape the rhetorical language he condemns; Allegories ofReading: Figural Language in
Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) In the
Origin ofGerman Tragic Drama
,
Walter Benjamin distances himself from Nietzsche and
accuses him of aestheticism (103). And yet, Benjamin seeks to go beyond knowledge
secured by subjectivity in the judging word and criticizes the concept. Both gestures
resonate as dominant themes in Nietzsche's work. Origin ofGerman Tragic Drama
,
translated by Osborne (London: Verso, 1977). In the last sentences of his essay "History
and Mimesis" in Looking After Nietzsche, Lacoue-Labarthes links both Nietzsche and
Heidegger to "determinate politics." Although Lacoue-Labarthes’s analysis of history and
mimesis is provocative, he risks obscuring important differences between the complicated
political alliances that both Nietzsche and Heidegger made. Nietzsche's support of the new
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to the extent that he defies delations and forces us to endlessly reevaluate fundamental
ethical and political categories? The radical disparities in the interpretation of his work
suggests that this may be the case. If Nietzsche is too quickly appropriated on the one
hand, he is often too quickly criticized or even dismissed for the possible problems that
result from his philosophy, on the other. A new reading of some of the major works by
Nietzsche can expand our sense of political and ethical possibilities. 2
Nietzsche's significance as an ethical thinker is disputed or dismissed. He might share
German state is not even analogous to Heidegger's alliance with National Socialism.
ooking After Nietzsche, edited by Rickels (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990). Derrida has
witten extensively on Nietzsche in path-breaking ways. In Spurs, he examines the question
ofwomen in Nietzsche; Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles
,
translated by Harlow (Chicago 1
Univer^ty of Ghieago Press, 1979). In Politics ofFriendship, Deirida examines Nietzschehe philosopher of the perhaps. Derrida's work opens productive avenues for further
research and he is careful not to close questions before they are adequately opened.(London: Verso, 1997). William Connolly has a provocative discussion ofNietzsche in
Ethos °fAlkalization and in Why Iam Not a Secularist. In the former he discuses
Nietzsche's "nontheistic gratitude for being" (31). Since Nietzsche relentlessly criticized
eing I wonder whether Connolly's reading smuggles in precisely what Nietzsche has
excommunicated. Connolly's conception of "little deviant acts" (68) is also provocative
although it risks diminutizing Nietzsche's importance. In Rethinking Generosity, Romand
Coles shows how Nietzsche can be mobilized for an ethic of generosity. Coles redirects
needed attention to Zarathustra, one of Nietzsche's most neglected and difficult books. In
Political Theory and the Displacement ofPolitics, Bonnie Honig shows how Nietzsche
could enrich our understanding of responsibility.
2Nietzsche was preoccupied by specific historical, political, economic, ethical, and
cultural phenomenon including the Franco-Prussian War, the founding of the new German
state, the question of German and European identity, and the complicated implications of
Richard Wagner in Bayreuth. To restrict his significance to the private realm, as Richard
Rorty does in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity diminishes Nietzsche's significance and
may even encourage one to overlook how he engaged these specific problems and how he
may be able to help us think about our own political, cultural, and ethical dilemmas. See
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 197.
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some of the blame for this since his unconventional writing style and the challenges
posed by his experimentation makes i, difficult to translate his ideas into simple ethical
maxims. Various scholarly agendas have also blurred the ethical dimensions of his work.
Martm Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche from the 1930s focus disproportionately on the
will giving an incomplete and potentially problematic rendering of the ethical meaning of
"the last metaphysician."’ Peter Berkowitz, Alexander Nehemas, Juergen Habermas, and
Ronald Dworkin have even contended that Nietzsche rejects morality.- In contrast to
these interpretive trends, a growing body of research has shown that Nietzsche expands
our ethical horizons.
The work of William Connolly is a perfect example of this tendency. 5 Motivated by
1Kn
3
^,
artin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Zweite Band, (Verlag Guenther Neske, Pfullingen96
1 ). Nietzsche, translated by David Farrell Krell, (Harper & Row Publishers 1 9791More is said about Heidegger's impressive study later in this essay.
Berkowitz, Peter, Nietzsche: The Ethics ofan Immoralist, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995). Berkowitz asserts that Nietzsche "generates impossibly high and
inevitably destructive standards for ethics and politics"; 20. See also Nehemas, Alexander,
Nietzsche: Life as Literature, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985): "Nietzsche is
clearly much more concerned with the question of how one's actions are to fit together into
a coherent, self-sustaining, well-motivated whole than he is with the quality of those actions
themselves"; 166. Juergen Habermas, in The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity:
Twelve Lectures, translated by Frederick G. Lawrence, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987)
states: "Nietzsche appeals to experiences that are displaced back into the archaic realm -
experiences of self-disclosure of a decentered subjectivity, liberated from all constraints of
cognition and purposive activity, all imperatives of utility and morality"; 94. Similarly,
Ronald Dworkin, during a talk at Amherst College (October 25, 1 999), claimed that
Nietzsche thinks that it is bad when the law stops a kidnapper.
5
In his essay, "Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault,"
Political Theory, Vol. 21 No. 3, August 1993, Connolly discusses Nietzsche at length.
Another example of the counter-trend is David W. Conway's Nietzsche and the Political.
Conway claims that "the over-arching goal of his politics is to preserve the diminished
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the possibility of creating a non-foundationalis, ethic, Connolly examines the significance
of the "body" and the role of feelings, or "contingent installations" in Nietzsche's
writings.
6
From this, he develops an ethos of generosity and claims that this is the locus
of Nietzsche's ethical meaning. Although my essay is mspired by Connolly's insightful
work, it also challenges it. In contrast to Connolly, who pays scrupulous attention to the
"body," but downplays the significance of law in Nietzsche, I examine ressemimem and
the pathos of distance and their relationship to law in Nietzsche's most significant texts on
morality. My readings of Zur Genealogie der Moral and Jemeits von Gut und Boese
demonstrate that Nietzsche's conception of ethical citizenship hinges on the relationship
between human feelings and law.’ In these texts, Nietzsche connects feelings to specific
moral and practical problems and this gives a future to thinking about both ethics and
politics.
Nietzsche opens ethical and political foundations to critique. He solicits a crisis in
purposive subjectivity whose ultimate assassination is the condition of possibility for a
new ethical sensibility. He wants to provoke a crisis in the meaning of ethics in order to
pathos of distance that ensures the possibility of ethical life and moral development in late
modernity"; 47.
6Heidegger claims that subjectivity becomes the body in Nietzsche (Vol. 4, 133).
7
Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Boese und Zur Genealogie der Moral.
Eine Streitschrift. (Muenchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988). I will also use
Kaufmann's and Hollingdale's English translation On the Genealogy ofMorals, edited by
Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). I also use Kaufmann's version of
Beyond Good and Evil (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).
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keep ethical reflection alive.' That means i, may no longer be possible to cling to
convictions.’ As we shall see, it is indeed the fixed character of ethics that is the
privileged target of Nietzsche's thinking:
"everything fixed killeth.'"" For him, there arc
no rules to follow that would give ethics any security. This does not lower the burden of
responsibility but intensifies it. Ethics becomes a challenge without a position of
comfort. This is the result of Nietzsche's thoughts on the connection between ethics and
feeling. Through feelings, Nietzsche stares at nihilism without blinking.
Not all feelings are the same, nor are they all essentially passive and/or reactive.
Situated in a space between relativism and absolutism, Nietzsche's ethics demands the
cultivation of an ethical sensitivity that does not insist on the necessity of a stable
foundation for ethical conduct but is nonetheless grounded on a law." In Nietzsche the
word "law" is emptied of its traditional metaphysical content - abstract universality -
Heidegger s words in Being and Time on science also apply to ethics: "The real
movement of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less
radical revision which is not transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached isdetermined by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts"; 29.
9
Nietzsche, Antichrist, "Convictions are prisons"; 184.
10
Antichrist, 156.
U
In "Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault," Connolly
makes a distinction between the moral and the ethical. Morality involves a firm anchor,
law, equivalence, teleology, commands; the ethical requires the cultivation of "possibilities
of being," "agonopluralism," and "tactics applied by the self to the self; Political Theory,
Vol. 21, No. 3 August 1993, 370-372. Although the distinction Connolly makes is
heuristic, I believe that Nietzsche frustrates his dichotomy. As we shall see, Nietzsche does
not completely abandon the Kantian imperative ethical tradition that Connolly criticizes. In
addition, Connolly's ontological dimension is relentlessly put into question in Nietzsche's
writings.
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and becomes a principle offormal contingency that grounds ethical conduct. Even
though feelings are essential for his ethics, they do no, take a completely aesthetre form.':
The key to understanding Nietzsche's new ethical position that affirms the loss of
metaphysical foundations, the pointlessness of suffering, and the ultimate
meaninglessness of human existence, can only be found in the interrelationship between
feelings, foundations, and practice that he articulates in his writings. This mixture is
inextricably connected to the possibility of autonomy and the self-relation of the will. 1 ’
The specific challenge confronting Nietzsche, and the one that is important for this essay,
is how some feelings are not incompatible with autonomy. Only those feelings that meet
this requirement can justifiably ground practice. 14
The first result of this new grounding is an ethic of sensitivity, or as I have called it in
the title of this essay, an ethic of singularity. Sensitivity is the ground for the emergence
F- an intnguing study of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics see Jane
Bennett's "’How is it, then, that we still remain barbarians?': Foucault, Schiller and the
Aestheticization of Ethics." Political Theory
,
Vol. 24, No. 4, November 1996
,
653-672.
“Explicitly ethical considerations ground the distinction between nobles and slaves
in the Genealogie. This should be understood within an explicitly Kantian problematic.
Nietzsche also develops a Kantian conception of autonomy. Giving oneself a law - the law
of life - is not only central to ethical nobility but it can be sharply contrasted to the passive,
reactive, and pathological morality of ressentiment. Jean-Luc Nancy has explored the
relationship between Nietzsche and Kant in "Our Probity," in Looking After Nietzsche. He
claims that reading Kant in Nietzsche is "indispensable"; 80. Another helpful discussion of
the connection between Kant and Nietzsche appears in Mark Warren's Nietzsche and
Political Thought.
“Conway (1997) has emphasized Nietzsche's interest in the ultimate justification, or
foundation, of ethics and politics. According to him, Nietzsche seeks to subordinate politics
to ethics. This is an important corrective to readings that ignore Nietzsche's ethical
dimensions altogether.
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of singularity - the birth of the individual. 15 The second result is an ethic of the
Antichrist. It links the force of an imperative of aporia, impossibility, and negativity -
formal contingency - with the necessity of permanent experimentation. It foregrounds
the risk and danger of ethical practice but also the joy, hope, and possibility that
accompanies every risk. Because he links his new ethical position to human feeling,
Nietzsche’s ethics emerge not as a formula, technique, knowledge, or program that is
mechanically implemented, but rather as a contingent experience of ethical peril where
the meaninglessness of human existence is constantly affirmed through perpetual self-
overcoming through submission to the fundamental law of practice: the law of life. This
law does not demand ethical homogeneity or the sacrifice of the senses in an ascetic
slaughterhouse but generates sensitivity. Paradoxically, one may have to be evil, at least
from the standpoint of the herd, in order to be sensitive.
B. Feeling
Feeling marks a knot of political and ethical problems in Nietzsche and is linked first
and foremost to his thinking on morality. In Daybreak, he states "behind feelings there
stand judgments and evaluations which we inherit in the form of feeling." 16 That
Nietzsche made the link between morality and feeling paramount does not make
understanding his thoughts on this connection any easier. The first reason is that there are
a plurality of words to refer to feeling in Nietzsche including Stimmung, Affekt, and
15For the best discussion of individuality in Nietzsche see Hamacher's essay
"'Disgregation of the Will': Nietzsche on the Individual and Individuality" in Premises.
16Daybreak, 25.
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Gefuehl. Separating one from the other and determining the precise shades of difference
between them would not yield results because Nietzsche is not consistent in the usage of
these words. But whatever the diverse etymological origins of these words may be. all of
them nevertheless have something important in common: they mark the limit of
cognition.
Unlike Descartes, Hobbes, and Kant, where a certain Scholastic precision is evident in
their effort to think about feelings, Nietzsche does not give a clear definition of feeling.
That is the second reason why examining feeling in Nietzsche is difficult. Additionally,
the fact that every person feels does not make it any easier to think about feeling. As that
which is closest to us, and perhaps the easiest to examine, it is the most obvious of all and
hence overlooked. But Nietzsche does not even claim that we have access to our own
body: "Our body is something outside of us.'" 7 Later, in Beyond Good and EviL
Nietzsche maintains that "our body is but a social structure composed of many souls." 18
It is not certain what a body is or whether we even have one.
Thinking the nonconceptual marks the difficulty of examining feeling in Nietzsche. If
he will remain true to the crisis that he demands, Nietzsche must simultaneously create
and subvert the vocabulary that marks feeling. Only that could prevent feeling from
becoming a concept. As we shall see, Nietzsche says strange, experimental, and even
sometimes incompatible things about feeling and this is what makes examining feeling
11 Unpublished Writings, 179.
18Beyond Good and Evil, 26.
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worthwhile in his writings. Even if we will never have aecess to feelings as sueh, the
attempt to think about feeling highlights cognitive limits that are important for
understanding Nietzsche’s ethical importance.
C. Toward a Genealogy ofMorals
The Genealogy tells a chilling story of the origin of moral categories in violence. 19
Nietzsche does not philosophize with a hammer but with his nose: "My genius is in my
nostrils." He smells blood and cruelty lurking behind the moral world. The reader is
addressed directly and is advised to learn how to read, that is, "to practice reading as an
art" (Preface; 8). Perhaps the reader will understand nothing in this polemical text: "If
this book is incomprehensible to anyone. ..the fault.. .is not necessarily mine" (Ibid). The
author talks of types who are atypical, of the will not to will, the meaninglessness of the
will to meaning, and the foundations of subjectivity in self-negation. Although it is
mainly a critical text, Nietzsche proposes a complicated ethical alternative to the
Christian moral universe. He seeks to open a space for reflection about ethical
alternatives foreclosed by Christianity through a devastating act of historical de-
sedimentation in order to "traverse with quite novel questions, and as though with new
eyes, the enormous, distant, and so well hidden land of morality. .."(Preface; 7). From a
19Does exposing the history of morality destroy its ability to assume an imperative
form? If moral categories emerge under specific historical conditions, does the revelation
of this fact destroy the basis for morality altogether? This is precisely what Leo Strauss
accepted as a fact but sought to cover with "noble rhetoric." As I shall demonstrate, the
answer is no.
20Ecce Homo, 326.
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standpoint without epistemological security, this text criticizes totality i„ all its forms:
ontological, scientific, and Christian
.
21
The Genealogy occupies a decisive place in Nietzsche's oeuvre. Looking back over the
textual landscape that constitutes his philosophical life, Nietzsche remarks: "The
questions concerning the origin of moral values is for me a question of the very first rank
because it is crucial for the future of humanity.- Questioning morality is the theme that
gives force to the Genealogie. The force of this line of questioning takes shape as a
demand: "we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must
first be called into question...”(Preface; 6). To this end, Nietzsche is preoccupied with the
moral significance of specific human feelings including pity, nausea, fear, self-disgust,
weariness, ressentiment, and the pathos of distance, all in order to answer one simple
question: what is the value of morality?23
1 hat feelings occupy a central and unifying place is clear early on in this text. In the
Preface Nietzsche claims that the impulse to publish his book was given by Paul Ree's
1 877 text The Origin ofthe Moral Feeling (Preface; 4), but his history with this matter
goes back further. As a boy of thirteen, Nietzsche explains, he confronted the problem of
According to Nietzsche, science and Christianity are allies. Both are modes of
myth insofar as they attempt to account for the origin. "Let there be light" (Gen. 1 :3) is no
different from the "big bang." The latter could even be the secularized version of
immaculate conception, i.e, scientific theology.
22
Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 291.
23Deleuze claims that Nietzsche poses "the problem of critique in terms of values"
Nietzsche & Philosophy, translated by Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press,
1 983) 1 . Deleuze's book has had a large impact on the reception of Nietzsche in France.
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the origin of evil (Preface; 3) and this marked the beginning of his analysis of .he
conditions, especially the feelings, grounding the emergence of moral valuation.
Nietzsche's interest in this problem is also apparent in every text that proceeded the
publication of the Genealogies
Not feelings as such, but specific moral feelings, concerned Nietzsche because he
suspected that they were the conditions for moral valuation:
"moralities are merely a sign
language of the affects [Zeichensprache der Affekte]." 25 The inner composition of the
structure of human subjectivity emerges as the privileged level of analysis. Once he
locates the dominant moral feelings, he evaluates these feelings so that the values they
produce can be determined. The moods, emotions, and feelings, that is, the markers of
the historical, particular, and contingent essence of the subject, are the signs that
Nietzsche will decipher.
Moral feelings are also important because they are connected with the possibility of
" 4Although it is only in the Genealogie where the relation between feeling and
morality receives its clearest formulation, two earlier texts paved the way for the
Genealogie in crucial ways: The Birth ofTragedy and "On Truth and Lie in an Extra Moral
Sense." The Birth of Tragedy discusses the cathartic effect of tragic drama and, more
importantly, the birth of individuation in the suspension of the Dionysian feelings that
threaten to disintegrate it.(New York: Vintage Books, 1967). In "On Truth and Lie in an
Extra-Moral Sense,"Nietzsche shows how the concept world is built on the graveyard of
feelings. Only through using concepts against concepts can feelings burst through these
ghostly abstractions. The free intellect "smashes this [conceptual] framework to pieces,
throws it into confusion, and puts it back together in an ironic fashion, pairing the most
alien things and separating the closest, it is demonstrating that it has no need of these
makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by
concepts"; 90.
zbBeyond Good and Evil, 1 00.
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intersubjectivity and moral autonomy. They are also essential for understanding the self-
relation of the will, a relation that has culminated in self-laceration as a result of the ami-
sensualis, ascetic ideals of Christianity. The most
.mportant feelings that Nietzsche
explores in the Genealogie in this regard are ressemimen, and the pathos of distance*
These feelings are no. only the site where the essence of Nietzsche's ethical significance
can be found but also where a fictional battle is staged between being and becoming,
represented by the figures of the slaves and nobles. 27
D. Ressentiment
Ressemimen, is one of the dominant feelings that Nietzsche analyzes and it is linked to
a network of concepts in the Genealogie including suffering, guilt, bad conscience, pity,
sympathy, debt, the will, and groundlessness.
2
* It is a problem that goes back at least to
the Untimely Meditations where, in the essay on history, Nietzsche claims that people can
2 6The latter corresponds to the affirmation of the loss of metaphysical foundations,
etting go, justice, an obligation to the future, and giving oneself laws; the former to the
spiteflil denial of absence and groundlessness, the will to self-maltreatment, the hatred of
difference, a politics of revenge, and the will to nothingness.
In Allegories ofReading, de Man claims that there are demagogic value oppositions
in Nietzsche (1 19). It may be useful to chart the history of these alleged oppositions. De
Man, moreover, claims that Nietzsche is unable to escape from the rhetorical deceit he
denounces (115). As with some of the formulaic versions of deconstruction, the results of
de Man's reading of Nietzsche are predictable.
" 8 For an interpretation of ressentiment refer to Max Scheler's On Feeling, Knowing,
and Valuing, translated by Bershady, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) 1 lb-
143. For a variety of readings of ressentiment see Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays
on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy ofMorals, Edited by Schacht, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994). For a discussion of the relationship between ressentiment and
politics refer to Wendy Brown, States ofInjury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
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"bleed ,o death from a single experience, a single pain, particularly even from a s.ngle
mtld injustice." 29 Even if Nietzsche's appeal to youth at the end of this essay is
undeveloped, the history essay nevertheless marks
investigation into the interrelationship between
an important moment in his
experience, pain, forgetting, action, life,
and history. But Nietzsche goes farther in traeing the implications of the interconnection
between pain and the possibility of liberation in the Genealogie.
W,th ressentiment in the Genealogie, Nietzsche explores its complex conditions of
possibility and its relation to the birth of a specific se, of moral categories. In the history
essay, Nietzsche avoided the question of subjects who want to bleed on others, or display
their wounds. In the Genealogie this is precisely the problem that he investigates. He
examines the relation between ressenlimenl and the modes of intersubjectivity (the herd
form) it demands. Ressenlimenl emerges as a peculiar rage at mediation signaled in the
lack of access to the thing in itself that results in the construction of a fictional ideal realm
that devalues sense and culminates in self-torture and in the desire to eradicate the other.
The Genealogie consists ol a preface and three essays that address interrelated themes.
The First Essay discusses how ressenlimenl gives birth to values; the Second shows how
it is transformed into bad conscience; in the Third, Nietzsche demonstrates how ascetic
priests manage and alter the direction of ressentiment and link it to the will to
nothingness. Indebted to the French word "sentir"~"to feel, to smell, to be conscious of
- the experience of ressentiment is the metaphysicalization of feeling. This refers to a
29
"On the Use and Abuse of History for Life,” 89.
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process that crystallizes becoming into being. Although all sensations are linked to
specific empirical events that take place at particular temporal moments, this is no longer
the case with ressentiment because it breaks the link between feeling and time and clogs
receptivity. The detemporalized residue of specific actions and events collect in the body
and the feelings associated with these actions are felt over and over again as festering
wounds.
The origin of ressentiment is contradictory. On the one hand it is a narcotic, but on the
other, it negates the feeling that it gives. Nietzsche claims that "the actual physiological
cause of ressentiment" is a "desire to deaden pain by means of affects" (Essay 3; 15).
Unable to forget and sublimate pain into creative activities that discharge it, the one
infected with this explosive feels all events as eternal insults and injuries: "One cannot
get rid of anything, one cannot get over anything, one cannot repel anything - everything
hurts. Seeking to deaden his pain, the man of ressentiment feels and constantly re-feels
everything as an affront (Essay 3; 15). He then seeks subterranean revenge for these
imagined injuries. Although he lives, he is also dead; and he gives his death as a gift to
anything that reminds him of his non-life.
Although ressentiment is a feeling, it is one that is unlike all others. If the word feeling
designates the possibility of vulnerability, that is, the capacity to be wounded by the
other, then ressentiment does not qualify as a feeling because it immediately reintegrates
all sensations into categories oriented to ascribing guilt and blame. Out of this ascription
30Nietzsche, Ecce Homo
,
translated by Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989)
230.
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and the "seduction of language" (Essay !; 13) that posits "being" behind "doing," the
defensive, reactive, and bordered subject is bom. This birth marks an important historical
moment - a fictitious subject is created for the purposes of blame, guilt, torture, and
punishment. In this way, ressentiment is inextricably linked to a valuative and moral
standpoint that culminates in internally and externally tormented subjectivity. 3 '
This is the first reference to ressentiment in the Genealogie: "The slave revolt in
morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the
ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate
themselves with an imaginary revenge" (Essay 1 ; 1 0). Living under the domination of the
instinct for self-preservation, the man of ressentiment gives birth to moral values that
arise out of his inability to act and his defensive and antagonistic relation to everything
that exists. Since he cannot act, he plots. Nietzsche defines the man of ressentiment as
one who "understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be
provisionally self-deprecating and humble" (Essay 1; 10). Prominent among anti-Semites
(Essay 2, 11), men infected with ressentiment look outward and construct their enemies —
them - in order to deceive themselves that they are happy (Essay 1; 10). All oppositional
political groupings are rooted in ressentiment
,
32
Hence, it is fundamentally incompatible
3 Perhaps the best example of tormented subjectivity would be the saintly Christian
voluptuary, the master of pleasure and self-torment known as St. Augustine. See the
Confessions (Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1989).
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche maintains that "one may doubt whether there
are any opposites at all"; 10. For him, there are "only degrees and many subtleties of
gradation"; 35. "The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in opposite
values"; 10.
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with autonomy because it always receives its ground for action from an externally
imposed source, and then it creates moral categories that value this very reactivity and
conformity. Whereas the noble reveres his enemies as a life tonic (Essay 1 ; 10), slave
morality says no to what is different (Essay 1; 10). The man of ressentiment "has
conceived 'the evil enemy,' 'the Evil One,' and this in fact is his basic concept, from which
he then evolves..." (Essay 1; 10). Incapable of being the source of his own grounds for
practice, unable to give himself laws, foreign impulses completely determine the action of
the man of ressentiment. He is only capable of "re-action."
Nietzsche then moves to show how ressentiment is linked to both guilt and the bad
conscience. Through an etymological analysis of moral categories, Nietzsche chips the
distorting sediment off of values and a chilling world-historical tale emerges. 33 This
painful story is merely an unanticipated consequence since Nietzsche's chisel shatters
deceitful moralizing and replaces it with a critical-historical account of the origin of
moral categories. Moral categories are not eternal, they have histories; hence they are
capable of transformation. In a mode of analysis whose Marxist dimension is impossible
to miss, Nietzsche traces the origin of guilt to the economic relationship between the
creditor and the debtor. The primordial economic relationship gave birth to a moral
world. For the first time, humans measured and compared themselves against others. 34
33The Genealogy is probably the best example of the critical mode of history
Nietzsche articulates in the Untimely Meditations.
3 4
In the Discourse on the Origin ofInequality, Rousseau claims that calculation and
comparison destroy the human's natural peace (Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1989).
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During interactions in the sphere of exchange, the qualitat.ve distinctions generated by
economic measures produced moral categories:
"It was in this sphere then, the sphere of
legal obligations, that the moral conceptual world of 'guilt,' 'conscience,'
'duty,' had its
or,g,n...It was here, too, that the uncanny intertwining of the ideas 'guilt and suffering'
was firs, effected..." (Essay 2; 6)» When the debtor is unable to pay back a debt, the
creditor imposes suffering as punishment and this bums a conscience and memory into
the offender. 36 In this way, suffering is interpreted into a system of equ,valence and this
gives it meaning.
In Essay 2, Nietzsche shows how ressentiment is transformed into bad conscience.
Nietzsche even credits the man of ressentiment with the creation of bad conscience
(Essay 2; 1 1). The result: "the earth was essentially altered" (Essay 2; 16). When the
oppressive walls of society were constructed, human movement was impaired - animal
man was negated. This inhibits the discharge [auslassen] that life seeks. 37 Prevented
from discharging itself outward, the instinct for freedom vents itself on itself; and out of
this springs the bad conscience and the will to self-maltreatment. For Nietzsche, "All
instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward - this is what I call the
internalization of man..." (Essay 2; 16). The work of Verinnerlichung [internalization]
culminates in the seifs brutal assault on itself:
Nietzsche s contention that the moral world is historical is a crucial condition that
culminates in his effort to rewrite moral categories, ones that will promote a noble culture.
36Nietzsche calls this process mnemotechnics (Essay 2; 3).
37Beyond Good and Evil, 2 1
.
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to th
an W °’ r0m ack of external enemies and resistances and forcibly confinedthe oppressive narrowness and punctiliousness of custom, impatiently
PerSe
J;
Uted
’ §nawed at, assaulted, and maltreated himself thUanimalthat rubbed itself raw against the bars of its cage as one tried to ’tame it thisepnved creature, racked with homesickness for the wild...this fool this yeamineand desperate prisoner became the inventor of the bad conscience (Essay 2
™
The rush and freedom of nomadic living has been replaced by the militarization of all
space and the human’s forced confinement. 38 This devalues the instincts, creates the soul
and simultaneously turns it against itself. The cry of the wild is replaced by the bad
conscience that transforms the human yearning for open space into a mute grimace of
self-dissatisfaction. This inner turmoil, or self-imposed suffering, culminates in the
suicide of the human's animality that the bad conscience constantly re-activates.
But ressentiment does more. It moralizes suffering by endowing it with meaning. In
its early phase, it seeks an external agent that is to blame for its suffering. Throughout
Essay 1, Nietzsche demonstrates that the nobles are hated and blamed by the slaves for
exceeding norms and putting conformity into question; through the falsifying and
venomous eyes" (Essay 1; 1 1) of the slaves, nobles are designated evil; that is the only
creative deed of the slaves. 39 In Essay 2, it is no longer the relationship with others but
38Today the distinction between a prison and educational, economic, and social
institutions no longer has any salience. In terms of so called educational institutions, I am
thinking of routine searches, camera surveillance, chemically fertilized industrial food, the
imperative of uniformity, the continued presence of the police, and the prohibition on
thinking. In terms of the militarization of private life in the United States, the distinction
between a tank and a car (SUV) is no longer meaningful. The home resembles a fortress
and television programs (COPS) situate viewers as the eye of the state.
39The noble is not immune from ressentiment. The crucial difference is that it
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one's self-relation that leads to the sacrifice of the senses in bad conscience.
Bad conscience does not conclude Nietzsche's discussion of the economy of suffering.
Not suffering as such but rather the meaninglessness and groundlessness of it was the
curse hanging over human existence. Man was surrounded by a "monstrous void - he
suffered from the problem of his meaning" (Essay 3; 28). A question without an answer
imposed itself on humans: "whereto man?" (Essay 3; 28). Stricken by this insoluble
question, human existence and all of its suffering lacked an explanation, reason, or
interpretation that could justify it. Nietzsche describes this as "Man, suffering from
himself.. .like an animal shut up in a cage, uncertain why or wherefore, thirsting for
reasons..." (Essay 3; 20). But the human's enslavement to meaning is artificial: "He is
like a hen imprisoned by a chalk line" (Essay 3; 20). The human craves for a meaning for
suffering and finds it in the eye of the divinity who can witness it. 40 And yet, it is the
pathological yearning for a spectator for suffering that is the very thing that produces this
artificial enslavement. The problem with suffering was not suffering itself but its
meaninglessness. But endowing suffering with a meaning only holds the human under
the curse of the quest for meaning.
Nietzsche's meditation on the impact of the senselessness of suffering and the human's
exhausts itself immediately. Nietzsche states , "Ressentiment itself, if it should appear in the
noble man, consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and therefore does
not poison..." (Essay 1; 10).
40Although the word for sin is Suende in German, the word for sense is Sinn which
has a close connection to the Christian word sin. To feel is to be fallen and guilty of divine
transgression.
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response to this plight plays a decisive role in his philosophical activity. The demand for
a meaning of suffering has a catastroph.c impact. According to Nietzsche, there is a need
to "abolish hidden, undetected, unwitnessed suffering and honestly deny it, one was in the
past virtually compelled to invent gods life tries to justify itself (Essay 2;7). Nietzsche
wants to give us a new innocence by helping us to accept the truth that there is no
ultimate justification for life or for suffering. Both have no transcendentally secured
meaning; suffering is doled out impersonally. The longing for a meaning to suffering is
essentially the will to misunderstand suffering (Essay 3;20). 41
E. Priests
It is precisely when the attempt to make sense out of the senselessness of suffering
flounders and reaches its limit that ascetic priests enter the world-stage and re-endow it
with a new meaning. According to Nietzsche, they do not point to the meaninglessness
of suffering but rather assert their will to misunderstand it. They write and re-write the
chalk line that traps humans within their own fictions. That is their "tremendous
historical mission" (Essay 3; 15). This mission has "inscribed itself in a fearful and
unforgettable way in the entire history of man" (Essay 3; 21). As we have seen, suffering
was imposed as punishment on the failed debtor for the breach of contractual agreements.
41The need to create a witness, or a spectator, not only pertains to Nietzsche's
reflections on the origin of the idealized moral world but also implicates politics grounded
in the demand for recognition and various modes of identity politics in unflattering ways.
See, for example, Charles Taylor's The Ethics ofAuthenticity, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1991). Hannah Arendt's claim that there will always be a witness in
Eichmann in Jerusalem could perhaps be interpreted in a Nietzschean light (New York:
Penguin, 1963). The question Nietzsche asks is whether we can accept our absolute
solitude without a pathological yearning for a spectator, recognition, group identity, or a
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but under the wand of the ascetic priest, all suffering is now interpreted as "punishment"
and "guilt" for life as such and this is pushed back into the bad conscience (Essay 2; 21 ).
In these moments, the will is turned against itself; scars are re-opened and bleed (Essay 3;
15), old wounds are rubbed against the bars of a self-imposed cage. 42
Through ascetic priests, the sufferers themselves learn that they are responsible for
their own suffering. Nietzsche paraphrases the discourse of the ascetic priests: "You
alone are to blame for yourself!" (Essay 3; 15). The fact that no one is to blame cannot be
accepted by these masters of meaning. The mad search for someone to blame may give
short term relief to those who suffer because it saves the will and "Man would rather will
nothingness than not will" (Essay 3; 28), but it nonetheless perpetuates the search for
meaning that is the real problem. The priest is an alchemist but the relief from guilt and
suffering that he gives is only temporary. Expect no lasting relief from his wand.
Nietzsche maintained that Christianity also raises the stakes of guilt and self-torment
which ultimately forecloses the possibility of human liberation. It places its followers
under an unsurpassable curse of guilt that can be traced back to ressentiment-, Christianity
satisfies its yearning for revenge by placing its followers under the burden of a debt that
cannot be discharged (Essay 2; 21). 43 The human crawls under the weight of this debt.
denial of the abyss without venting our feeling of isolation and helplessness on others.
4 2The ascetic life, according to Nietzsche, is the highest manifestation of ressentiment
(Essay 3; 1 1) insofar as it seeks to master life as such.
43For the origin of Christianity out of ressentiment : "The truth of the first inquiry is
the birth of Christianity: the birth of Christianity out of the spirit of ressentiment, not, as
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"The moralization of the concepts of guilt and duty, their being pushed back into the bad
conscience," Ntetzsche nratntains, has as its aim "to make the glance recoil disconsolately
front an iron impossibility" and to preclude the "prospect of a final discharge" (Essay 2;
2
1
). Nietzsche pushes the logic of Christian self-torture to its limit:
In this mental cruelty there resides a madness of the will which is absolutelv
unexampled: the will of man to find himself guilty and reprehensible to a degreethat can never be atoned for; his will to think himself punished without anypossibility of the punishment becoming equivalent to the guilt... (Essay 2; 22).
The expiating possibility of equivalence is foreclosed by Christianity because it refiises to
free the individual from the curse of guilt. The will is mad insofar as it searches for a
meaning at all costs, even if the one it finds forces it to announce its own guilt and leads
to its own self-annihilation." The human stabs itself with the blunt instruments
Christianity lovingly puts into its hands. In this way, ressentiment gives birth to a
fanatical totalitarian moral system that is reactive, negates the future, poisons all life, and
renders impossible any liberation from the Christian economy of guilt. Only an
Antichrist can save us now.
people may believe, out of the 'spirit
a
countermovement by its very nature, the great
rebellion against the dominion of noble values." Ecce Homo
,
312, italics in original.
4 4The search for a meaning at all costs frequently takes the form in academic arenas
as the tyranny of the principle of non-contradiction. Any attempt to formulate ethical
demands more rigorous than ones grounded on this principle are accused of violating the
protocols of reason and are dismissed. Derrida has shown how double contradictory
imperatives maintain the connection between action and freedom in his writings on politics.
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F. Pathos of Distance45
The pathos of distance (if there is such a thing) is linked to many fundamental ideas in
Nietzsche's work."6 It is an aporetic formulation that appears infrequently in Nietzsche's
writings. It is illogical, contradictory, nonsensical, and that is precisely why it is
interesting and provocative. The expression evolves and is used in different ways.
Nietzsche’s appeal to pathos of distance cannot be separated from his attack on the
concept because it names two incompatible aesthetic relations to the world. Nietzsche
modifies distance with pathos and this combination fails to yield a determinate meaning.
It is a forced figure of speech, catachresis. Both words cleave and tear at each other and
never pull themselves above the tension maintained between them. Unlike ressentiment,
the result of the denial of mediation, the pathos of distance is the result of the affirmation
of mediation, the flux of appearances, illusion, and change. But why does Nietzsche
45The pathos of distance is not liberal tolerance which retreats to the private realm
when the possibility of agon appears and gives everyone the right to have his opinion. It is
not Kantian respect even in its most paradoxical formulations. Distance is a check on
enthusiasm, on identifying with anything too quickly, and prevents feeling from getting out
of hand.
4 distance has a prominent place in pivotal texts in Western political thought.
Machiavelli, for example, linked distance to the possibility of political knowledge. Princes
needed advisors to overcome their partial and limited perspective would dictate. The
advisor could give him an additional perspective, one with adequate distance. See The
Prince "Dedication" (New York: Penguin, 1961). Kant claimed that distance was central to
the possibility of moral conduct and contrasted the feeling of love with respect precisely in
terms of distance: "The principle of mutual love admonishes men constantly to come closer
to one another; that of respect they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance from
one another..."; Metaphysics ofMorals, 244. Carl Schmitt criticizes distance in Political
Romanticism. He locates the yearning for the distant as one of the decadent features of
romanticism and labels it self-absorbed apolitical occasionalism. Political Romanticism,
translated by Oakes, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986).
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invoke such a seemingly contradictory and artificial construction?
Although it is invoked at precise moments in Nietzsche's corpus, it is difficult to
interpret.
47 As early as 1873 in "On Truth and Lie in a Extramoral Sense," Nietzsche
struggled to articulate a pre-conceptual feeling as an alternative to the tyranny of the
concept that would put the stability of the conceptual order permanently into question. 48
Although he invokes the word intuition [Anschauung], he recognized that the new feeling
he was trying to articulate would have to remain unnamed: "There exists no word for
these intuitions." 49 During this same period Nietzsche wrote an essay called "The Pathos
47 01iver Connolly in "Pity, Tragedy and the Pathos of Distance" defines the pathos of
distance as "the painful distance that necessarily lies between my suffering and that of
others," 290. European Journal ofPhilosophy, 6:3, Blackwell Publishers. Although Oliver
Connolly's discussion is instructive, the pathos of distance can be more precisely clarified.
See also David H. Brown's "Dionysian and Apollonian Pathos of Distance: A New Image
of World History," in Dialogos, 57, 1991, 77-88. Unfortunately, there is very little
discussion of the pathos of distance in this essay. Conway (1997) has a very helpful, albeit
brief, discussion of the pathos of distance: "The pathos of distance signifies an enhanced
sensibility for, or attunement to, the order of rank that 'naturally' informs the rich plurality
of human types," 40. The most provocative, albeit brief, interpretations of the pathos of
distance can be found in the work of Sarah Kofman and Wemer Hamacher. For the former,
the metaphor of the abyss is a metaphor for the pathos of distance, 20. Hamacher goes
further: "the will no longer one with itself, the pathos of distance" (121) and "individuality
speaks from the undecidability between determination and indeterminacy, thus from a
"pathos of distance" (176). My interpretation of the pathos of distance owes much to
Hamacher's formulations.
48In this essay, Nietzsche advises us to throw concept against concept and throw
metaphors into confusion; 90.
49
Ibid. In contrast to the rational man, intuitive man "reaps from his intuition a
harvest of continually inflowing illumination, cheer, and redemption -- in addition to
obtaining a defense against misfortune. To be sure, he suffers more intensely, when he
suffers; he even suffers more frequently, since he does not understand how to learn from
experience and keeps falling over and over again into the same ditch. He is just as irrational
in sorrow as he is in happiness: he cries aloud and will not be consoled"; 91
.
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of Truth" but this feeling has little connection to what Nietzsche fifteenyears later would
call the pathos of distance » The expression pathos of distance appears for the firs, time
in Beyond Good and Evil
.
51
m the same chapter called "What is Noble" where the expression pathos of distance
occurs, Nietzsche also advises the reader "not to remain stuck to one's own detachment,
to that voluptuous remoteness and strangeness of the bird who flees ever higher to see
ever more below him - the danger of the flier."* Nietzsche criticizes distance getting out
of hand, of the possibility of getting stuck in distance.” But even ifNietzsche hesitated
about the risks and meaning of the pathos of distance in Beyond Good and Evil, it appears
with the greatest frequency and precision in the Genealogie where it emerges as a
50Whether the pathos of truth means suffering for the sake of the search of truth or the
urgency of the search for truth it is nonetheless distinct from the pathos of distance.
51
This is the full quote: "Every enhancement of the type "man” has so far been the
work of an aristocratic society -- and it will be so again and again -- a society that believes
in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and
that needs slavery in some sense or other. Without that pathos of distance which grows out
of the ingrained difference between strata - when the ruling cast constantly looks afar and
looks down upon subjects and instruments and just as constantly practices obedience and
command, keeping down and keeping at a distance - that other, more mysterious pathos
could not have grown up either - the craving for an ever widening of distances within the
soul itself, the development of ever higher, rarer, more remote, further-stretching, more
comprehensive states ~ in brief, simply the enhancement of the type "man," the continual
"self-overcoming of man," to use a moral formula in a supra-moral sense"; Beyond Good
and Evil, 257. Although the meaning of distance within one soul is difficult to determine, it
challenges Plato's conception of the harmony of the soul in the Republic, translated by
Grube & Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1992).
52Beyond Good and Evil, 52.
53For Nietzsche, it is necessary to have "the most comprehensive responsibility -
conscience for the overall development of man"; Beyond Good and Evil, 72.
110
measure for critique; paradoxically, it is also the affirmative response to the absence of a
common measure. 54
Nietzsche contrasts ressentiment with the pathos of distance. According to Nietzsche,
the pathos of distance is a "feeling." 55 If it is hard to miss Nietzsche’s use of a French
word to describe the reactivity of the slaves, Nietzsche's use of a Greek word
-pathos ~
to discuss noble morality is also striking. Pathos
,
meaning both emotion and suffering or
something that one endures, is linked to distance. Although distance is not absence it is
similar to it and how one can feel or undergo distance, or the absence of an object, is a
riddle. The pathos of distance can be clarified by both contrasting it with ressentiment
and through discussing its relationship to freedom, autonomy, and obligation.
In contrast to slave morality, the pathos of distance does not occur as a result of any
particular object in the world but refers to the pure possibility of feeling. Ressentiment
leads to a predictable cycle of revenge on others and/or self-laceration, the pathos of
distance is a feeling that un-determines the subject because it does not produce
determinate or predictable actions. According to Nietzsche, the pathos of distance is not
a derivative but a self-produced feeling. 56 Filled with life and passion (Essay 1; 10), the
54The pathos of distance is not the unification of the Apollinian and Dionysian, since
distance differs from Dionysian excess and intoxication.
55There are references to the pathos of distance in Ecce Homo
,
Beyond Good and
Evil, Twilight ofthe Idols, and On the Genealogy ofMorals.
56Self-produced feelings, or the phenomena Kant calls "self-affection," are difficult to
interpret and seem to be a distinctly modem phenomenon. But for Kant and Nietzsche the
possibility of self-affection is inextricably related to moral elevation.
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nob.e does no, have ,o receive outward or external affirmation of himself, but actively
affirms himself spontaneously He is distant and distance announces the possibility of
human freedom: "For wha, is freedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility. That
one preserves the distance which divtdes us. That one has become more indifferent to
hardship, toil, privation, even to life- The preservation of the "distance which divides
us" is not a formula for civil war but is the art of "separating without setting against one
another." 59
5 7
Aristotle has a discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics of the 'Wat sohIpH" tw •
re ated to Nietzsche's conception of nobility in essential ways: "When faced with necessarytasks or with minor problems, he is the last person to complain and to ask for assistance^
'
' TTT f behaV10r }S ch“shc of a person who takes these things seriously And heis the kind of person whose possessions are noble but unprofitable, rather than profitableand useful, since this is more indicative of self-sufficiency. His movements are thoughtslow his voice deep, and his speech measured: since only a few things matter to him he isnot likely to be rushed. And since he puts no great weight on anything, he is not vehementwhen he speaks; it is rushing and vehemence that make for hastiness and a high-pitched
voice^ Such a person, then, is the great-souled"; 71
. Nicomachean Ethics
,
translated &
edited by Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Nietzsche's critique of thepettiness of scholars in Beyond Good and Evil is a good point of contrast.
58
Nietzsche, Twilight ofthe Idols, translated by R. J. Hollingdale (New York-
Penguin Books, 1968) 103.
Ecce Homo, 254. In Politics ofFriendship, Derrida asks how a politics of
separation be founded (55), one that would not give in to proximity or identification (65).
Distance could threaten the possibility of community but it is also the negative condition of
its possibility. A community without distance between members is a cult; one with too
much distance disintegrates. Communion and fusion destroy community. A Nietzschean
community can only exist as the tension between two incompatible imperatives to
simultaneously congregate and separate without ever resting on either side. The possibility
of a community of autonomous citizens has its roots in Kant and finds its contemporary
expression in Derrida s new international, Nancy's The Inoperative Community, and
Blanchot's Unavowable Community. See Specters ofMarx: The State ofthe Debt, the Work
ofMourning & the New International, translated by Kamuf, (New York: Routledge, 1994);
The Inoperative Community, edited by Connor, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
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The oppositional groupings that spring from value judgments grounded in ressenUmen,
are replaced by non-oppositional relations; this announces the paradoxical possibility of
relations grounded on distance. In Human, All Too Human
,
Nietzsche states; "It is not
how one soul approaches another but in how it distances itself from it that I recognize
their affinity and relatedness.- The art of distance, no. proximity, marks the quality of
affinity and relation; distance ruptures the drive for homogeneity, recognition, and
identification. The pathos of distance does not involve opposition or antagonism, both
which seek to colonize the other, but affirmative relations.61 And yet, these relations find
their ground in separation. The pathos of distance is the "will to be oneself, to stand
out."
62
Standing out suspends the quantitative imperative that reduces differences in the
declaration of equality. Equality is a demand of the herd and renders equal that which is
unequal in order to naturalize the mediocrity of the herd; this prevents the emergence of
individuals who exceed common measures: "Equality, a certain actual rendering similar
of which the theory of equal rights is only the expression, belongs essentially to decline:
Press, 1991); The Unavowable Community, translated by Joris, (Barrytown: Station Hill
Press, 1988).
60Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, translated by Hollingdale, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 275.
61 For how distance could be the condition for a relation see Maurice Blanchot's
Friendship, translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg, (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1 997). Our friends reserve "an infinite distance, the fundamental separation on the basis of
which what separates becomes relation"; 291.
62
Twilight ofthe Idols, 102.
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the chasm between man and man, class and class, the multiplicity of types, the will to be
oneself, to stand out - that which I call pathos of distance - characters every strong
age 63 Nietzsche laments the absence of this feeling. "No one any longer possess today
the courage to claim special privileges or the right to rule, the courage to feel of sense of
reverence towards himself and towards his equals - the courage for a pathos of
distance... The aristocratic outlook has been undermined most deeply by the lie of equality
of souls..." 64 Nietzsche does not reject equality so long as it is not secured by law.
The first reference to the pathos of distance in the Genealogie occurs in the second
aphorism of the First Essay:
The pathos ofnobility and distance... the protracted and domineering total
fundamental feeling on the part of a higher ruling order in relation to a lower
order, to a below' - that is the origin of the antithesis 'good' and 'bad' (Essav 1 • 2
emphasis added). 65 v J ’ 5
Whereas the good/evil value antithesis sprouts from ressentiment, Nietzsche traces the
origin of the antithesis good/bad to the pathos of distance. Out of the feeling of distance -
- a designation for one's broken or severed relations - the noble creates this value
antithesis independently of all external grounds. It was not, Nietzsche claims, the slaves
who spontaneously created values:
63 Twilight ofthe Idols
,
102.
64
Antichrist, 168-9.
“Nietzsche links greatness to nobility in Beyond Good and Evil\ "the concept of
greatness entails being noble, wanting to be by oneself, being able to be different, standing
alone and having to live independently;" 139.
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IS, of the first rank.
..It was out of this pathos ofdistance that they first seT^d' hengh, to create values and to coin names for values... (Essay I
; 2^^^).
We saw how resseniimen, culminated in the will to misunderstand suffering, out of the
rage against meaninglessness or, as Nietzsche puts it, "horror vacui" (Essay 3; 1). The
result of the pathos of distance is an interpretation of suffering too, but, unlike
ressentiment
,
the pathos of distance permits one to rise above suffering. In the Birth of
Tragedy, Nietzsche views individuation as "the origin and primal cause of all suffering." 66
But these themes are taken further in the Genealogie and, unlike his discussion of
suffering the Birth of Tragedy, which has only an indirect relation to ethics, in the
Genealogie it has an immediate moral relevance. How one interprets suffering becomes a
marker of nobility. Only those capable of affirming the ultimate meaninglessness of their
own suffering - a possible answer to the question "What is Noble?" raised in 1886 in
Jenseits von Gut and Boese — can affirm difference and can act spontaneously. 67 The
total affirmation of the unknowability of existence, all of its suffering, and all of the
riddles and mysteries it contains, becomes the only justifiable ethical position.
The pathos of distance names this positionless ethical position and it is linked to both
66The first quote appears on 73. Nietzsche also claims in the Birth ofTragedy that
suffering is the "sole ground" of the world; 45.
67The German word vornehm is difficult to translate and is often rendered "noble."
But noble misses the complex word chain that is signaled in vornehm that includes in front
of, chosen, selected, and perhaps even avant-garde.
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d.gmty and obligation; it is the condition of possibility of a newly conceived community
of ends. The absolute dignity of this new "inoperative community." to borrow a phrase
coined by Jean-Luc Nancy, must first be established so that the duty to the future that the
nobles embody will be preserved.- This dignity, in accordance with the explicit Kantian
overtones of this word, requires the abolition of instrumental relationships. 6’
The higher ought not to degrade itself to the status of an instrument of the lowerthe pathos ofdistance ought to keep their tasks eternally separateL.the nobles
a one are the guarantors of the future, they alone are obligated [verpflichtetl forthe future of humanity (Essay 3; 14). 70
F J
Whereas ressentiment demands absolute proximity, immediate recognition, sameness,
and homogeneity, those who feel a pathos of distance affirm what opposes them, are just
and objective even toward what injures them, and never act as the result of external
stimuli but always out of self-given laws, the plenitude ofjoy, and cheerfulness. They
always have a "readiness for great responsibilities." 71 Although they may be attacked by
an other, these oysters redeem, transform, and elevate the infiltrator. Distant, spaced
apart, the noble has an obligation to the future. What grounds the action of the nobles if
they do not react to external stimuli?
68Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community.
69Nietzsche claims in Beyond Good and Evil that "The objective man is an
instrument"; 128. Nietzsche also criticized most university professors as tools, "mirrors"
(126), as opposed to autonomous and unappropriatable thinkers.
70Walter Kaufmann translates verpflichtet as "liable." His translation misses the
explicitly Kantian overtones of this word. Obligated is better.
11Beyond Good and Evil, 140.
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G. Law of Life
The question of law/constraint is a significant part of Nietzsche's philosophy but one
that has received insufficient analysis. Certain inherited prejudices about Nietzsche may
even lead one to conclude that he rejects all law. That would be an error because
Nietzsche develops a conception of law that is central to his thinking on ethics. 72 But
Nietzsche will not insist on the non-arbitrary character of his law. All laws are essentially
arbitrary but we still need them: "Arbitrary law needed." 73 The fact that Nietzsche's new
law departs from conventional conceptions that deny their groundless foundation may
account for the oversight. For Nietzsche, justice must present its own arbitrariness in
order to remain what it is; justice must say it is only a perspective. For this reason, the
law of life, the imperative to change, comes as close as it is possible to come to be a non-
arbitrary law but it remains nevertheless essentially arbitrary.
Even if it was named other things in earlier texts, the law of life appears throughout
most of Nietzsche's writings. In Nietzsche's unpublished notebooks dating from the time
of the Untimely Meditations
,
he claims that "perishing and coming into being are
governed by laws." 74 In Philosophy in the Tragic Age ofthe Greeks
,
Nietzsche refers to
the "law of becoming." 75 In the Gay Science, he claims "all ethical systems hitherto have
72
In Daybreak, he claims that we must "construct anew the laws of life and action";
190.
73Human, All Too Human, 167.
1A Unpublished Writings, 103.
75Philosophy in the Tragic Age ofthe Greeks, 68.
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been anti-natural." 79 But it was not until the Genealogie that
life was articulated with the greatest
the relation between law and
precision. The challenge is to create an ethical
some continuity with this
principle that affirms life. Even if it is possible to trace
conception, the law of life is a formula,ton that is no, easy to interpret. Both law and life
have a tremendous amount of significance in Nietzsche's writings, but according to
Heidegger, ''Nietzsche's use of the word life is ambiguous.'' 77 The law of life is
Nietzsche’s effort to think of an alternative to purely rational foundations for ethics and he
finds one not in the irrational but between reason and nonreason. 78
Nietzsche is a eritie of some modes of law beeause they determine meaning and repress
the instinct for freedom which produces life-denying pathologies. Although he praises
law because it depersonalizes conflict between those prone to revenge, legal orders that
prevent all struggle are "hostile to life” and "assassinate the future of man" (Essay 2; 1 1).
As I pointed out earlier, the restriction on the outward expression of the instinct of life
marked the emergence of self-torture in the bad conscience. But Nietzsche does not
reject the bad conscience tout court
; nor does he reject law as such. 79 The trick is whether
7 6Gay Science
,
75
.
7
7
The first quote appears on 78. Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, uses life as
another word for Being, Vol. 3, 194, Nietzsche. This is a big claim which is probably not
possible to support given Nietzsche's critique of Being throughout his philosophical
writings.
^Abstraction is bad for the body.
79Nietzsche claims that the bad conscience should not be eliminated. So, instead of
whipping oneself in the face of ascetic ideals "wed the bad conscience to all the unnatural
inclinations, all those aspirations to the beyond, to that which runs counter to sense, instinct,
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law can contain within itself the limits of its own sovereignty; that is, whether a law can
open spaces for freedom and autonomy, produce exceptions (the genius), as opposed to
creating normalized, homogeneous, pacified, and self-surveilling subjects.
In the conclusion of the Third Essay of the Genealogie, Nietzsche articulates the
highest principle for ethical conduct. Similar to Kant's categorical imperative, this law is
not concerned with the result of action, or with subjective ends, but with the form, purity,
and principle for ethical conduct. Hitherto, the will has grounded itself on ascetic ideals
because it lacked a meaning and a purpose; the ascetic ideal gave the will a goal but it
was one that devalued sense and enforces fear of happiness and beauty (Essay 3; 28). 80 It
muted all sensitivity (Essay 3; 18). Although he seeks to cultivate ethical sensitivity,
Nietzsche does not merely turn the world right side up and find new ground for the will in
the realm of sensibility. Grounding practical ethics in this way would be, as he states in
an untranslated 1 868 fragment titled "Ueber Ethik," "like a doctor who is merely
combatting symptoms..." 81 An imperative ethics, in contrast to one grounded on
aesthetics, "is one which. ..believes that it can remove the root of this disease." 82 The new
nature, animal, in short all ideals hitherto, which are one and all hostile to life and ideals
that slander the world" (Essay 2; 24).
80According to Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil, will is a unity only as a word; 26.
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, Gesammelte Werke, (Munich: Musarion Ausgabe, 1922),
1 :405. I would like to acknowledge the generous translation assistance of Cornelius I.
Partsch. Ethics grounded on aesthetics would reconstitute nihilism since no distinctions
could be made which would allow for a valuative determination.
82
Ibid.
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ground for ethics, then, takes the fonn of a law. Accord,ng to Nietzsche in Human, All
Too Human, "to be ethical means to practice obedience towards a law..."*’ The
foundation for ethics in the Genealogie is the "law of life.” Nietzsche's ethics emerge as
the highest mode of practice characterized by a decision to liberate the will through the
affirmation of eternal and necessary self-overcoming.*'’ This is the law of life:
All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self
overcoming: thus the law of life will have it, the law of the necessity of 'selfovercoming in the nature of life - the lawgiver himself eventually receives the
call, submit to the law you yourself proposed' (Essay 3; 27)
The law of life, a principle of a new mode of ethical universalization, or as I have named
it earlier,formal contingency
,
facilitates the perpetual birth of singularity. Self-
overcoming is the law. The law commands us to be other than we are. The law of life is
the representation of the impossible as possible. 85 This law does not constitute the
ahistorical self-identical subject but creates ones that are contingent, indeterminate, freed
88Human, All Too Human
,
51
.
84The concept of the decision has a prominent place in the work of Soren
Kierkegaard, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Jacques Derrida. The type of decision
Nietzsche has in mind here is one that has the paradoxical goal of the total suspension of
subjective purposiveness. Perhaps the sharpest contrast in terms of the decision could be
drawn between Nietzsche and Schmitt. See Carl Schmitt's Der Begriffdes Politischen
,
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996). Christianity is the fault line that divides Nietzsche
from Schmitt but investigating this relationship is beyond the scope of the present study.
85
In a section called "Books which teach one to dance" in Human, All Too Human,
Nietzsche states: "There are writers who, by representing the impossible as possible and
speaking of morality and genius as though both were merely a matter of wanting them, a
mere whim and caprice, evoke a feeling of high-spirited freedom, as though man were
standing on tiptoe and compelled to dance for sheer joy"; 96.
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from the past, opened to the future, undefined, and finite. Ones that are not racked with a
had conscience, guilt, or other poisonous feelings but generous, trusting, and free. In
accordance with Kant's categorical imperative, those receptive to their constant liberation
hear the call of the law; one joyfully submits to this law.*6 If one refuses to change one is
guilty of violating the law of life. Nietzsche's law is not a law as long as law is
understood as an abstraction that conceals its arbitrary foundation and then violently
imposes itself on the subjects it creates who violate its standards. Nietzsche's law is a
future lawgiving based, as he states in Daybreak, on the belief that "I submit only to the
law which I myself have given..." 87
The consequences of the law of life are impossible to know in advance. It is the
perpetual negation of Being and carries with it the "terribleness and majesty of infinite
demands, infinite meanings." 88 As such, the law of life is pure negativity and, according
86
Benjamin's "Zur Kritik der Gewalt" is instructive here. According to Benjamin,
"the great criminal confronts the law with the threat of declaring a new law...The State fears
this violence simply for its lawmaking character"; 241. When the law exercises violence
over life and death, "the law reaffirms itself; 242. As for the relationship between the call
[Ruf] and the moral law, Kant states: "The veiled goddess before whom we of both parties
bend our knees is the moral law in us, in its inviolable majesty. We do indeed perceive her
voice and also understand very well her command. But when we are listening, we are in
doubt whether it comes from man, from the perfected power of his own reason, or whether
it comes from an other, whose essence is unknown to us and speaks to man through this, his
own reason." "On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy," translated by Peter
Fenves in Raising the Tone ofPhilosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative
Critique by Jacques Derrida, Edited by Peter Fenves, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1993) 71.
87Daybreak, 110.
88This quote appears in Beyond Good and Evil in reference to Jewish morality (185)
but can also be applied to the law of life.
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to Nietzsche in an 1872 series of aphorisms called "The Philosopher: Reflections on the
Struggle Between Art and Knowledge," "a negative morality is the kind with the most
grandeur because it is wonderfully impossible."'9 And, "Mankind propagates itself
through impossibilities; these are its virtues.™ Finally, as Nietzsche states in an 1873
fragment, "Element of impossibility inherent in all virtues that make the human being
great."
91
Submission to this law instantaneously and repeatedly annihilates all grounds for
conduct that are constituted on the basis of a life denying ideal; and this places the
lawgiver in a realm free from the need to torture oneself or others, both of which result
from the construction of an abstract world. 92 Acting under the law of life, the will wills
its necessary transformation and disintegration. 93 The necessary and eternal submission
to the sovereignty of this law, nothing else according to Nietzsche, guarantees that there
will be a future. And the future is nothing less than a realm of pure indetermination. The
law of life is a law that is based not on an eternal ahistorical truth, nor one completely
8
’Philosophy and Truth, 46.
90
Ibid., 45.
91 Unpublished Writings, 188.
92According to Kofman, morality and the concept are allies: "morality uses the
generality of the concept to guarantee its universality; the concept uses morality to impose
itself as a norm of truth"; 58.
9 According to Werner Hamacher, "the will is its release from itself." Premises:
Essays on Philosophy and Literaturefrom Kant to Celan, translated by Fenves,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) 140.
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grounded in aestheticism, but one that discloses itself in a new and distinct way of
feehng, a pathos of distance. This feeling is a sign of autonomy; the result of giving
oneself a law signaled in "breaking away" [aus einander] (Essay 3; 1 8) and standing apart
in a newly conceived Nietzschean "kingdom of ends."
H. Letting Go
Letting go is a paradoxical expression that appears infrequently in Nietzsche's writings.
How could one have the goal of having no goal? Of willing not to will? In order to
bring it into clarity, I focus on the place where it appears in the Genealogie, and bring
other near formulations of this idea into a relationship with it, in order to challenge not
only Heidegger’s overemphasis on the will as the culmination of Cartesian subjectivity in
Nietzsche, as opposed to its displacement, but also to open a dimension of Nietzsche's
thought that has been insufficiently examined but that nonetheless has a decisive impact
on the multi-dimensionality of Nietzsche's ethical significance. 94 Nietzsche's critique of
ressentiment
,
his affirmation of the pathos of distance and the law of life is
interconnected with the idea of letting go. As we shall see, letting go is not giving up.
Rather, it is the condition of possibility of experience and experience is the very thing
that living according to concepts destroys.
In the section called "What the Germans Lack" in Twilight ofthe Idols
,
Nietzsche
claims that "learning to see, not to will, defer decision, in an attitude of hostile calm
94 Heidegger states: "Nietzsche ineluctably stands...under Descartes's metaphysics";
Vol. 4, 103 Nietzsche.
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[feindseliger Ruhe] one w„, a,low the strange, the nove,..,o approach - The condttion
for something new to approach is the suspension of the decision, of giving up on the will,
of watting not in a state of passivity but in a "hostile calm."« A hostile calm is
intentionless activity, anticipation, and receptivity to the new, the strange, and to what
destroys the subject's image of itself in the joy of liberation and passion for life. A noble
culture does not react immediately to what is new, it is strong enough to wait:
One has to learn to see, one has to learn to think, one has to learn to speak andwrtte: the end ,n all three is a noble culture. - Learning to see - hah tuatinJ heeye to repose, to pat.ence, to letting things come to it; learning to defertudgmentto investigate and comprehend the individual case in all its aspects This is the
’
first preliminary schooling in spirituality: not to react immediately to a stimulusbut to have to have the restraining, stock-taking instincts in one's control,
earning to see, as I understand it, is almost what is called in unphilosophical
anguage strong will-power": the essence of it is precisely not to 'will', the abilityto defer decision All unspirituality, all vulgarity, is due to the incapacity to resist
a stimulus -- one has to react, one obeys every impulse. 97
Nietzsche makes a striking contrast in this quote between reactivity and undecidability
and connects the former to vulgarity and the latter to a "preliminary schooling in
spirituality. The suspension of the will transforms the subject in ways that make it
receptive to that which is individual and unique. Paradoxically, strong will power is
95
Twilight ofthe Idols
,
76.
96
Hostile calm is probably the closest approximation to the pathos of distance.
97
Twilight ofthe Idols, 76.
"Derrida and Benjamin have theorized undecidability in provocative and original
ways. But Derrida has taken it further and explored the ways in which it disfigures
dominant political and philosophical texts in order to open new avenues for thinking about
ethics and politics.
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precisely the capacity not to will. One must be strong enough to let things come, to defer
judgment, to allow the force of individuality to be experienced without prior conceptual
projections. One does not obey every impulse but is free. Nietzsche claims that
"immoralists have the suspicion that the decisive value of an action lies precisely in what
is unintentional in it."" Practical reason cannot be programmed.
Similar ideas are also articulated in a decisive place in the Genealogie. We saw earlier
how ordinary humans are caged by guilt and bad conscience, that is, by artifice; and how
ascetic ideals and Christianity sanctify this enslavement. Nietzsche shows us how to
break these chains. The way out involves "letting go": "How accommodating, how
friendly all the world is toward us as soon as we act as all the world does and 'let go' like
all the world!" (Essay 2; 24). 100 Letting go signals the break with phenomenality as the
determining ground of practice since nothing empirical can now determine how one will
act. Letting go is the exit and names the total liberation of the will from positing and
from its desperate search for empirical grounds for conduct; it erases the chalk line or
artificial cage constructed by the resentful and reinforced by ascetic priests. It releases
the will from self-maltreatment and redeems us from the curse that the reigning ideal has
imposed upon human existence.
Let us exit the current epoch that is poisoned by the curse of ressentiment and enter a
redeemed and cheerful era that celebrates a new goal; the goal of "letting go." It is an
99Beyond Good and Evil
,
44.
100Nietzsche's "gehen lassen" [letting go] should be distinguished from Martin
Heidegger's "lassen sein" [letting be] insofar as the former has no trace of ontology.
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imperative to free oneself from the will to nothingness by simply ceasing to will.- „ is
an ethical strike.- The absolute nothingness and worthlessness of the empirical world is
thus announced because one is not motivated by anything sensible. The loss of
sensibility as a ground for conduct is replaced with the increasing sense of one’s distance,
or freedom, from it. But this distance is not divorced from feeling; one feels the feeling
of liberation from the domination of the determining power of sensibility.
I. Ethical Singularity
For Nietzsche, human feelings are essential to understanding the difference between
the moral and the ethical: "Autonomy and morality are mutually exclusive" (Essay 2; 2).
For Nietzsche, ressentiment produces a quantitative morality; a pathos of distance gives
birth to a qualitative ethic. Morality is characterized by the feeling of ressentiment,
ascetic ideals, bad conscience, guilt, the will to nothingness, revenge, a will to self-
maltreatment, hatred of difference, the total devaluation of life, and the inability to give
oneself laws. Ressentiment devalues life, the pathos of distance elevates it. The former
1 01 The will to meaning is essentially nihilism because it is based on the fear of
meaninglessness. Affirming meaninglessness is the antidote to nihilism because it gives
birth to undetermined values and meanings that are not grounded on the reactive denial of
ruptured foundations.
102For a discussion of the strike see Jacques Derrida's "Force of Law: The 'Mystical
Foundation of Authority,"' translated by Quaintance, in Deconstruction and the Possibility
ofJustice, (New York: Cardozo Law Review, 1990); Walter Benjamin's Zur kritik der
Gewalf, Werner Hamacher's "Afformative, Strike: Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence,"' in
Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, edited by Andrew Benjamin
and Osborne, (New York & London: Routledge, 1994).
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demands absolute proximity; the latter fractures relations rooted in fusion™ Nietzsche
destroys the conventional moral categories that spring from ressentiment and his ethical
alternative to ressentiment is an ethic of singularity
Ethieal singularity is eharaeterized by a pathos of distance, letting go, non-oppositional
relations, spontaneous action, autonomy, and an imperative ethics contained in the law of
life. To be an ethical citizen, one must affirm the loss of absolute foundations. 104 This is
not a formula for license, but rather a project of autonomy. Generated by the non-sensual
but yet non-ascetic law of life, the pathos of distance permanently destabilizes the self
The result is perpetual self-overcoming; this creates fissures and gaps in one's identity
that make an affirmative relation to otherness, the future, and change possible. Seen in
this light, the ethical in Nietzsche is a perpetual test that can be summarized in two
simple, but polemical, questions: Can you affirm groundlessness, perpetually change
and act without ressentiment? Can you be upright without a point of support, without a
transcendentally secured foundation, without an absolute ground?
Nietzsche s ethic raises the stakes of post-Kantian autonomy but it is not the categorical
10JHans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutic and Hegelian "fusion of horizons" should be
contrasted with Nietzsche's affirmation of distance. See Truth and Method, translated by
Weinsheimer & Marshall, (New York: Continuum, 1993).
104
Liberalism makes ethical citizenship impossible by positing foundations that are
placed outside of the acceptable realm of contestation. Institutions and bureaucracy,
although probably indispensable for certain functions in advanced societies, are nonetheless
signs of the fear of democracy. Citizens are prevented from being active lawgivers and are
reduced to passive petitioners. Perhaps Carl Schmitt has a point when he claims that there
is always an undemocratic moment in every democratic order. That is to say, a certain level
of dictatorship is unsurpassable in all regimes that are founded. See Schmitt's Crisis of
Parliamentary Democracy, translated by Kennedy, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).
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.mperative but the law of life that enforces distance that counteracts rage against fmitude.
Rising above rancor prevents one from venting their own inability to accept the
meaninglessness of suffering on others (a politics of blame) or on themselves (a politics
of self-torture). The alternative to both of these is self-legislation that gives birth to
singularity. An awareness of the attraction of a polities of blame in late modernity can
help us be on guard against it and criticize it when it appears. 105 Following Kant.
Nietzsche insists on the absolute priority of the ethical - in this case, an ethics without
ethics, an ethics strong enough to constantly cross itself out - and that, according to
Nietzsche, is the only justifiable foundation for all iuture political projects. The result of
Nietzsche s critique of philosophical foundations is not, as Peter Fenves suggests,
"irrationalism," 106 nor the often misunderstood term called nihilism, but rather the law of
life and a lawful feeling - the pathos of distance - and an obligation to the
indeterminability of the future.
J. Justice, not Convictions
An ethic of singularity is not an ethic of conviction. Nietzsche defines convictions as
the belief that on some particular point of knowledge one is in possession of the
unqualified truth. To have convictions is, according to the Antichrist, "not to see many
105
Politics in the United States of America seems to have reached a new symbolic
dimension. Multiple life sentences and multiple death penalties for the same person are one
of the signs of this. Law seeks to not only to deprive offenders of movement or life but to
symbolically over-annihilate them.
106
Peter Fenves, "Foreword: From Empiricism to the Experience of Freedom," in
Jean-Luc Nancy's The Experience ofFreedom, translated by McDonald, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1993) xxii.
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things, conviction is mendaciousness on principle." 107 To live without grounds, reasons,
and convictions and nonetheless seek to be ethical is the highest demand ofjustice.
Nietzsche classifies the genius ofjustice as an "opponent of convictions for it wants to
give each his own.'" 08 In an uncharacteristic moment of humility, Nietzsche asserts: "Let
us. ..kneel down before justice as the only goddess we recognize over us." 109 In contrast to
justice, an ethic of conviction sacrifices what is singular on the alter of its generality
when it is a matter ofjustice there are no rules but only an art of nuances. The scales of
justice annihilate particularity in comparisons between things that are essentially
incommensurable. The scales rise up and down, then they freeze, then judgment is
passed. If an ethic of conviction is an ethic of abstraction, Truth, rules, and the Christian
God, an ethic of singularity is an ethic of the Antichrist that carries the new ethical
doctrine of singularity down to the victims of Christianity in order to announce their
liberation. Nietzsche wants to cure those who have been made lame by Christianity: "I
can write in letters which make even the blind see." 110 The ethic of the Antichrist
announces the death of God, the death of fixed convictions, even the death of death (at
least the Christian conception of death).
The writings of Nietzsche can further the project of critique in the domain of morality
107
Antichrist, 186.
l0BHuman, All Too Human, 202.
109Human, All Too Human, 203.
110
Antichrist, 99.
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and help us make distinetions between positions that smuggle in the transcendental
ground that is the origin of ressentimem, bad conscience, guilt, and the war against
everything that is free and creative. We will remain disoriented but, as Nietzsche
suggests, we can look into the abyss without venting our rage on others. But we may get
a strange glance back: "when you look into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.
Justice as an art of nuances and an ethic of singularity is the new ethical epoch whose
faint glow Nietzsche sees breaking through the Christian/moral horizon that has denied
its possibility. Through his critique of the alliance between morality and Christianity,
Nietzsche lays the groundwork for the emergence of the genius ofjustice who will
activate an ethic of singularity.
K. Beyond Nietzsche
In the earlier chapters, I read both Hobbes and Kant against the grain. In this one, I
demonstrated how Nietzsche attempts to think his way out of the crisis called modernity
that has culminated in nihilism. Nietzsche enacts his own imperative of radical autonomy
and singularity in his writing style and in his call for a perpetual crisis in conceptuality
that will permit a rebirth of feeling, ones that do not suffer from the stamp of words." 2
It would be a rebirth that would allow life to begin anew; one capable of opening itself to
a secular redemption freed from idols, symbols, and concepts.
1 1
1
Beyond Good and Evil
,
89.
112
"On the Use and Abuse of History for Life," 162.
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CHAPTER 5
THE CHALLENGE OF CITIZENSHIP
A. The Necessity and Difficulty of Ethics
This project started with claims about the difficulty of ethics, a difficulty that is the
result of the current theoretical context. How are we to justify our deepest moral
commitments without forsaking the critique of foundationalism? 1 This not only involves
two necessary and competing projects whose reconciliation is difficult to imagine but can
only be an ongoing project. Inspired by post-structuralism, I have attempted to find a
way to develop a new framework for thinking about the interconnection between ethics
and politics that undermines foundationalist assumptions about self, other, and world.
One that also overcomes the preoccupation with merely subverting or deconstructing
oppositions ( anti -ism) and takes an affirmative form. Apocalyptic pronouncements
about the "end of philosophy" are part of the problem. The exhaustion thesis is itself
exhausted. 2 The real challenge today is how reflect on the relationship between ethics
Although his work on the contingency of all fundamental assumptions is
provocative, I detect an unhelpful moment of resignation in the work of Richard Rorty. His
thinking seems to be stuck within the opposition between foundationalism and
subjectivism. He forecloses in advance the exploration of possibilities for politics that
complicate this paralyzing binary.
2Derrida is a good example of a thinker who faces the exhaustion of philosophy
without giving up on the promise of emancipation. In the Other Heading
,
he states: "the
very old subject of cultural identity in general. ..the very old subject of European identity
indeed has the venerable air of an old, exhausted theme. But perhaps this "subject" retains a
virgin body"; 5. He then proceeds in this remarkable text to articulate new modes of
identity capable of putting an end to the pointless violence inherent to the quest for self-
identity.
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and politics in ways that, in the words of Stephen White, "sustain affirmation." 1 We need
to find a balance between critique and affirmation. 4
A critical ethic pushes for a displacement of the traditional field of ethics in the
direction of ethical indeterminacy, the cultivation of aesthetic-affective dimensions of
existence, the suspension of the self, responsiveness to the other, self-overcoming, double
contradictory imperatives, and acknowledging one's limits involved in the justification of
one ethico-political possibility over another. Non-purposive freedom activated in
imperatives of indetermination was the antidote for sovereign subjectivity. In contrast to
commentators who claim that the philosophical tradition is exhausted, the resources for
overcoming the excessive pretensions of Enlightenment philosophy can be found in the
Enlightenment itself. Breaking the relationship between knowledge/reason and
responsibility and putting specific feelings their instead was the first step to building an
affirmative normative vision of the connection between ethics and politics and renewing
ethico-political reflection in an age of disenchantment. A difficult but necessary
undertaking.
3 Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths ofWeak Ontology in
Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
4 Consider the following passage by Stephen White in Sustaining Affirmation: "In
relation to postmodernism or poststructuralism, the core issue I have raised is how one
challenges various fundaments of modernity without that critique becoming an imperative
disconnected from affirmative moral and political formulations. I have argued that to be
persuasive in a sustained sense, such formulations must draw explicitly upon ontological
sources"; 151, emphasis added. The word "must" is a bit too strong here. As Derrida's
recent work on politics demonstrates, the critique of ontology can have ethical and political
implications.
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A critical ethic attempts to overcome some of the shortcomings of liberalism,
communitarianism, discourse ethics, and radical/plural democracy. These models of
citizenship fail to adequately conceptualize the relationship between self and other. In
contrast to communitarian "fusion," a critical ethic allows for distance between members
of a collectivity and the refashioning of individual and collective identity in indeterminate
ways. In contrast to liberalism, a critical ethic welcomes dialogue in the public sphere
about difficult philosophical dilemmas and competing conceptions of the good but
without officially establishing any one version or abandoning a skeptical attitude toward
them. In contrast to radical plural democracy, a critical ethic always views difference as
an opportunity, not as something that should be subordinated to the "movement." In
contrast to discourse ethics, a critical ethic holds reason in check through the affirmation
of ambiguity and paradox; it also views the quest for transparency with suspicion.
The running hypothesis of this study has been that what and how we feel - our
aesthetic-affective response to existence — preconditions our capacity to act in ways that
are ethical. Although the cultivation of anxiety, respect, and distance interrupt self-
identity they also increase the likelihood of inventing context sensitive strategies of
engagement fused with a receptivity to the other. Certain feelings do not constitute the
subject but allow it to be put into question in ways that render an affirmative relation with
otherness possible. The precondition for this is an experience of the indetermination of
the borders of the self. Although it cannot be absolutely guaranteed, specific aesthetic-
affective experiences produce receptive, open, generous, and critical "subjects" capable of
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aftlnning the other without having a ground of absolute support. The experience of the
tensions involved in the formation of the self, one's that are likely to be marginalized or
denied through the emphasis on the "narrative self." are important for ethics. 5 My hope
is that a different self is possible (one that does not need to completely secure its identity)
and that anxiety, respect, and the pathos of distance will release new moral sources in our
lives.
6
B. Birth of the Subject; Death of the Citizen
Modern political thought grounds itselfon new privileges granted to the subject. The
invention of the subject is a modern event. Descartes secured the certainty of the subject
5The narrative self appears in Benhabib's Situating the SW/and Charles Taylor's
Sources ofthe Self: The Making ofModern Identity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
1 ress, 1 989). I take issue with both of their normative visions of the self. For Benhabib
"the identity of the self is constituted by a narrative unity, which integrates what T' can do
have done and will accomplish with what you expect of 'me,' interpret my acts and
intentions to mean, wish for me in the future, etc" (5). For Taylor, we want our lives to
have meaning and "grasp our lives in a narrative" (47). Taylor again: "We understand
ourselves inescapably in narrative" (51). In my view, narratives lend an illusory coherence
to the self. Contingency, paradox, and incoherence seem to be more probable
characteristics ol the self. Both Benhabib and Taylor seem to be reacting to the problem of
meaning. The need for the narrative unity of the self could be viewed as one of the possible
responses to its lack and the anxiety that produces. The absence of a coherent narrative of
the self seems to be precisely what allowed the non-Jewish King of Denmark to where the
Jewish star when the Nazis came to deport the Jews. See Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report
on the Banality ofEvil
,
(New York: Penguin, 1963). Coherent narratives of the self,
especially if there fictionality is forgotten, may stand in the way of a just response to the
other. It is impossible to know whether he would he have responded similarly if he had a
strong sense of his identity.
6
Anxiety, respect, and the pathos of distance are non-projective emotions. Fear,
despair, hope, desire would be projective ones and are incompatible with a critical ethic.
The ethico-political potential of the interpersonal emotions of friendship and love would be
worthy objects of future inquiry.
134
and established it as its own ground. This philosophical moment set the stage for major
currents in modem philosophy and leaked into the realm of politics in ways that are still
in force today. Modem political thought sought to design institutions capable of
defending the individual subject from state interference. The realm of politics was not
conceived in its classical manner as face to face relations between citizens in the public
sphere or as public argumentation about competing conceptions of the good life. Rather,
politics became the search tor neutral rules and institutions that would mediate the
interactions between subjects. Concomitant with institutions conceived for self-
preservation, the distinction between public and private created a space where the subject
could retreat when his life choices were questioned or challenged.
Social contract theory (Hobbes in particular) attempted to neutralize all conflict by
breaking the connection between the political order and any one conception of the
summun bonum or good life. But the prioritization of the search for neutrality in the
realm of politics was disastrous for the cultivation of citizenship. The citizen was
increasingly displaced; the belief in the human as a political animal seemed to be a relic
of bygone age. Although he became a subject empowered with choice, he was also
dependent on the state. In the political sphere, he became a passive petitioner, a
supplicant, forced to bend his knee to the state, prevented or disabled from enacting the
promise of his own autonomy. Lacking any goal higher than itself, the modern state
manipulated the movements of subjects through pain and pleasure for the purposes of its
and their self-preservation; it had no higher aim other than mere survival. Any goal
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higher than mere life would risk infringing upon subjective autonomy. The possibility of
a conception of citizenship as the experience of freedom, indetermination, receptive
negotiation, public argumentation, and conflict was increasingly displaced by the political
preoccupation with subjective sovereignty and the de-politicizing institutions designed to
protect it.
C. Death of the Subject; Birth of the Citizen
I have sought to revitalize the moral citizen through the intensification of the "death" of
the subject. Modem political thought announces the birth of subjectivity and it
paradoxically also marks the progressive intensification of its decline. The decline of
subjectivity can be found not at the end of the modem age but at its birth, precisely at the
moment when its political stabilization is most urgent. I did not go to Descartes to chart
the interruption of the subject but to three authors who are reputed to elevate it politically:
Hobbes (self-preservation as summon bonum), Kant (sovereign subjectivity), and
Nietzsche ("will to power"). As I have demonstrated, these interpretations overlook the
various earthquakes already shaking the self-identical subject: Hobbesian anxiety,
Kantian respect, and Nietzschean pathos of distance. These earthquakes in the subject
also displace the traditional way morality has been conceived in ways that can infuse a
new Left with an alternative conceptualization the relation between ethics and politics . 7
One could also look elsewhere for the destabilization of the subject. One could look
to the Copemican de-centering of the earth, the Kantian inaccessibility of the thing-in-itself,
the death of the Christian God (Nietzsche), the unconscious tumor haunting the self-
identical subject (Freud), and the death of the subject in writing (Derrida). These deep
convulsions in the ground of the subject and the subject as ground have undermined its
confidence and self-certainty. As Stephen White suggests, "one of the entities most thrown
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As opposed to trying to rescue the subject, this study furthered its indictment in the
name of ethico-political citizenship conceived as an experience of ethical
indetermination. The "subject" that is the result of this study must work against
everything that attempts to deny its indeterminacy, oppose everything that tries to deny
its rightful claim to anxiety, and reject everything that tries to deny its singularity through
the imposition of a recognizable identity. Both the indetermination of identity and
ethico-political undecidability raise the stakes of ethico-political practice because they
expand the terrain within which we must act, and more importantly, cultivate a critical
reflexiveness out of the concern for responsiveness to the other.
In my defense of the ethico-political potential of anxiety, respect, and ethical feelings
in Nietzsche, my study has pointed to some alternative possibilities for subjectivity. I put
into question the assumption that feelings are always bound to an object of
representation. The future (Hobbes), the moral law as a law of freedom (Kant), and the
experience of suffering (Nietzsche) dislodge the necessary connection between the stable
subject and its construction of objects of knowledge that it can master. Putting this
assumption into question threatens the classical pillars of subjectivity: self-
consciousness, representation, and will.
Feeling, then, does not depend on the mental acts that secure subjectivity but only
occurs when the order of representation breaks down. This seems to me precisely what
into question has been our conception of the human subject"; "Weak Ontology and Liberal
Political Reflection," Political Theory
,
Vol. 25 No. 4 1997, 503. The paradox was that the
subject was simultaneously constituted and undermined at the same moment.
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the feeling of anxiety, the philosophical feelings excellence, marks.' It would be the
feeling of the "otherwise," the feeling of the indeterminate force of possibility. The
substantiality of materiality vanishes and the weight of indeterminacy interrupts the
grounding requirements of subjectivity. The self is unable to secure itself through
projections that link the will to objects of representation.
Feeling is not about mastery hut receptivity and vulnerability, precisely what is
foreclosed in instrumental relations that cement the subject/object opposition into the
consciousness of subjects as the only possible form human interaction can take. As
Adorno put it in Minima Moralia, "tenderness between humans is nothing other than the
consciousness of the possibility of non-instrumental relationships...''
9
Humans incapable
of transcending instrumental ones, for Adorno, suffered from the "sickness of contact."' 0
The experience of friendship, or what Derrida calls aimance, excludes all violence; it is
the non-instrumental relation to the other."
Anxiety, respect, and the pathos of distance are not formulas but are groundless
feelings that keep spaces open in both the structure of subjectivity and in how she
8According to Nietzsche in a section of "The Struggle Between Science and Wisdom"
where he paraphrases Socrates: "anxiety concerning oneself becomes the soul of
philosophy." Philosophy and Truth, edited and translated by Breazeale, (Atlantic
Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1979), 135.
9Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem Beschaedigten Lehen, (Berlin u.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1951), 61, my translation.
l0
Ibid., 62.
1 Derrida, "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism," 83.
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responds to the riddles of existence. These feelings potentially uproot the presuppositions
that fuel fundamentalist aggression. The proper mix of anxiety, respect, and the pathos of
distance allow us to appreciate the unknown, may prevent us from thinking ethical
dilemmas have unambiguous solutions, permit us to affirm things that may threaten the
stability of our identity, and may be the closest thing to an experience of justice. The
cultivation of aesthetic-affective dimensions of existence is my way to expand
responsibility, promote active citizenship, and affirm pluralization.
D. Shifting Ground
My reformulation of the ground for ethical conduct has sought to alter how ethics can
be justified and also seeks to heighten the experience of responsibility. In the sphere of
practice, there are no formulas, no clear paths, and no programs to follow. Following
single codes for practice reduces ethico-political practice to a tool, annihilates freedom,
and denies moral groundlessness. We will never have a ground for ethico-political
practice that relieves us from the burden of critically reworking their inter-relationship
over and over again.
Ethics is not about the positivity of rules. Ethico-political reflection can only take a
negative form; it should never lend any certainty to action. As Derrida puts it, as soon as
the negative form for ethics is converted into a positive certainty "one can be sure that
one is beginning to be deceived..." 12 The loss of the positivity of foundations does not
necessarily lead to license but makes the challenge of inventing practices responsive to
12
Derrida, The Other Heading, 81.
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the other an ongoing project. The critical negativity of imperatives of indetermination
and radical freedom become the only justifiable moral commands in a disenchanted age.
The challenge is to act and affirm the other in ways that do not violate groundlessness. A
responsible decision is more likely to occur if it is taken on a perpetually shifting ground.
It would be a mistake, however, to reject the use of all rules in all situations. While a
critical ethic favors the cultivation of aesthetic-affective dimensions of the self, it does
not reject juridical codes for conduct as such. It would be a dogmatic to do so. Although
I think Habermas is prone to go too far in this direction, he is correct to suggest that
Law is better understood as a functional complement to morality. As a positively
valid, legitimately enacted, and actionable, law can relieve the morally judging
and acting person of the considerable cognitive, motivational, and organizational
demands of a morality based entirely on individual conscience. Law can
compensate for the weaknesses of a highly demanding morality that — if we judge
from its empirical results — provides only cognitively indeterminate and
motivationally unreliable results. 13
Habermas may be right. But the danger here is that the relief law gives reduces, or even
paralyzes, thought. To suggest that the empirical results of law are necessarily more
reliable than morality overlooks the great deal of contingency (i.e. interpretation of the
meaning of the law and legal discretion) often involved in the implementation of law. As
long as the approach to rules is non-formulaic, compatible with freedom, and does not
destroy the necessity of cultivating the moral feelings that I valorize, I would be willing
to support Habermas's position.
13Habermas, The Inclusion ofthe Other , 257.
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E. Critical Ethic as Risk
A critical ethic opens foundations to perpetual interrogation. That can be risky or even
dangerous. We may fee! apathetic if we can longer justify our ethical positions with the
appeal to something absolute. We may feel an increasing sense of meaninglessness,
paralysis or resignation overtaking our lives. We may feel rage, anger, and despair. But
this loss can also be an opportunity to rethink the ways we try to justify our actions and
our lives. As my chapter on Nietzsche illustrated, it could mean leaving behind both the
violence to self and to other that marked the era of belief in meaning, a standpoint outside
of a particular perspective, God, and absolute foundations. The real danger is a politics of
revenge and blame that tends to result from the insistence of foundations at all costs; a
politics grounded on the rage against finitude.
As opposed to heightening despair, affirming groundlessness can produce a longing for
a better political life. For those who may be homesick for absolute ground, this may be
experienced as a permanent crisis. But a crisis can be good and healthy insofar as it
serves as a check on hubris. Perhaps this is what Nietzsche had in mind when he stated
that "a real crisis, and especially a great universal crisis, tends to make human beings
better and more warm hearted." 14 A critical ethic affirms the impossibility of finding
rules for ethics but keeps the Enlightenment project of the quest for universality and the
emancipatory ideal alive in imperatives of indetermination and in double contradictory
imperatives. The person who can think and act in such a way is simultaneously affirming
14Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as Educator," translated by Grey, Unfashionable
Observations, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 200.
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a critical ethic and he or she is a "free spirit” or a philosophical Californian with a
sympathy for earthquakes who can "maintain himself on insubstantial ropes and dance
even near abysses.” 15 Dancing is not formless raving but requires some rules and form;
but they have to be ones that are compatible with human freedom; ones compatible with
the art ofnuances that ethico-political reflection and action always involves.
15Nietzsche, Gay Science, 289-290.
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